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Social Security, Divorce, and the Scope of 
Federal Preemption 
MICHAEL T. FLANNERY† 
INTRODUCTION 
The time has come for Congress to recognize that there 
is no clear consensus among state courts with respect to the 
scope of the Social Security Act’s federal preemption of state 
property distribution laws upon divorce. Specifically, state 
courts are clearly at a loss as to what, if anything, Congress 
intends state courts to do with Social Security benefits when 
equitably dividing property of divorcing parties. State courts 
have intermittently grappled with the issue, albeit 
unsuccessfully, since 1960, when the U.S. Supreme Court 
first set parameters on the nature of the property interest 
held in Social Security benefits vis-à-vis state property 
distribution laws.1 Many commentators since then have 
anticipated similar resulting inequities in other federal 
 
† Judge George Howard, Jr. Distinguished Professor of Law, University of 
Arkansas at Little Rock, William H. Bowen School of Law. 
 1. See Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 611 (1960) (ruling that Social 
Security beneficiaries hold a non-contractual interest in benefits, which are not 
considered an accrued property right). 
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benefit contexts affected by state property distribution laws.2 
Even the U.S. Supreme Court has attempted to clarify the 
scope of federal preemption by analogizing decisions that 
address the same dilemma involving other federal benefits, 
such as railroad retirement benefits,3 ERISA benefits,4 life 
insurance benefits,5 military disability benefits,6 and even 
 
 2. See generally John H. Langbein, Destructive Federal Preemption of State 
Wealth Transfer Law in Beneficiary Designation Cases: Hillman Doubles Down 
on Egelhoff, 67 VAND. L. REV. 1665 (2014); Lawrence W. Waggoner, The Creeping 
Federalization of Wealth-Transfer Law, 67 VAND. L. REV. 1635 (2014); Leonard 
Bierman & John Hershberger, Federal Preemption of State Family Property Law: 
The Marriage of McCarty and Ridgway, 14 PACIFIC L.J. 27 (1982); Marilyn M. 
Cochran, The Effect of Divorce on ERISA-Regulated Life Insurance Benefits, 11 
BENEFITS L.J. 55 (1998); Debra A. Davis, The Next Generation of Preemption 
Cases: State Regulation of 401(K) Plans, 26 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 355 (2009); 
Michael T. Flannery, Military Disability Election and the Distribution of Marital 
Property Upon Divorce, 56 CATH. U. L. REV. 297 (2007); Aaron Klein, Divorce, 
Death, and Posthumous QDROS: When Is It Too Late for a Divorcee to Claim 
Pension Benefits Under ERISA?, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 1651 (2005); Katherine A. 
McAllister, A Distinction Without a Difference? ERISA Preemption and the 
Untenable Differential Treatment of Revocation-on-Divorce and Slayer Statutes, 
52 B.C. L. REV. 1481 (2011); William A. Reppy, Community and Separate Interests 
In Pensions and Social Security Benefits After Marriage of Brown and ERISA, 25 
UCLA L. REV. 417 (1978); James A. Riddle, Preemption of Reconcilable State 
Regulation: Federal Benefit Schemes v. State Marital Property Law, 34 HASTINGS 
L.J. 685 (1983); Jon H. Trudgeon, The Effects of Divorce Upon Qualified 
Retirement Benefits, 29 LABOR L.J. 786 (1978); Stanley W. Welsh & Franki J. 
Hargrave, Social Security Benefits at Divorce: Avoiding Federal Preemption to 
Allow Equitable Division of Property in Divorce, 20 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW. 
285 (2007). 
 3. See Railroad Retirement Act of 1974, 45 U.S.C. § 231 (2012); see also 
Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572 (1979) (finding that the Social Security 
Act preempts application of state property law). 
 4. See Employee Retirement Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (2012); 
see also Kennedy v. Plan Adm’r for Dupont Savs. & Inv. Plan, 555 U.S. 285, 285–
86 (2009) (regarding federal common law waiver as ineffective for divorce decrees 
not qualifying as a valid QDRO); Egelhoff v. Egelhoff ex rel Breiner, 532 U.S. 141, 
150 (2001) (holding that federal law preempts state laws regarding presumption 
of revocation upon divorce of non-probate assets). 
 5. See Federal Employees’ Group Life Insurance Act (“FEGLIA”) of 1954, 5 
U.S.C. § 8705(a) (2012); see also Hillman v. Maretta, 133 S. Ct. 1943, 1949–55 
(2013) (ruling that FEGLIA preempts state law provisions regarding life 
insurance designation). 
 6. See Uniformed Services Former Spouses’ Protection Act (“USFSPA”), 10 
U.S.C. § 1408 (2012); see also Howell v. Howell, 137 S. Ct. 1400 (2017); Mansell 
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the inheritance rights of posthumously-conceived children.7 
Nevertheless, states sharply disagree over the 
analogousness of the specific benefits and the applicability of 
the Court’s reasoning to the Social Security context.8 It is 
confounding, then, why Congress continues to idly observe 
the guessing game that persists among state appellate courts 
with respect to how Congress intends federal Social Security 
benefits to be considered in state divorce proceedings, when 
its idleness comes at the expense of divorcing parties and 
stands in stark contrast to the aims of its own federal benefit 
scheme. 
In May 2017, the U.S. Supreme Court offered some 
insight into Congress’s intent with respect to the scope of 
federal preemption—at least in the narrow context of 
military disability benefits—in Howell v. Howell.9 The 
Court’s decision is instructive in its dicta, but it is by no 
means directive for state courts considering the classification 
and distribution of Social Security benefits upon divorce, in 
light of its limited scope and arguably distinguishable 
context. Therefore, until Congress expressly clarifies the 
scope of federal preemption under the Social Security Act, 
state appellate courts will continue to emulsify the Social 
Security Act in an effort to equitably divide marital property 
in accordance with their respective state property 
distribution laws. Although this may provide equity between 
divorcing spouses within an individual state, the continued 
accretion of the Social Security Act only exacerbates the lack 
of uniformity among states and the inequity between 
 
v. Mansell, 490 U.S. 581 (1989); McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 210, 220–36 
(1981). 
 7. See MODEL ACT GOVERNING ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY (AM. 
BAR ASS’N 2008), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/
family_law_quarterly/family_flq_artmodelact.authcheckdam.pdf. 
 8. See, e.g., Gray v. Gray, 101 S.W.3d 816, 827 (Ark. 2003) (quoting Skelton 
v. Skelton, 5 S.W.3d 2, 4–5 (Ark. 1999)) (“Because the purposes of social security 
and the [Civil Service Retirement System] are fundamentally different, they are 
not interchangeable.”). 
 9. See discussion infra Section III.A.1. 
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divorcing spouses of different states, which seems to 
contradict Congress’s intent for the equitable and uniform 
execution of the Social Security Act. Therefore, it is time for 
Congress to prioritize its goals by clarifying its intent 
regarding the scope of federal preemption of Social Security 
benefits. 
State courts are obligated to equitably divide property 
upon divorce within the framework of federal preemption, as 
prescribed in the Social Security Act. In the effort to apply 
their respective state laws without violating the Supremacy 
Clause of the U.S. Constitution, state courts have now 
adopted no less than seven different interpretations of the 
proper scope of federal preemption.10 This lack of uniformity 
seemingly defies the federal Social Security scheme that 
Congress intended. Therefore, Congress must act now to 
clarify its intent with respect to how, if at all, state courts 
may consider federal Social Security benefits when equitably 
dividing marital property upon divorce. 
Part I of this Article describes the competing 
relationship between the Social Security Act and the 
respective state property distribution schemes relevant to 
divorce. Both legal bases are applicable to the equitable 
division of marital property, and state courts must negotiate 
the intersection of these two governing bodies of law within 
the context of federal preemption. Part I simply sets out the 
parameters within which this problem arises, which forms 
the basis for the need for Congress to clarify its intent on this 
issue within the context of Social Security. 
There are other federal benefit contexts within which a 
similar problem has arisen that are relevant to the context 
of Social Security.11 The most relevant of other contexts are 
railroad retirement benefits12 and military disability 
 
 10. See infra notes 127–33 and accompanying text. 
 11. See supra notes 3–7 and accompanying text. 
 12. Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572 (1979). 
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benefits.13 These contexts offer insight into Congress’s 
probable intent with respect to the scope of federal 
preemption of Social Security benefits.14 However, each 
federal benefit context has its own statutory language and 
unique considerations, and even the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
conclusions about the nature of the respective federal benefit 
schemes is not necessarily determinative of Social Security. 
The law relevant to these arguably analogous contexts and 
the dilemma of its applicability to Social Security also is 
discussed in Part I. 
The variation among state courts resulting from this 
dilemma in the context of Social Security is fully discussed 
in Part II. The purpose of federal preemption of Social 
Security is threefold: to provide financial security to qualified 
beneficiaries, equity to divorcing parties, and a uniform 
application of relevant benefits.15 However, Part II will 
describe the wide variation of state court approaches to the 
consideration of Social Security benefits upon divorce. These 
range from permitting the offset of marital property to the 
total preemption of any consideration of benefits in equitably 
dividing marital property. Part II describes all seven of the 
various approaches, each based on the states’ respective 
interpretations of Congress’s intent regarding the scope of 
federal preemption within this context.16 
 
 13. See generally Howell v. Howell, 137 S. Ct. 1400 (2017); Mansell v. Mansell, 
490 U.S. 581 (1989); McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 210 (1981). 
 14. See infra text accompanying notes 53-72, 448–90, 495–506. 
 15. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.110(d) (2017) (including “[n]ationwide uniformity of 
standards” as a part of the purpose of the program). See generally Ronen Perry, 
Differential Preemption, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 821 (2011) (recognizing the need for 
uniformity in preemption of maritime law, specifically, but generally asserting 
that uniformity should not be an end in itself, but a means to protect federal 
interests, and concluding that when parties can select applicable law, uniformity 
becomes less important); Susan J. Stabile, Preemption of State Law by Federal 
Law: A Task for Congress or the Courts?, 40 VILL. L. REV. 1 (1995) (discussing 
uniformity as a goal of federal preemption that may be harmful when federal 
interests become frustrated by it). 
 16. See infra Part II. 
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The consequences of this variation are neither 
uniformity among state courts nor equity between or among 
divorcing spouses. To provide such uniformity, Congress 
must expressly clarify its intent for the scope of federal 
preemption under the Social Security Act. In Part III, I will 
discuss the U.S. Supreme Court’s May 2017 decision in 
Howell v. Howell, in which the Court provided, in dicta, its 
own interpretation of Congress’s intent regarding the scope 
of federal preemption, albeit in the arguably analogous 
context of military disability benefits.17 The Court in Howell 
concluded that Congress’s likely intent is that federal 
preemption be “total” in scope. I will discuss the basis for the 
Court’s conclusion in Part III. 
I also will discuss in Part III the effect that “total 
preemption” will have on the states that adopt the various 
approaches described in Section II.B. Such restrictions may 
result in uniformity among states, but this will have 
consequences for state legislative and judicial authorities to 
fulfill their obligations to enact and apply statutory schemes 
for equitably dividing marital property—even marital 
property other than Social Security. Thus, congressional 
clarification may provide uniformity among states, but only 
at the expense of equity between divorcing spouses. I will 
discuss the parameters of these consequences for state 
legislatures and divorcing spouses in Part III. 
Notwithstanding the relevance and significance of the 
Court’s dicta in Howell, congressional clarification is 
necessary because of the arguably limited context of Howell 
and a long history of other U.S. Supreme Court decisions that 
have distinguished benefits in other contexts when faced 
with state courts attempting to equitably divide Social 
Security benefits in divorce. After all, it is from the decisions 
in other federal contexts from which the debate over the 
proper scope of federal preemption of Social Security benefits 
first began to fragment. In Part III, I will explain the specific 
 
 17. See infra Section III.A. 
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need for congressional clarification in the Social Security 
context. 
Without congressional clarification of the intended scope 
of federal preemption of Social Security, state courts will 
continue to fragment the application of federal law by 
interpreting the Social Security Act in various ways that 
allow state courts to apply state property distribution laws 
to account for Social Security benefits in the equitable 
division of marital property. And, if the U.S. Supreme Court 
is correct in its dicta in Howell—that Congress likely 
intended the federal preemption of Social Security to be 
“total” in scope—then absent congressional clarification, the 
majority of states will continue to usurp congressional intent 
regarding the extent to which federal law should preempt 
conflicting state law governing the distribution of Social 
Security benefits upon divorce. 
I. THE CONFLICT BETWEEN FEDERAL AND STATE LAW 
GOVERNING THE DISTRIBUTION OF SOCIAL SECURITY 
BENEFITS UPON DIVORCE 
The critical issue addressed in this Article is not simply 
whether federal or state law should govern the distribution 
of Social Security benefits upon divorce. The Social Security 
Act makes clear that Congress intends federal law to govern 
the administration of this federal benefit scheme, and there 
are no state courts that suggest otherwise. Rather, the 
critical issue that warrants congressional clarification is the 
extent to which federal law should preempt otherwise 
applicable state law governing the equitable distribution of 
marital property. Even more specifically, as state courts 
continue to try to negotiate the ambiguous parameters of 
federal law so as to constitutionally reconcile the federal 
scheme with otherwise applicable state property distribution 
laws, the confounding issue has become whether the scope of 
federal law should extend so far as to preempt state law that 
otherwise is applicable to property other than Social Security 
insofar as the application of state law to such property may 
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do significant damage to the federal plan.18 To assess the 
factors that bear on this issue, we must first understand the 
dynamics and purposes of each of the competing bodies of 
law—the federal Social Security Act and the respective state 
property distribution schemes—and the nature and 
necessity of their coexistence. 
A. State Law 
Generally, issues of domestic relations, including divorce 
and commonly related claims for property distribution, 
support, and custody, are governed by state courts applying 
state law.19 Notwithstanding the basic distinctions between 
community property and common law jurisdictions,20 with 
respect to the distribution of property, each state employs its 
own statutory distributive scheme to ensure equity between 
the parties. Relevant to the distribution of Social Security 
benefits is the issue of whether such benefits are classified 
as “marital” or “separate” property. 
All state statutory schemes typically define any property 
as “marital” or “separate”—and, thereby, generally divisible 
 
 18. See, e.g., Litz v. Litz, 288 S.W.3d 753, 758 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009) (ruling that 
the trial court could consider parties’ Social Security benefits in determining 
equitable distribution of property, but not to the extent that it would have 
material impact on federal scheme). The court ultimately held that the wife’s 
proposed consideration of Social Security as hypothetical value that offset Civil 
Service Retirement System benefits would materially impact relatively equal and 
equitable division of property. Id. 
 19. See In re Burrus, 136 U.S. 586, 593–94 (1890); In re Marriage of Crook, 
813 N.E.2d 198, 202 (Ill. 2004) (quoting Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572, 
581 (1979)) (“‘[t]he whole subject of the domestic relations of husband and wife, 
parent and child, belongs to the laws of the States, and not to the laws of the 
United States’ . . . [h]owever . . . when state family law has come into conflict with 
a federal statute, this Court has limited review under the Supremacy Clause to 
a determination whether Congress has ‘positively required by direct enactment’ 
that state law be pre-empted.”). Before state law is preempted, it “must do ‘major 
damage’ to ‘clear and substantial’ federal interests.” In re Crook, 813 N.E.2d at 
202. 
 20. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Brane, 908 P.2d 625, 628 (Kan. Ct. App. 1995) 
(discussing difference in applicability of Hisquierdo to common law and 
community property states). 
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or not divisible—and prescribe rules for the division of either 
form of property upon divorce. In applying these rules, most 
state statutory schemes prescribe statutory considerations 
or “factors” to be employed by the court in determining an 
equitable division of property.21 The factors most commonly 
relevant to a court’s consideration of Social Security benefits 
typically include: the value of any property interests of the 
parties, the current or future economic circumstances of the 
parties, or any other factor that the court deems necessary 
or appropriate to determine a fair and equitable division of 
property.22 Absent any federal question or constitutional 
requirement that mandates uniformity on a specific domestic 
relations issue,23 each state has a constitutional right to 
define the details of its own rules relevant to marriage and 
divorce.24 Thus, there is a presumption against federal 
preemption of domestic relations matters, including the 
distribution of marital property because historically, this 
matter has been relegated to the authority of state courts.25 
In analyzing whether there is sufficient conflict for 
federal preemption to apply, a court must assess whether the 
application of existing state law encroaches on the federal 
interest that Congress is seeking to protect, and not vice-
versa. Congress is not limited by existing state laws; rather, 
existing state laws may be preempted by Congress based on 
the federal interests involved and the extent to which 
existing state law conflicts with those interests. The extent 
of the conflict will determine the scope of the preemption. As 
 
 21. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 8–205(b) (West 2017) (listing 
required considerations for grant of award or transfer of ownership of interest in 
property). 
 22. The final factor is commonly referred to as a “catch-all” provision. Id. § 8–
205(b)(11). 
 23. See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2593–2608 (2015) (holding 
that state law prohibiting same-sex marriage violated equal protection). 
 24. Umber v. Umber, 591 P.2d 299, 301 (Okla. 1979). 
 25. Barber v. Barber, 62 U.S. 582, 584 (1858); see also Egelhoff v. Egelhoff ex 
rel. Breiner, 532 U.S. 141, 151 (2001). 
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described by the U.S. Supreme Court, “[o]n the rare occasion 
when state family law has come into conflict with a federal 
statute, this Court has limited review under the Supremacy 
Clause to a determination [of] whether Congress has 
‘positively required by direct enactment’ that state law be 
pre-empted.”26 To provide a sufficient conflict, “[s]tate family 
and family-property law must do ‘major damage’ to ‘clear and 
substantial’ federal interests before the Supremacy Clause 
will demand that state law be overridden.”27 As noted 
previously, whether state statutory schemes sufficiently 
conflict with federal law respecting Social Security is not the 
issue—all courts accept that they do. Rather, the issue is, to 
what extent does Congress intend that state law must be 
preempted so as not to violate federal law? To determine this, 
we must first look to the nature of the federal interests 
involved. 
B. Federal Law 
The relevant federal law in the discussion is the Social 
Security Act (“Act”), which President Franklin D. Roosevelt 
signed into law on August 14, 1935.28 The Act created a 
highly regulated social insurance benefit program designed 
to ensure a continuing source of income to retired workers, 
age sixty-five or older.29 
Since 1977, divorced spouses are eligible to receive Social 
Security benefits on account of a former spouse. The current 
 
 26. Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572, 581 (1979) (quoting Wetmore v. 
Markow, 196 U.S. 68, 77 (1904)). 
 27. Id. (quoting United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341, 352 (1966)); see also 
Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 449 (2005) (quoting N.Y. State 
Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins., 514 U.S. 645, 655 
(1995)) (“In areas of traditional state regulation, we assume that a federal statute 
has not supplanted state law unless Congress has made such an intention ‘clear 
and manifest.’”). 
 28. Pub. L. No. 74-271, 49 Stat. 620 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 402 
(2012)). 
 29. Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 402 (2012). 
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provision for eligibility is summarized as follows: A divorced 
husband or divorced wife of an individual who is entitled to 
old-age or disability insurance benefits is entitled to spousal 
insurance benefits if he or she: 
(1) has applied for such benefits;30 
(2) is at least 62 years old;31 
(3) is not married;32 
(4) is not entitled to his or her own primary insurance benefit in an 
amount equal to or greater than one-half of the primary insurance 
amount that is due to the former spouse;33 and 
(5) had been married to his or her spouse for a period of 10 years 
immediately before their divorce.34 
Within the Act, Congress reserved for itself the exclusive 
authority to alter, amend, or repeal any of its provisions.35 
Because of this exclusive authority, the U.S. Supreme Court 
has held that Social Security beneficiaries have a non-
contractual interest in Social Security benefits and that 
these benefits are not to be considered as an accrued property 
right.36 In addition, Section 407(a) of the Act prohibits the 
 
 30. Id. § 402(b)(1)(A), (c)(1)(A). 
 31. Id. § 402(b)(1)(B), (c)(1)(B). 
 32. Id. § 402(b)(1)(C), (c)(1)(C). 
 33. Id. § 402(b)(1)(D), (c)(1)(D). 
 34. Id. § 416(d)(1), (d)(4). 
 35. Id. §1304. 
 36. Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 609–10 (1960); In re Marriage of Kelly, 
9 P.3d 1046, 1047 (Ariz. 2000) (holding Social Security benefits may not be 
divided as community property); Skelton v. Skelton, 5 S.W.3d 2, 4 (Ark. 1999) 
(“Congress has excluded from its definition of marital property any benefits from 
social security”); In re Marriage of Morehouse, 121 P.3d 264, 265 (Colo. App. 2005) 
(“a trial court cannot distribute or divide Social Security benefits as marital 
property”); Mahoney v. Mahoney, 681 N.E.2d 852, 855–56 (Mass. 1997) (holding 
that Social Security benefits are not marital property in light of Congress’s 
expressed intent to preempt an entire area of law when providing for divorced 
spouses under limited circumstances); Wolff v. Wolff, 929 P.2d 916, 920–21 (Nev. 
1996) (finding that Social Security benefits cannot be divided as community 
property); Neville v. Neville, 791 N.E.2d 434, 436 (Ohio 2003) (citing Hisquierdo 
for proposition that federal law preempts state law that authorizes equitable 
distribution of Social Security benefits); In re Marriage of Swan, 720 P.2d 747, 
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assignment of benefits: 
The right of any person to any future payment under this 
subchapter shall not be transferable or assignable, at law or in 
equity, and none of the moneys paid or payable or rights existing 
under this subchapter shall be subject to execution, levy, 
attachment, garnishment, or other legal process, or to the operation 
of any bankruptcy or insolvency law.37 
Thus, Congress expressly forbids the use of any legal process 
to dispose of a party’s right to future Social Security 
interests.38 
In 1975, pursuant to Section 659 of the Act, Congress 
carved out a narrow exception to this prohibition—for 
collection of past due child support or alimony.39 The current 
provision states: 
Notwithstanding any other provision of law (including section 
407) . . . , moneys (the entitlement to which is based upon 
remuneration for employment) due . . . to any individual . . . shall 
be subject . . . to withholding . . . to enforce the legal obligation of 
the individual to provide child support or alimony.40 
In 1977, Congress narrowly defined the type of “alimony” 
 
750 (Or. 1986) (“[i]ncluding the value of . . . social security benefits . . . in a 
division of marital property . . . is contrary to the Social Security Act”); In re 
Marriage of Zahm, 978 P.2d 498, 502 (Wash. 1999) (“federal statutes secure social 
security benefits as the separate indivisible property of the spouse who earned 
them”). 
 37. 42 U.S.C. § 407(a). 
 38. Courts differ as to whether a divorce proceeding qualifies as a legal 
process to dispose of a party’s right to future Social Security interests. Gross v. 
Gross, 8 S.W.3d 56, 57–58 (Ky. Ct. App. 1999) (“mere consideration of a [non-
prospective Social Security] benefit did not constitute a transfer, assignment, or 
‘other legal process’ as prohibited by the anti-alienation provisions of the Act”); 
Depot v. Depot, 2006 ME 25, 893 A.2d 995, 1001 (holding that Social Security Act 
does not include divorce as qualified legal process); Jackson v. Sollie, 141 A.3d 
1122, 1136 (Md. 2016) (holding that consideration of Social Security as equitable 
factor in distribution of property is not a qualified legal process that transfers 
property). 
 39. 42 U.S.C. § 659(a). 
 40. Id. 
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that may be assigned under Section 659.41 The current 
provision defines “alimony” as excluding “any payment or 
transfer of property or its value by an individual to the 
spouse or a former spouse of the individual in compliance 
with any community property settlement, equitable 
distribution of property, or other division of property 
between spouses or former spouses.”42 The U.S. Supreme 
Court has broadly construed this prohibition.43 Thus, there 
exists an inherent conflict between the federal law expressly 
limiting a state court’s authority to assign Social Security 
benefits in a dissolution proceeding and a state court’s 
obligation to equitably divide marital property upon divorce. 
Despite this conflict, as will be discussed fully in Section 
III.A, there is at least one degree of uniformity among states 
insofar as the scope of federal preemption of Social Security 
benefits is concerned: all states agree that federal law 
preempts state courts from directly dividing Social Security 
benefits when equitably dividing property upon divorce.44 
Notwithstanding this clear prohibition, however, neither 
Congress nor the U.S. Supreme Court has clearly concluded 
that federal law preempts a state court from either: (1) 
offsetting marital property other than Social Security 
benefits to compensate for the inequitable receipt of Social 
Security benefits resulting from federal preemption; or (2) 
considering each parties’ receipt of Social Security benefits 
as an equitable factor within the state property distribution 
scheme when determining an equitable division of property 
upon divorce. 
Consequently, state courts have adopted these 
approaches—and variations thereof—in an effort to 
compensate divorcing parties who suffer the inequity 
arguably resulting from the prohibition on dividing Social 
 
 41. Id. § 662(c) (repealed 1996). 
 42. Id. § 659(i)(3)(B)(ii). 
 43. See Philpott v. Essex Cty. Welfare Bd., 409 U.S. 413, 417 (1973). 
 44. See infra Section III.A. 
14 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66 
Security benefits upon divorce.45 And, until Congress 
clarifies its intent with respect to the scope of federal 
preemption in this area, the disparity among states, and the 
resulting inequity for divorcing parties, will only continue. 
State appellate courts are not without precedent in 
determining which of the state approaches Congress likely 
intended. The U.S. Supreme Court has addressed the scope 
of federal preemption in the context of other federal benefit 
plans46 and has analogized those contexts to the Social 
Security context.47 Thus, there is some basis by which to 
narrow (or broaden) the scope of federal preemption in the 
context of Social Security. However, many state courts find a 
relevant distinction between the Social Security context and 
the contexts of other federal benefits—either within the 
express language of the federal acts governing the respective 
benefits,48 or by the very nature of the federal benefits, 
themselves49—such that there is reason to hold that other 
federal benefit plans are not sufficiently analogous to the 
federal Social Security plan to be determinative. 
The primary and original authority on the issue of the 
 
 45. See infra Section II.B. 
 46. See supra notes 3–7 and accompanying text. 
 47. See Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572, 581–90 (addressing scope of 
federal preemption in Railroad Retirement context). 
 48. In re Marriage of Kelly, 9 P.3d 1046, 1049 n.3 (Ariz. 2000) (noting that 
anti-attachment language in Social Security Act is similar, but not identical, to 
that of the Railroad Retirement Act); Depot v. Depot, 2006 ME 25, 893 A.2d 995, 
999 (distinguishing that 45 U.S.C. § 231(m)(b)(2)—railroad retirement—and 10 
U.S.C. § 1408(c)(1)—military disability—countermanded Hisquierdo and 
McCarty by making benefits subject to community property law, but that 
Congress did not do same for Social Security); In re Marriage of Swan, 720 P.2d 
747, 751 (Or. 1986) (“Because the antiassignment provisions of 45 USC § 231m 
are legally indistinguishable from the antiassignment provisions of 42 USC § 
407(a), we have no hesitancy in concluding that the Hisquierdo rule applies 
here.”). 
 49. See, e.g., Gray v. Gray, 101 S.W.3d 816, 827 (Ark. 2003) (quoting Skelton 
v. Skelton, 5 S.W.3d 2, 4–5 (Ark. 1999)) (“Because the purposes of social security 
and the [Civil Service Retirement System] are fundamentally different, they are 
not interchangeable.”). 
2018] SOCIAL SECURITY AND DIVORCE 15 
scope of federal preemption of federal benefits is Hisquierdo 
v. Hisquierdo.50 In Hisquierdo, the U.S. Supreme Court 
considered whether retirement benefits received under the 
federal Railroad Retirement Act of 1974 could be either 
attached or offset with other property during state divorce 
proceedings.51 The Court held that either attachment of 
benefits or an offsetting award in a state divorce action would 
impermissibly conflict with the Railroad Retirement Act and, 
therefore, prohibited a state court from either attaching or 
offsetting Railroad Retirement benefits upon divorce.52 The 
Court reached its decision by analogizing Railroad 
Retirement benefits with Social Security benefits as non-
contractual benefits in which the parties hold no property 
interest.53 Therefore, since Hisquierdo, many courts have 
held that the Court’s reasoning with respect to Railroad 
Retirement benefits equally applies to Social Security 
benefits.54 
 
 50. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. at 572. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. at 574–77. 
It is for Congress to decide how these finite funds are to be allocated. 
The statutory balance is delicate. Congress has fixed an amount thought 
appropriate to support an employee’s old age and to encourage the 
employee to retire. Any automatic diminution of that amount frustrates 
the congressional objective. By reducing benefits received, it discourages 
the divorced employee from retiring. And it provides the employee with 
an incentive to keep working, because the former spouse has no 
community property claim to salary earned after the marital community 
is dissolved. Section 231m shields the distribution of benefits from state 
decisions that would actually reverse the flow of incentives Congress 
originally intended. 
Id. at 585. 
 53. Id. at 575 (“Like Social Security, and unlike most private pension plans, 
railroad retirement benefits are not contractual.”). 
 54. In re Marriage of Crook, 813 N.E.2d 198, 202 (Ill. 2004); In re Marriage of 
Boyer, 538 N.W.2d 293, 294–95 (Iowa 1995); In re Marriage of Brane, 908 P.2d 
625, 628 (Kan. Ct. App. 1995); Pongonis v. Pongonis, 606 A.2d 1055, 1058 (Me. 
1992); Rudden v. Rudden, 765 S.W.2d 719, 720 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989); Wolff v. Wolff, 
929 P.2d 916 (Nev. 1996); Olson v. Olson, 445 N.W.2d 1, 6–7 (N.D. 1989); In re 
Marriage of Zahm, 978 P.2d 498, 501 (Wash. 1999). But see Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 
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In response to the questions posed in Hisquierdo, 
Congress clarified its intent regarding the scope of the 
preemption of Railroad Retirement benefits when it 
amended the Railroad Retirement Act to allow distribution 
of certain retirement benefits in state divorce proceedings.55 
At the same time, Congress amended the Social Security Act 
to include Section 407(b), which functions similarly by 
providing exceptions to the anti-assignment clause of the 
Social Security Act for purposes of child support and 
alimony.56 Thus, many courts hold, just as Congress 
intended for Railroad Retirement benefits, that the 
exceptions for child support and alimony in Section 407 
represent the entirety of a state court’s authority to consider 
Social Security assets.57 
Subsequent to Hisquierdo, the federal benefit context 
that offers the most insight into what Congress likely 
intended with respect to Social Security benefits is military 
disability election under the Uniform Services Former 
Spouses Protection Act (USFSPA).58 Until 1981, state courts 
distributed federal military retirement monies according to 
their respective state distribution schemes. In 1981, the U.S. 
Supreme Court held, in McCarty v. McCarty, that federal law 
preempted state law with respect to the distribution of 
federal military retirement benefits upon divorce.59 The 
McCarty Court based its decision on the Court’s reasoning in 
 
at 602 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (“Unlike the Social Security Act, . . . the Railroad 
Retirement Act contains no express provision permitting Congress to terminate 
it.”) (internal citation omitted). 
 55. 45 U.S.C. § 231m(b)(2) (2012) (subjecting railroad retirement benefits to 
community property laws). 
 56. See 42 U.S.C. § 407(b) (2012). 
 57. Gray v. Gray, 101 S.W.3d 816, 827 (Ark. 2003); Gentry v. Gentry, 938 
S.W.2d 231, 232–33 (Ark. 1997); Johnson v. Johnson, 726 So. 2d 393, 394–95 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 1999). 
 58. See Uniformed Services Former Spouses’ Protection Act (“USFSPA”), 10 
U.S.C. § 1408 (2012). 
 59. McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 210 (1981). 
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Hisquierdo.60 
In direct response to the McCarty decision, in 1982, 
Congress enacted the USFSPA, which expressly authorized 
state courts to distribute disposable retired pay in divorce.61 
In doing so, however, state courts varied in their 
interpretation of the scope of their authority under the 
USFSPA.62 In 1989, in Mansell v. Mansell, the U.S. Supreme 
Court attempted to clarify the scope of state court authority 
under the USFSPA by holding that state court authority was 
limited to disposable marital property, which did not include 
the portion of retired pay that was waived in the election for 
disability pay, which the Court held was the separate 
property of the disabled military retiree.63 As a result of this 
limitation, some state courts began to offset the portion of 
military retirement pay that was waived to receive disability 
pay with other disposable marital property.64 Yet others held 
that the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution and the 
anti-assignment clause within the USFSPA preempted state 
courts from offsetting in this manner.65 
Since Mansell, state courts have varied in their 
interpretation and application of the scope of federal 
preemption in the context of military disability benefits in 
precisely the same way that states are now doing in the 
 
 60. Id. at 220–21. 
 61. 10 U.S.C. § 1408(a)(2)(C), (a)(4), (c)(1). 
 62. Flannery, supra note 2, at 297, 325–27 (describing pre-Mansell state court 
treatment of disability pay under the USFSPA). 
 63. Mansell v. Mansell, 490 U.S. 581, 581–82 (1989). 
 64. Flannery, supra note 2, at 329–59 (describing state court responses to 
Mansell). 
 65. See id. at 320–25. The Arizona Supreme Court in Howell recognized the 
majority view that most states allow a judge to use equitable remedies to prevent 
unilateral reduction of military retirement pay granted to a spouse in a divorce 
decree. See In re Marriage of Howell, 361 P.3d 936, 938–39 (Ariz. 2015). But see 
Mallard v. Burkart, 10–CA–02069–SCT, 95 So. 3d 1264, 1271 (Miss. 2012) 
(disagreeing that there is a clear majority view on this point). 
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context of Social Security benefits.66 It was not until 
December 2016, when the U.S. Supreme Court granted 
certiorari in the case of Howell v. Howell, that the Court 
seemed postured to resolve, once and for all, the issue of the 
scope of federal preemption of military disability benefits 
and, by arguable analogy, Social Security benefits in divorce 
cases.67 However, in its May 2017 decision, the U.S. Supreme 
Court addressed a much narrower issue and simply 
concluded that, insofar as military disability benefits are 
concerned, the outcome is governed by the Court’s decision 
in Mansell, which limited a state court’s authority to dispose 
of military disability pay, which it defined as separate 
property.68 In light of the state court variation of the 
interpretation and application of Mansell that already 
existed before the Howell decision, it would seem that the 
Court brought no greater clarity to the resolution of the issue 
in 2017 than it did in 1989. 
In fact, the Court expressly provided that it did not 
decide these broader matters in its opinion in Howell. 
Instead, the Court noted the narrow scope of the issue that 
it addressed and the limitation of its holding and, in dicta, 
expressly recognized the issue that remains—and the issue 
that is addressed in this article—which is: to what extent 
may state courts consider the effect of the scope of federal 
preemption of federal benefits, as prescribed in Mansell, 
when equitably dividing marital property upon divorce?69 
Before endeavoring to understand the effect of the Court’s 
decision in Howell on the distribution of property in the 
 
 66. See Flannery, supra note 2, at 329–59 (describing state variation in 
military disability election context on issue of offsetting). 
 67. Howell v. Howell, 361 P.3d 936 (Ariz. 2015), cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 546 
(U.S. Dec. 2, 2016) (No. 15 – 1031). 
 68. Howell v. Howell, 137 S. Ct. 1400 (2017). 
 69. Because the Court’s decision in Howell is clearly relevant and insightful 
in its dicta as to Congress’s likely intent on the broader issues addressed in this 
Article, a full discussion of the facts and specific holding in Howell, and the effect 
of the Court’s decision on the scope of federal preemption of Social Security 
benefits, is fully discussed in Part III. 
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Social Security context, however, we must first fully 
understand the variation among state courts that exists in 
that context and the reasoning that supports each of the 
various approaches that state courts adopt. 
II. RECONCILING THE SCOPE OF FEDERAL PREEMPTION OF 
SOCIAL SECURITY 
One of the primary purposes of the federal preemption of 
Social Security is the uniform distribution of benefits.70 
Although the Social Security Act applies in a variety of 
different contexts, dividing Social Security benefits upon 
divorce is clearly an area that presents a significant 
opportunity for application disparity, given that each state 
adopts its own definitions and criteria by which it classifies 
and distributes marital property.71 Thus, the issue is 
whether the uniformity that Congress intends is for all states 
to similarly distribute Social Security benefits under a broad 
scope of federal preemption or to similarly classify Social 
Security benefits as non-divisible separate property, but to 
provide equity through the application of state property 
distribution laws under a narrow scope of federal 
preemption. In negotiating this dilemma, state courts have 
adopted no less than seven different approaches to the 
treatment of Social Security benefits in divorce, each 
representing a different interpretation and application of 
federal preemption in light of the holding in Mansell.72 
Notwithstanding this wide disparity among the states, 
however, all states uniformly agree that federal law 
prohibits state courts from the direct distribution of Social 
Security benefits. 
 
 70. See supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
 71. See supra text accompanying notes 19–25. 
 72. See infra Part II. 
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A. State Uniformity on Prohibiting the Direct Distribution 
of Social Security Benefits 
Notwithstanding the diversity of state court approaches 
on the issue of the scope of federal preemption, there is a 
uniform starting point at which all courts agree: federal law 
preempts state courts from treating Social Security benefits 
as marital property that is directly divisible upon divorce.73 
The basis of this uniformity is the plain language of the anti-
assignment provision within Section 407 of the Social 
Security Act.74 The issue, however, is whether the scope of 
Section 407 is limited to a state court’s classification of Social 
Security benefits as divisible marital property or whether it 
extends to a court’s consideration of Social Security benefits 
within the broader equitable factors included within the 
applicable state property distribution provisions. The 
following section discusses the uniformity of state courts’ 
 
 73. Luna v. Luna, 608 P.2d 57, 60 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1979) (finding that Social 
Security disability benefits are the separate property of the receiving spouse); 
Gentry v. Gentry, 938 S.W.2d 231, 233 (Ark. 1997) (deeming unenforceable 
provision in property settlement agreement providing that wife receive one-half 
of future Social Security benefits paid to husband); In re Marriage of Hillerman, 
167 Cal. Rptr. 240, 243–44 (Ct. App. 1980) (recognizing implicit congressional 
intent that Social Security benefits are immune from division by state courts in 
marital dissolution proceedings); Johnson v. Johnson, 726 So. 2d 393, 394–95 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999); Sherry v. Sherry, 701 P.2d 265, 270 (Idaho Ct. App. 
1985); In re Marriage of Boyer, 538 N.W.2d 293, 295 (Iowa 1995); Cruise v. 
Cruise, 374 S.E.2d 882, 884 (N.C. Ct. App. 1989) (holding that Social Security 
benefits may not be disbursed in an equitable distribution award); Kluck v. 
Kluck, 1997 ND 41, 561 N.W.2d 263, 270 (N.D. 1997); Umber v. Umber, 591 P.2d 
299, 301–02 (Okla. 1979) (qualifying husband’s Social Security benefits as 
separate property and not subject to division as property settlement in a divorce 
proceeding); Kirk v. Kirk, 577 A.2d 976, 980 (R.I. 1990) (holding that “Social 
Security benefits are not to be treated by State courts as property”); Simmons v. 
Simmons, 634 S.E.2d 1, 3–4 (S.C. Ct. App. 2006); In re Marriage of Zahm, 978 
P.2d 498, 502 (Wash. 1999) (holding that trial court erred in characterizing Social 
Security benefits as community property but that the error was nevertheless 
harmless because court merely considered wife’s hypothetical benefits, in lieu of 
Social Security, when determining parties’ relative economic circumstances at 
dissolution, and did not directly apportion or indirectly offset Social Security 
benefits). 
 74. 42 U.S.C. § 407 (2012). 
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views on the plain language of the anti-assignment provision 
of Section 407 of the Social Security Act and the arguable 
limits of that provision and, thereby, the limits of state 
uniformity. 
1. The Plain Language of the Social Security Act 
The basis of the sole point of uniformity among states on 
the issue of the direct distribution of Social Security benefits 
is the plain language of Section 407 of the Social Security 
Act, which many states interpret from Hisquierdo as 
sufficient to denote the minimal parameter of federal 
preemption.75 All courts strictly adhere to this minimal 
parameter. For example, in Kirk v. Kirk, relying on the 
limitations prescribed by Hisquierdo, the Supreme Court of 
Rhode Island held that “Social Security benefits may be 
reached by a former spouse for alimony or child support but 
not for property division.”76 The court simply held that 
“[u]nder the supremacy clause of the U.S. Constitution, 
Article VI, [state] law must defer to the Social Security Act’s 
statutory scheme for allocating benefits.”77 
The Kirk court explained that Congress: restricted 
allocation of benefits to the recipient spouse under Section 
407 of the Act; carved out specific exceptions for child support 
and alimony in Section 659(a); limited the kind of alimony 
that is reachable by a non-participant spouse within the 
language of Section 662(c);78 and, held that “[i]n this way 
Federal law has carefully limited a divorced spouse’s ability 
to reach both past and future Social Security benefits.”79 
Relying on Congress’s express language, the court reasoned 
that “Social Security benefits are not to be treated by State 
 
 75. See, e.g., Kirk, 577 A.2d at 979–80 (prohibiting direct distribution). 
 76. Id. at 980. 
 77. Id. at 979 (citing Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572 (1979)). 
 78. See 42 U.S.C. § 662(c) (repealed 1996). 
 79. Kirk, 577 A.2d at 980. 
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courts as property.”80 Rather, 
Social Security benefits are intended to protect the Social Security 
beneficiary and those dependent upon him or her from the claims of 
creditors. . . . When a former spouse attempts to attach these 
benefits, then the former spouse becomes more like a creditor than 
a dependent. Therefore, these Social Security benefits may be 
reached by a former spouse for alimony or child support but not for 
property division.81 
Thus, for the court in Kirk, this comprised the entirety of 
the analysis; there was no basis by which the court would 
consider the broader issues of whether to offset other 
property or consider Social Security benefits as an equitable 
factor as a means of providing equity to the parties within 
the application of state property distribution laws. 
Likewise, in Cruise v. Cruise, the North Carolina Court 
of Appeals provided that “[t]he federal statutory scheme is 
complete. It provides certain benefits for divorced spouses 
which are not dependent on the idiosyncrasies of each state’s 
system of marital property law.”82 The court reasoned that if 
state courts were to divide Social Security benefits based 
upon state marital property law, it could distribute Social 
 
 80. Id. 
 81. Compare id. (internal citation omitted), with Evans v. Evans, 434 S.E.2d 
856, 860 (N.C. Ct. App. 1993) (“[W]here a wife seeks her husband’s Social Security 
benefits in the form of alimony, she is not a creditor as such; and the statute 
should not apply, therefore, to defeat her claim for alimony.”). 
 82. Cruise v. Cruise, 374 S.E.2d 882, 884 (N.C. Ct. App. 1989) (citing Richard 
v. Richard, 659 S.W.2d 746, 749 (Tex. App. 1983)); see also Sherry v. Sherry, 701 
P.2d 265, 270 (Idaho Ct. App. 1985) (holding that “the federal law embodied in 
the Social Security Act and the state community property laws are in actual 
conflict and . . . federal law preempts the application of the state laws.”); 
Loudermilk v. Loudermilk, 397 S.E.2d 905, 909–10 (W. Va. 1990) (recognizing 
that inequitable result of federal law “at first blush . . . appear[s] to defy logic,” 
but nevertheless holding that “specific provisions of federal law” provide “very 
strong, very clear, and very unambiguous language” that excludes Social Security 
from pool of marital property to be equitably divided). But see Phipps v. Phipps, 
864 P.2d 613 (Idaho 1993) (addressing the “consideration” question and 
subsequently allowing consideration of Social Security if it is not determined by 
an “actual” amount and offset with other property). 
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Security benefits to a spouse that neither applied nor 
qualified for such benefits, thereby doing major damage to 
the federal benefit scheme.83 Thus, some state courts, like 
those in Kirk and Cruise, resolve the issue of direct 
distribution on the basis of the plain language of Section 407 
of the Social Security Act and the unambiguous supremacy 
of federal law, which excludes Social Security benefits as 
divisible property under state law.84 
2. The Limitations of the Plain Language of the Social 
Security Act 
Beyond the narrowest scope of federal preemption, which 
is limited to the plain language of Section 407 and the direct 
division of Social Security benefits, ambiguity presents itself. 
Many state courts that adhere to the express prohibition on 
direct distribution of Social Security benefits nevertheless 
have recognized the limitations of the plain language of the 
Act and the natural progression of issues that result from 
those limitations. For example, when the issue of the division 
of Social Security benefits upon divorce first came before the 
Supreme Court of Oklahoma in 1979, in the case of Umber v. 
Umber, the principal question for the court was “whether . . . 
federal social security benefits received by the [husband] 
were his separate property and not subject to division as 
property settlement in a divorce proceeding.”85 In conformity 
 
 83. Cruise, 374 S.E.2d at 884. 
 84. Olson v. Olson, 445 N.W.2d 1, 11 (N.D. 1989); In re Marriage of Swan, 720 
P.2d 747, 751–52 (Or. 1986). 
Although an employee’s social security account increases in relative 
value over his working life, social security is not a property like a 
pension. It is a system of social insurance. To engraft upon the social 
security system a concept of accrued property rights would deprive it of 
the flexibility and boldness in adjustment to ever-changing conditions 
which it demands. 
Johnson v. Johnson, 726 So. 2d 393, 395 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (quoting Mack 
v. Mack, 323 N.W.2d 153, 156 n.1 (Wis. Ct. App. 1982)) (internal quotations 
omitted). 
 85. Umber v. Umber, 591 P.2d 299, 300 (Okla. 1979) (emphasis added). 
24 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66 
with the consensus that the court may not directly divide 
Social Security benefits as property settlement, the court 
reasoned that “Congress intended to specify the distribution 
of benefits between spouses at the time of divorce, thus 
placing such questions beyond state control.”86 But in so 
reasoning, the court held that “Social Security benefits are 
not an item to be considered in determination of property 
settlement . . . .”87 The court did not say that Social Security 
benefits may not be “divided,” or “distributed” or “allocated;” 
rather, it said that Social Security may not be “considered.”88 
Thus, the court’s language leaves open the question of the 
scope of the court’s consideration of Social Security benefits 
in dividing property. 
These broader questions that extend from such 
seemingly plain language under the Act arise from a 
combination of the factual distinctions that present 
themselves to the courts on an ad hoc basis, and the 
distinctions between the respective state property 
distribution schemes. For example, in Pleasant v. Pleasant, 
the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland held that “the 
Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution precludes states 
from intervening in the allocation of social security benefits. 
Consequently, social security benefits may not be considered 
marital property or be subject to distribution in any manner 
in a divorce proceeding.”89 
Based on the court’s reasoning (the supremacy of federal 
law) and the totality of its language (“in any manner”), its 
view of the scope of federal preemption as to the division of 
Social Security seems clear—it is totally excluded from 
property distribution. Nevertheless, the court added that, 
 
 86. Id. at 301 (emphasis added). 
 87. Id. at 302 (emphasis added). 
 88. Id. 
 89. Pleasant v. Pleasant, 632 A.2d 202, 206 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1993) 
(emphasis added); see also Huntley v. Huntley, 145 A.3d 607, 613–14 (Md. Ct. 
Spec. App. 2016) (“[T]he court did not have the power to divide [Social Security] 
benefits.”). 
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“[i]n an appropriate case, of course, it may be that a court 
could consider the fact that a party is receiving, or will 
receive, social security benefits, as ‘any other factor’ in 
determining whether to make a monetary award.”90 Thus, 
the court simply begs the question of the extent to which 
federal law preempts the “manner” in which a state court 
may consider Social Security benefits and compensate the 
spouse for any equitable imbalance without subjecting the 
actual benefits to distribution. 
The broadest application of federal preemption suggests 
that the only manner in which a court may consider Social 
Security is as an equitable factor in the determination of 
alimony, pursuant to Section 659, which typically comes in 
the form of a monetary award.91 In Pleasant, however, the 
court implied that it may consider Social Security benefits as 
an equitable factor in the division of other marital property, 
which also may come in the very same form of a monetary 
award. This implication raises numerous questions. 
For example, if the court’s determinations of property 
division and alimony are both based on the same equitable 
consideration—the receipt of Social Security—and if the 
monetary award that compensates for the resulting inequity 
may come from the same property source—such as a bank 
account awarded in the division of assets upon divorce—then 
what damage is caused to the federal scheme if federal law 
allows the court to classify the compensating award as 
“alimony,” but state law allows the court to classify it as 
“property”? Could Social Security benefits not qualify as 
both? Indeed, is a legitimate award of alimony that is based 
on the disparate future incomes of the parties (perhaps 
caused solely by one party’s receipt of Social Security 
benefits) and paid every month from the payor spouse’s 
income, which subsequently is deposited into a bank account 
 
 90. Pleasant, 632 A.2d at 207 n.3. 
 91. See infra notes 376–78; see also discussion infra text accompanying notes 
472–76. 
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and used to pay alimony or other financial obligations, now 
prohibited under federal law simply because the source of the 
monetary award is the payor spouse’s income derived from 
the receipt of Social Security benefits?92 Does federal law 
preempt a state court from considering Social Security 
benefits in its determination of alimony if Social Security 
benefits are the sole source of income for the payor spouse?93 
Must the court distinguish the nature of the equitable 
interests under such a circumstance?94 Is this even 
possible?95 
Note that all of these questions evolve from the 
narrowest application of the scope of federal preemption, 
which provides, simply, that state courts may not directly 
divide Social Security benefits—the only scope of federal 
preemption upon which all courts agree. Yet, the narrowest 
and most uniform of applications has led to wide disparity 
among states on how to provide equity to spouses beyond this 
narrow framework of federal preemption. 
No jurisdiction more clearly represents the natural 
expansion of the issues that are raised when a state court 
simply resolves the narrow issue of the direct division of 
Social Security benefits than Indiana, specifically in the case 
of Luttrell v. Luttrell.96 In Luttrell, the wife received $915 per 
 
 92. See, e.g., Depot v. Depot, 2006 ME 25, 893 A.2d 995, 1002–03 n.6 (Dana, 
J., dissenting) (providing that if court just continued husband’s alimony after 
retirement, it could avoid the issue altogether). 
 93. See Mays v. Braden, No. 10-350-GFVT, 2011 WL 4478958, at *3 (E.D. Ky. 
Sept. 26, 2011); Russo v. Russo, 474 A.2d 473, 476 (Conn. App. Ct. 1984); see also 
infra note 284 and accompanying text. 
 94. See, e.g., Vitko v. Vitko, 524 N.W.2d 102, 104 (N.D. 1994) (obscuring 
whether the court distinguished military disability income from Social Security 
income with respect to its ability to consider Social Security as a financial factor 
outside of property distribution). 
 95. In re Marriage of Mueller, 2015 IL 117876, 34 N.E.3d 538; Lorenzen v. 
Lorenzen, 883 N.W.2d 292, 298 (Neb. 2016); Panetta v. Panetta, 851 A.2d 720, 
727–29 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2004) (questioning court’s ability to consider 
effect of disparity in receipt of benefits without calculating value of benefits). 
 96. See Luttrell v. Luttrell, 994 N.E.2d 298 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). 
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month in Social Security disability benefits and had received 
a lump sum payment of $14,430.75 in Social Security 
disability (SSDI) benefits in 2010.97 The parties divorced in 
2012, and the trial court concluded that the wife’s lump sum 
SSDI award was not a marital asset subject to division. The 
court awarded the wife sixty percent of the marital estate, as 
well as $15,000 in attorney’s fees, due to the parties’ 
disparity in income.98 The husband appealed, claiming that 
the wife’s lump sum SSDI award should be treated as 
marital property because the payment was analogous to a 
worker’s compensation benefit intended to replace lost 
earnings during the marriage.99 
The Court of Appeals was inclined to agree, based on 
state property distribution law, but held that the trial court 
properly excluded the wife’s lump sum award from the 
divisible property based on the plain language of federal law, 
specifically Sections 407 and 659 of the Social Security Act.100 
This is so even though the payment was retroactive, even though a 
large portion of it covered a period of time during the marriage, and 
even though the money would have been available for both [the 
husband and wife]’s use had it been received as payments . . . when 
her disability began and when they were living as a married 
couple . . . rather than as a lump sum payment following their 
separation.101 
Thus, the court relied upon a broad application of the 
plain language of the anti-assignment and alimony exception 
provisions of the Social Security Act and held that federal 
law preempts the direct division of Social Security benefits 
under state law.102 However, in a footnote, the court 
 
 97. Id. at 300. 
 98. Id. at 301. 
 99. Id. at 302. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. at 303. 
 102. Id. 
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acknowledged the narrow scope of the issue for which it 
relied upon this broad application of federal law by 
recognizing: 
Some courts have held that, while SSDI payments may not be 
divided in divorce proceedings, they may be considered as part of 
the total picture as a court decides how to equitably divide up those 
items that are divisible. . . . We do not reach that question here.103 
Subsequently, the husband filed a petition to transfer 
jurisdiction to the Supreme Court of Indiana, which denied 
the husband’s petition.104 In his dissent from the denial of 
the transfer, Justice David, joined by Justice Rush, held that 
the court should formally address the issue presented on 
transfer, which was the issue raised, but not addressed, by 
the Court of Appeals as to “whether trial courts can consider 
[Social Security] as part of the total picture when 
determining how to equitably divide property upon 
divorce.”105 The dissent held that “the [Social Security Act] 
does not control [this issue].”106 
Supporting this position, the dissent observed that the 
wife’s lump sum Social Security award stood as a “potential 
windfall” for the wife, “particularly where, under most 
circumstances, the lump sum represents lost income that 
was compensated for by a combination of the other spouse 
stepping up and both parties doing without during the period 
which gave rise to the SSDI qualification.”107 The court 
recognized that this windfall could be substantially greater 
in any given case.108 The court ultimately held that, at a 
minimum, receipt of lump sum Social Security should be a 
 
 103. Id. at 303 n.4 (internal citation omitted). Cf. Howell v. Howell, 137 S. Ct. 
1400, 1406 (2017) (recognizing but declining to address same question). 
 104. Luttrell v. Luttrell, 10 N.E.3d 1002, 1002 (Ind. 2014). 
 105. Id. at 1003 (David, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
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factor for the court to consider when awarding attorney fees, 
particularly when the attorney fees that were awarded were 
based on the trial court’s consideration of the parties’ 
disparity of future income,109 which is permitted in the 
court’s determination of alimony.110 
The Luttrell case precisely represents the distinction 
between the narrow and broad applications of the scope of 
federal preemption of Social Security benefits and the 
arguable inequities that result when the state court is 
preempted from considering the equitable factors that it 
would otherwise consider when dividing the parties’ 
property. As demonstrated in Luttrell, this is particularly so 
when the court’s final division of property is closely 
connected to its final determination of alimony, attorney’s 
fees, and the distribution of other separate property, in 
balancing the overall equities of the parties. 
Likewise, in Simmons v. Simmons, when the parties 
divorced in 1990, the Family Court in South Carolina 
approved the parties’ agreement that, as part of the 
equitable division of property, the wife would receive a 
portion of each monthly Social Security check that the 
husband was entitled to receive upon retirement.111 The 
agreement provided that “any payments to Wife under the 
terms of this provision regarding division of Social Security 
benefits shall be construed only as a property settlement, and 
shall not in any way be considered or construed as 
alimony.”112 When the husband reached retirement age and 
failed to pay the wife any portion of his Social Security 
benefits, she petitioned the court, in 2003, to compel the 
husband’s compliance with the agreement.113 After a trial 
and upon appeal, the Court of Appeals held that because the 
 
 109. Luttrell v. Luttrell, 994 N.E.2d 298, 301 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). 
 110. Luttrell, 10 N.E.3d at 1003 (David, J, dissenting). 
 111. Simmons v. Simmons, 634 S.E.2d 1, 2 (S.C. Ct. App. 2006). 
 112. Id. (emphasis in original). 
 113. Id. 
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Social Security Act’s anti-assignment clause defines Social 
Security benefits as non-marital or separate property with 
respect to the division of property upon divorce, the family 
court necessarily lacked subject matter jurisdiction to divide 
a spouse’s Social Security benefits in a property 
distribution.114 Consequently, the court voided that part of 
the agreement that resulted from the parties’ (and the trial 
court’s) mutual mistake regarding the ability to equitably 
apportion Social Security benefits as property.115 
Subsequently, in 2008, the wife moved the court to 
reopen the entire judgment in the case to reconsider the now 
partially void settlement agreement and the effect of the 
court’s preemption enforcement by holding that Social 
Security benefits were not divisible.116 The Family Court 
 
 114. Id. at 2–3. But see Biondo v. Biondo, 809 N.W.2d 397, 401 (Mich. Ct. App. 
2011) (holding “[t]he Social Security Act simply does not divest state courts of 
subject-matter jurisdiction in divorce cases. Rather, the Supremacy Clause 
preempts state laws regarding the division of marital property only to the extent 
they are inconsistent with 42 U.S.C. § 407(a).”). 
 115. See Simmons, 634 S.E.2d at 5. Many other courts have held similarly in 
declining to enforce settlement agreements in which the parties agreed to divide 
Social Security benefits as part of the equitable division of property. Gentry v. 
Gentry, 938 S.W.2d 231, 233 (Ark. 1997) (invalidating agreement to divide Social 
Security benefits as “a transfer or assignment of future benefits prohibited by § 
407”); In re Marriage of Anderson, 252 P.3d 490 (Colo. App. 2010) (finding 
husband’s agreement to pay former wife part of future Social Security benefits 
was void under Supremacy Clause); In re Marriage of Hulstrom, 794 N.E.2d 980, 
982 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003) (invalidating agreement where the parties combined their 
social security benefits and then sought to equitably divide them); Biondo, 809 
N.W.2d at 401–02 (holding that federal law preempted enforcement of divorce 
agreement provision obligating parties to equalize Social Security benefits); 
Boulter v. Boulter, 930 P.2d 112 (Nev. 1997) (holding that neither the Nevada 
Supreme Court nor the trial court could enforce agreement requiring husband to 
pay his wife one-half of Social Security benefits); Olson v. Olson, 445 N.W.2d 1, 2 
(N.D. 1989) (finding “that [S]ocial [S]ecurity should not be considered in dividing 
marital property”); In re Marriage of Swan, 720 P.2d 747, 747 (Or. 1986) (holding 
that “the value of social security benefits of either spouse may not be considered 
in the division of property”); Kirk v. Kirk, 577 A.2d 976, 980 (R.I. 1990) (finding 
that social security benefits could not be reached by a former spouse for property 
division). But see Reffalt v. Reffalt, 10–CA–01013–COA, 94 So. 3d 1222, 1226 
(Miss. Ct. App. 2011) (finding the parties may agree on division of Social Security 
as equitable factor relevant to alimony instead of property distribution). 
 116. Simmons v. Simmons, 709 S.E.2d 666, 666–67 (S.C. 2011). 
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held in accordance with the 2006 decision by the Court of 
Appeals and dismissed the wife’s motion for lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction.117 However, on appeal, the South 
Carolina Supreme Court held that the Family Court had 
jurisdiction to revisit the entire divorce judgment, noting 
that the parties’ original agreement in 1990, albeit mistaken 
and unenforceable, represented what the parties determined 
to be a “fair and reasonable” compromise under all the 
circumstances and “an equitable resolution to all of the 
issues” before the court.118 The court held that “[b]ecause . . . 
the parties’ desire to equitably divide [the husband]’s Social 
Security benefits was a significant feature of the over-all 
agreement, we expand the scope of the remand to include 
[the wife]’s alimony claim.”119 
Thus, the scope of the court’s review upon remand would 
fall within the Social Security Act’s “alimony” exception to 
the preemption of state courts directly dividing Social 
Security benefits.120 But the Simmons court added that, “in 
divorce settlements, it would be difficult to fairly view the 
various aspects of this agreement in isolation. . . . [T]he 
parties’ intended agreement concerning alimony is 
inextricably connected to the agreed upon division of marital 
property, and vice versa.”121 Thus, the Simmons court 
highlighted the dilemma that continues to confound state 
courts burdened with the task of equitably dividing marital 
property, which is whether, and to what extent, the court 
may consider the effect of the federal preemption of Social 
Security benefits, beyond the consideration of alimony or 
child support, when providing equity to the parties in the 
context of the distribution of marital property. As recognized 
by the court in Simmons, the court’s determination of 
 
 117. Id. at 667. 
 118. Id. at 666 n.1. 
 119. Id. at 667. 
 120. See 42 U.S.C. § 659 (2012). 
 121. Simmons, 709 S.E.2d at 668. 
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alimony bears directly on the court’s equitable division of 
property, and vice-versa, and both categories may be directly 
affected by the court’s consideration of Social Security 
benefits. Yet, federal law has expressly permitted the court 
to consider Social Security with respect to one right—
alimony—but has left unanswered the extent to which it may 
consider Social Security with respect to property 
distribution. It is no wonder, then, that state courts are at a 
loss as to how to ensure equity for the parties under state law 
without violating federal law. 
B. State Variations on the Scope of Federal Preemption of 
Social Security Benefits 
As previously described, all courts agree that federal law 
preempts state courts from directly distributing Social 
Security benefits when dividing marital property upon 
divorce.122 However, beyond this, there is very little 
consensus among the states. In 1960, the U.S. Supreme 
Court decided, in Flemming v. Nestor, that Social Security 
beneficiaries have a “non-contractual interest” in Social 
Security benefits and that, therefore, these benefits are not 
to be considered as an accrued property right that is subject 
to state law regarding the distribution of marital property 
upon divorce.123 Since then, state courts have widely varied 
in defining the scope of federal preemption in this context. 
Indeed, efforts by state courts to define the scope of federal 
preemption beyond a prohibition of direct distribution so as 
to constitutionally divide marital property under their 
respective state property distribution schemes have led to 
the development of six additional interpretations and 
applications of the scope of federal preemption.124 These 
include: (1) offsetting any marital property other than Social 
Security benefits with the value of actual Social Security 
 
 122. See supra Section II.A. 
 123. Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. at 603, 610–11 (1960). 
 124. See infra Section II.B. 
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benefits;125 (2) offsetting retirement benefits received in lieu 
of Social Security with a hypothetical Social Security 
value;126 (3) offsetting retirement benefits received in lieu of 
Social Security with actual Social Security value;127 (4) 
prohibiting offsetting;128 (5) considering Social Security 
benefits as one of many factors relevant to the equitable 
division of marital property;129 and, (6) totally preempting 
the court from considering Social Security benefits in any 
way in determining an equitable division of marital 
property.130 
1. Offsetting Permitted 
In Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, the U.S. Supreme Court 
defined the parameters of the anti-assignment clause by 
holding that it prohibits state courts from directly assigning 
or offsetting Social Security benefits.131 Because one of the 
purposes of federal preemption is to protect the participating 
spouse by assuring that he or she receives the benefits that 
Congress has solely reserved for the participant employee, 
several state courts have held that Hisquierdo prohibits only 
the offsetting of actual Social Security benefits.132 Those 
state courts further hold that in dividing property upon 
divorce, a court is only preempted from offsetting if the 
division of property alters the actual receipt of benefits by 
the participating spouse.133 Thus, some state courts have 
implemented offsetting methods that arguably have no effect 
on the actual receipt of Social Security benefits reserved for 
 
 125. See infra Section II.B.1.a. 
 126. See infra Section II.B.1.b.i. 
 127. See infra Section II.B.1.b.ii. 
 128. See infra Section II.B.2. 
 129. See infra Section II.B.3. 
 130. See infra Section II.B.4. 
 131. 439 U.S. 572, 586, 590 (1979). 
 132. See infra text accompanying notes 197–200. 
 133. See infra text accompanying notes 135–41. 
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the participating spouse.134 
These alternative offsetting methods come in two 
primary forms: (1) offsetting divisible marital property other 
than Social Security benefits with the actual value of Social 
Security benefits; and, (2) offsetting retirement benefits 
received in lieu of Social Security with either the 
hypothetical or actual value of Social Security benefits. 
Arguably, neither of these methods directly alters the receipt 
of Social Security benefits by the participant spouse, yet 
compensates the non-participant spouse for the inequitable 
distribution of retirement benefits in which the non-
participant spouse claims he or she otherwise would have a 
marital interest. The question, of course, is whether either of 
these methods is constitutional in light of Congress’s 
intended scope of federal preemption. 
 
 134. See infra Section II.B.1. 
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a) Offsetting any other Marital Property with Actual 
Social Security Value 
 Almost every state interprets the holding in 
Hisquierdo as prohibiting the offset of Social Security 
benefits with other marital property.135 The exceptions are 
Louisiana,136 Pennsylvania,137 New Jersey,138 Arizona,139 
and Ohio.140 Georgia and Rhode Island also are postured to 
permit offsetting, but they present limited case law with 
unique circumstances in addressing this question.141 
However, even within this small minority of states, 
Louisiana stands alone in its statutory prescription for such 
an approach. 
Louisiana Revised Statute Section 9:2801.1 provides: 
When federal law or the provisions of a statutory pension or 
retirement plan, state or federal, preempt or preclude community 
classification of property that would have been classified as 
community property under the principles of the Civil Code, the 
spouse of the person entitled to such property shall be allocated or 
assigned the ownership of community property equal in value to 
such property prior to the division of the rest of the community 
property. Nevertheless, if such property consists of a spouse’s right 
to receive social security benefits or the benefits themselves, then 
the court in its discretion may allocate or assign other community 
 
 135. See infra Section II.B.2. 
 136. See infra text accompanying notes 142–59. 
 137. See infra text accompanying notes 166–87. 
 138. See infra text accompanying notes 202–22. 
 139. See infra text accompanying notes 190–200. 
 140. See infra text accompanying notes 223–57. Also, some states, like 
Washington, Iowa, and Kentucky, may employ an offset of Social Security 
benefits in dividing marital property, but do so merely as an equitable 
consideration of the parties’ financial circumstances, rather than as a prescribed 
policy for offsetting Social Security benefits. See infra text accompanying notes 
285–314. 
 141. See Rabek v. Kellum, 620 S.E.2d 387, 388 (Ga. 2005) (viewing offset as 
viable option, but husband failed to present sufficient evidence to support claim); 
Schaffner v. Schaffner, 713 A.2d 1245, 1249 (R.I. 1998) (finding that offsetting 
may be appropriate under certain circumstances but does not clarify what offset 
method of valuation to use). 
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property equal in value to the other spouse.142 
Thus, the statute allows the court, at its discretion, to 
directly offset the marital value of a recipient’s Social 
Security benefits with other marital property of the same 
value.143 
For example, in Carmichael v. Brooks, the court valued 
the husband’s Social Security benefits at $44,000 and 
awarded the wife one-half of that value, totaling $22,000.144 
Upon the husband’s appeal, the court held that the scope of 
federal preemption of Social Security benefits is limited to 
the state’s ability to classify Social Security benefits as 
community property.145 The court determined that, were it 
not for federal law preempting state courts from classifying 
Social Security benefits as property of the marital 
community, the husband’s Social Security benefits would be 
classified as property of the marital community in which the 
wife held an interest.146 The court held that, pursuant to 
Section 9:2801.1, “a trial court is granted discretion to choose 
whether to award a spouse additional community assets as 
compensation for the right to receive social security benefits, 
or the benefits themselves, of the other spouse when those 
benefits would otherwise be classified as community 
property but for federal preemption.”147 In so holding, it is 
relevant to note that the court specifically referred to this 
compensation as an “offset” of Social Security benefits.148 
 
 142. LA. STAT. ANN. § 9:2801.1 (2016). 
 143. Section 9:2801.1 is equally applicable to the division of military disability 
benefits. See Ast v. Ast, 2014-1282 p. 5–6 (La. App. 3 Cir. 4/1/15); 162 So. 3d 720, 
724–25, writ denied, 2015-0864, p. 1 (La. 6/5/15), 171 So. 3d 952. 
 144. Carmichael v. Brooks, 2016-93, p. 1, 3 (La. App. 3 Cir. 6/22/16); 194 So. 3d 
832, 836. 
 145. Id. at p. 4, 194 So. 3d at 837. 
 146. Id. at p. 4, 194 So. 3d at 837. 
 147. Id. at p. 4, 194 So. 3d at 837 (quoting Bhati v. Bhati, 09-1030, p. 6 (La. 
App. 3 Cir. 3/10/10); 32 So. 3d 1107, 1111. 
 148. Id. at p.4, 194 So. 3d at 837–39, 844. 
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However, the court specifically stated that “the state 
statute, La.R.S. 9:2801.1, allowing for an offset equal in 
value, is in fact enacted for the purpose of achieving an 
equitable result.”149 In exercising its discretion, the court 
considered the offset of exactly one-half of the husband’s 
Social Security benefits as equitable and, therefore, the court 
affirmed the trial court’s award.150 Thus, the court in 
Carmichael manifested numerous levels of analysis that 
confound the issues and warrant congressional clarification. 
Specifically, is the scope of federal preemption limited to the 
classification, direct distribution, offset, or consideration of 
Social Security benefits? Or, does Congress intend its 
preemption of state law to be “total” in scope, thereby 
prohibiting state courts from considering the receipt of Social 
Security benefits as in any way bearing on the equitable 
division of the parties’ property?” 
Louisiana’s answer to these questions is the narrowest 
of all the states’ interpretations of the scope of federal law in 
that, as long as the state respects federal law and does not 
categorize Social Security benefits as community property 
and, therefore, as directly divisible upon divorce, the state 
court has statutory authority to exercise its discretion as to 
how to compensate for the inequity resulting from the 
limitations prescribed by federal law. In exercising its 
discretion, sometimes the court finds an offsetting award to 
be equitable,151 and sometimes it does not.152 In Carmichael, 
 
 149. Id. at p.4, 194 So. 3d 837. 
 150. Id. at p.4, 194 So. 3d 839. 
 151. Id. at p.4, 194 So. 3d 839; Comeaux v. Comeaux, 08-1330, p. 6 (La. App. 3 
Cir. 4/1/09), 7 So. 3d 110, 115–16 (“equalizing payment [of one-half of husband’s 
Social Security interest] necessary to balance the community of acquets and gains 
and to reimburse [wife] for payments she made for the community.”). 
 152. Williams v. Williams, 2012-732, p. 3 (La. App. 3 Cir. 12/5/12), 104 So. 3d 
760, 763 (affirming trial court’s refusal to allocate marital property to wife to 
offset husband’s Social Security benefits); Tucker v. Tucker, 47,373, p. 6 (La. App. 
2 Cir. 8/1/12), 103 So. 3d 493, 497 (denying offset of husband’s Social Security 
because husband was still fifteen years from eligibility, and wife had retained 
employment and had begun accumulating pension benefits); Trahan v. Trahan, 
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the amount of offset that the court deemed equitable 
happened to be exactly one-half of the husband’s Social 
Security benefits.153 The husband objected to this award on 
the basis that it contravened federal law by treating his 
Social Security benefits as community property.154 
Nevertheless, the court held that the statute “does not 
classify social security benefits as community property . . . 
To the contrary, it merely provides for a discretionary 
equitable offset.”155 Therefore, as long as the court does not 
directly distribute or assign to one party actual Social 
Security benefits that, under federal law, are reserved for the 
participating spouse, the Louisiana statute allows the court 
the discretion to offset the benefit amount with other marital 
property that otherwise falls within the court’s authority to 
divide under the state property distribution scheme. In this 
way, the statute arguably respects the preemption mandated 
by federal law as well as the state court’s obligation to 
provide equity to the parties within the state’s statutory 
distribution scheme. 
Of course, this begs the question of the proper scope of 
 
2010-0109, p. 19 (La. App. 1 Cir. 6/11/10), 43 So. 3d 218, 234 (finding that it was 
not equitable to offset husband’s Social Security because wife received significant 
assets through the marriage contract); Bhati, 09-1030 at p. 6, 32 So. 3d at 1111 
(denying offset to wife because wife received periodic support of $1,000.00 per 
month, the couple’s three children were no longer minors, the wife was 
employable, and the wife received a substantial monetary award via 
disbursements of husband’s other retirement accounts not including his social 
security benefits). 
 153. The court held that “[t]he trial court did not err in adjudicating [the wife’s] 
entitlement to the offset and reaching a decision on the valuation and amount 
thereof. The amount of the offset to which [the wife] is entitled, being established 
at $22,000.00, is to be accounted for when the division of the remaining items is 
accomplished.” Carmichael, 2016-93 at p. 3, 194 So. 3d at 836. As to the method 
for valuation, to which the husband objected as “vague and unreliable” and “utter 
guesswork,” the court heard expert testimony on the value of the Social Security 
benefits and held that “[t]he trial court . . . considered the present value of the 
benefits and granted [the wife] an offset of one-half of that amount toward the 
community property partition.” Id. at p.6, 194 So. 3d at 838. 
 154. Id. at p.6, 194 So. 3d at 838. 
 155. Id. at p.6, 194 So. 3d at 838. 
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federal preemption by assuming that federal preemption is 
limited to mere classification and, thereby, to direct 
distribution. In Tucker v. Tucker,156 the court held that, 
because of other factual considerations in the case, the trial 
court did not abuse its discretion by not awarding other 
marital property to the wife to offset the husband’s Social 
Security benefits. The court noted the following with respect 
to Louisiana’s approach to offsetting Social Security benefits: 
[T]he result . . . places Louisiana law in a “minority of one” on the 
issue of whether a court can award an “equal value” offset award for 
noncommunity property social security benefits. A review of the 
case law of other states calls into serious doubt whether R.S. 
9:2801.1 is constitutional under federal preemption. . . . [E]xcept for 
Louisiana and the states which absolutely forbid an award of any 
type of offset for the value of a spouse’s social security benefits, there 
is a uniform and consistent statutory or jurisprudential rule that a 
spouse’s social security benefits may be a factor to be considered in 
marital property division, but an award equal to the estimated 
value of those benefits is a violation of federal law. R.S. 9:2801.1 
appears to run afoul of this line of out-of-state cases because it 
purports to give a trial court the discretion to “allocate or assign 
other community property equal in value.” 
 If the majority national position is correct . . . the discretion 
granted in R.S. 9:2801.1 to give an amount “equal to” is 
unconstitutional, violative of the Supremacy Clause.157 
However, the court in Carmichael held contrarily: 
Federal law preempts the classification of social security benefits as 
community property, but it does not prohibit an assignment of 
property equal in value to the amount of social security benefits. . . . 
Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:2801.1 is not in contravention of 
federal law. Rather, its enactment simply allows a trial court, 
depending upon the facts and circumstances of the community 
property regime, to provide a spouse an offset in an amount equal 
to that of the social security benefits, when doing so would be 
equitable and in furtherance of Louisiana’s community property 
laws. . . . [T]here is an inequity of [one spouse] receiving much more 
than one-half of the social security benefits available to the parties 
 
 156. Tucker, 47,373 at p. 1, 103 So. 3d at 493 n.1 (internal citation omitted). 
 157. Id. at p.1, 103 So. 3d at 493 n.1 (internal citation omitted). 
40 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66 
and . . . the state statute, La.R.S. 9:2801.1, allowing for an offset 
equal in value, is in fact enacted for the purpose of achieving an 
equitable result.158 
Thus, even within the State of Louisiana—the only state 
that statutorily provides for the direct offset of Social 
Security benefits with other distributable property equal in 
value to Social Security benefits—there is confusion over the 
proper scope of federal preemption and the court’s ability to 
reconcile ambiguous congressional intent with the 
application of the state’s own property distribution scheme. 
And, as evidenced by the court’s express reasoning in 
Carmichael, a state court’s ability to compensate for the 
inequity of federal preemption of Social Security may rest 
entirely on the semantic distinction between calling the 
division an “offset of equal value” or an “equitable 
consideration,” which simply may happen to be equal.159 
Unless or until Congress clarifies its intent, Louisiana will 
continue to statutorily authorize state courts to offset the 
value of actual Social Security benefits from the value of 
other marital property that the court is otherwise permitted 
to divide so long as Social Security benefits are classified as 
separate property pursuant to federal law. 
b) Offsetting Retirement Benefits “in lieu of” Social 
Security with Hypothetical or Actual Social Security Value 
Although Louisiana is the only state to statutorily pro-
vide for directly offsetting Social Security benefits with other 
marital property of equal value, there are other states that 
allow an offset of Social Security benefits when one party re-
ceives Social Security benefits but the other party does not 
because he or she has contributed to a retirement plan “in 
 
 158. Carmichael, 2016-93 at p. 4, 194 So. 3d at 837. 
 159. See Howell v. Howell, 137 S. Ct. 1400, 1401–02 (2017) (noting “semantic” 
distinctions of state court reasoning). 
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lieu of” Social Security.160 These states include Pennsylva-
nia,161 New Jersey,162 Arizona,163 and Ohio.164 
Depending on the circumstances of the case, the offset 
can consist of deducting from the marital portion of the non-
participating spouse’s pension received in lieu of Social Secu-
rity either: (1) the hypothetical value of Social Security ben-
efits that the non-participating spouse would have received 
were it not for his or her receipt of pension benefits in lieu of 
Social Security; or, (2) the actual value of Social Security ben-
efits received by the participating spouse. Under the first op-
tion of offsetting with the hypothetical value of Social Secu-
rity benefits, the hypothetical value that the non-participant 
spouse may have earned, had he or she participated in Social 
Security, may be quite different (greater or less) than the 
value of the participant spouse’s actual benefits. This offset 
is not necessarily “equated” but, rather, is “maximized,” to 
allow each party to separate their respective interests in So-
cial Security benefits—one being actual and the other being 
hypothetical. However, under the second option of offsetting 
the actual value of Social Security benefits, the court takes 
the value of the participating spouse’s actual Social Security 
benefits and offsets an equalizing amount for the non-partic-
ipating spouse from the marital portion of the non-partici-
pating spouse’s retirement benefits received in lieu of Social 
Security; thus, the offsetting amount is “equated.” Of course, 
this begs the question of whether equating the benefits by 
 
 160. This also could apply when both parties receive varying Social Security 
benefits but one party also contributes to a private retirement plan in lieu of 
Social Security. 
 161. Cornbleth v. Cornbleth, 580 A.2d 369, 373–74 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990). 
 162. Panetta v. Panetta, 851 A.2d 720, 727–28 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2004). 
 163. Kelly v. Kelly, 9 P.3d 1046, 1048 (Ariz. 2000). 
 164. Neville v. Neville, 99 Ohio St. 3d 275, 2003-Ohio-3624, 791 N.E.2d 434, at 
¶ 12; Hochstetler v. Hochstetler, 2012-Ohio-2669, at ¶¶ 28–29; Colley v. Colley, 
2009-Ohio-6776, at ¶41; Parsons v. Parsons, 2008-Ohio-1904, at ¶¶ 15, 19; 
Harshbarger v. Harshbarger, 158 Ohio App. 3d 121, 2004-Ohio-3919, 814 N.E.2d 
105, at ¶ 15; Eickelberger v. Eickelberger, 638 N.E.2d 130, 134 (Ohio Ct. App. 
1994). 
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offsetting with an equalizing value is “equitable,” particu-
larly if the parties would not have earned the same amount 
of Social Security had they both contributed to it. 
For example, consider the circumstances wherein a 
husband is employed and contributes during the marriage to 
Social Security, and, thereby, receives or anticipates 
receiving Social Security benefits upon retirement. Consider 
also that his wife, who also is employed during the marriage, 
opts to participate in a private pension plan, whereby she is 
prohibited from participating in Social Security and, thereby, 
receives or anticipates receiving no Social Security benefits 
but, instead, receives greater benefits through her private 
pension plan, which both spouses are able to enjoy during the 
marriage. Consider, finally, that the parties then divorce. In 
determining an equitable distribution of the parties’ 
property, the court must confront the fact that federal law 
requires that the husband’s Social Security benefits are 
classified as the separate property of the husband and are 
not subject to division. However, under most state property 
distribution schemes, the wife’s retirement benefits are 
classified as marital property and, thereby, are divisible 
upon divorce.165 
Thus, assuming an equal division of marital property, 
the court must award the husband one hundred percent of 
his Social Security benefits, but the court will divide the 
wife’s retirement benefits acquired in lieu of Social Security 
by awarding fifty percent to the wife and fifty percent to the 
husband. Accordingly, if the only marital property to be 
divided were the parties’ retirement interests, the husband 
would receive one hundred fifty percent of the parties’ total 
property, while the wife would receive only fifty percent of 
the total property. Arguably—at least for the wife—this is 
 
 165. Although most states classify retirement benefits as marital property, 
some states may statutorily define retirement benefits in lieu of Social Security 
benefits as separate property. See, e.g., MO. REV. STAT. § 169.572 (1991) 
(providing that teacher retirement benefits be treated in same manner as Social 
Security benefits and therefore are not divisible). 
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not an equitable division of property. Accordingly, the wife 
contends that if the husband solely is to enjoy his Social 
Security benefits, she solely should be able to enjoy the 
amount of her retirement plan that equals either: (1) the 
hypothetical value of Social Security benefits that she solely 
would have enjoyed as her separate property if she had 
participated in the Social Security program instead of the 
private plan in which she participated; or, (2) one-half of the 
actual amount of Social Security benefit attributable to the 
marriage that her husband now solely enjoys, so as to equate 
the parties’ marital interests in their total retirement 
property. The following subsections address each of these 
two options, which various courts have considered and 
adopted as methods for compensating the non-participating 
spouse for the arguable inequity resulting from the federal 
preemption of Social Security. 
i. Offsetting Using the Hypothetical Value of Social 
Security 
The leading decision in which a court placed a present-
day hypothetical value on the Social Security benefit that a 
non-participating spouse would have earned had he or she 
contributed to Social Security instead of contributing to a 
private retirement plan in lieu of Social Security is the 
Pennsylvania case of Cornbleth v. Cornbleth.166 In Cornbleth, 
the husband participated in the Civil Service Retirement 
System (CSRS) and, therefore, did not participate in Social 
Security.167 His participation in Social Security would have 
resulted in a commensurate decrease in his pension annuity 
under CSRS.168 Any compensation the husband received 
through his CSRS pension during the marriage was 
considered marital property and, therefore, was divisible.169 
 
 166. Cornbleth, 580 A.2d at 369. 
 167. Id. at 371. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. at 371 n. 1 (referencing 5 U.S.C. § 8345(j)(1) (2012) of the Civil Service 
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However, the wife contributed to Social Security through her 
retirement plan, the income from which, therefore, was 
exempt from distribution.170 The husband argued that 
because the wife’s Social Security benefits could not be 
considered marital property under federal law, his CSRS 
benefits should be similarly treated.171 The court agreed and 
excluded a portion of the husband’s CSRS benefits from the 
marital estate.172 
In support of its holding, the court first observed that 
“[a]lthough the benefit of the [husband’s] pension may be 
delayed until some future time, its value to the owner is 
undeniable . . . [and] a present value can be ascribed to it . . . 
thus providing a means for dividing its value.”173 
Additionally, the court observed that “income earned during 
the marriage, which would otherwise become disposable to 
the couple, is most often utilized to fund the pension.”174 
Likewise, “any employer contributions to the pension can 
easily be viewed as a form of delayed compensation” and any 
compensation earned during the marriage constitutes 
marital property.175 Therefore, the husband’s CSRS pension 
may be included as divisible marital property.176 
As such, upon the equitable distribution of marital 
property, the pension recipient will suffer a “diminution of 
expected retirement income.”177 Yet, despite a tremendous 
degree of similarity between the nature of Social Security 
 
Retirement Act (“CSRA”), which allowed for the equitable division of CSRS 
benefits as marital property). 
 170. Id. at 372. 
 171. Id. at 371. 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. 
 177. Id. 
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benefits and conventional retirement benefits,178 Social 
Security benefits are excluded as marital property, and the 
wife reaps the benefits of this exemption upon retirement.179 
Had Social Security benefits not been so excluded, 
the parties, as a married couple, would have benefitted either by 
having an increased disposable income or by saving the additional 
funds. Had the funds been saved or used to purchase an asset that 
retained value, then that value would have been subject to equitable 
distribution. Conversely, had the funds been simply expended by 
the couple during their marriage there may not have been an asset 
to equitably divide. However, there would have been a present 
enjoyment of that stream of income by both parties during the 
course of the marriage.180 
Thus, there is no division of Social Security benefits upon 
divorce to offset the division of the non-participating spouse’s 
pension benefits.181 The court observed that this inequity is 
exacerbated: 
in that the money that would, in a conventional setting, be routed 
into Social Security, and thus into an exempt status, would either 
have been consumed by the couple, thus providing previous benefits 
enjoyed by both, or, perhaps, routed into the CSRS or another 
retirement type vehicle, which, of course, would then be included in 
the marital estate.182 
Therefore, the court determined that income that is 
otherwise marital is used to finance a future Social Security 
 
 178. Id.; see also Kelly v. Kelly, 9 P.3d 1046, 1047 (Ariz. 2000) (“Social Security 
bears many characteristics of a pension and would ordinarily be considered 
community property under state law principles.”). But see cases cited supra note 
8. 
 179. Cornbleth, 580 A.2d at 371. 
 180. Id. at 372 (internal citation omitted) (emphasis added); see also Kelly, 9 
P.3d at 1048 (“[I]n the absence of social security contributions, the community 
could have spent, saved, or invested those funds as it saw fit. . . . But . . . 
community funds have been diverted to the separate benefit of one spouse. . . . 
[T]his situation compels an equitable response.”). 
 181. Cornbleth, 580 A.2d at 371. 
 182. Id. at 372. 
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benefit that is excluded from the equitable division of 
property and shielded for the benefit of the Social Security 
participant, but similar CSRS benefits are not so 
protected.183 The court concluded that this leaves CSRS 
beneficiaries at a significant disadvantage upon divorce 
when compared to the majority of the work force who 
contribute to Social Security.184 The exemption, therefore, 
creates a bias that must be eliminated by equitably 
distributing property in a way that equates the parties’ 
differing financial circumstances. 
To equate the benefits to the parties, the court held that 
it is: 
necessary to compute the present value of a Social Security benefit 
had the CSRS participant been participating in the Social Security 
system. This present value should then be deducted from the 
present value of the CSRS pension at which time a figure for the 
marital portion of the pension could be derived and included in the 
marital estate for distribution purposes.185 
Accordingly, the court held that “to the extent part of [a] 
pension might figuratively be considered ‘in lieu of’ a Social 
Security benefit . . . that portion should be exempted from 
the marital estate.”186 
In describing the need for a state court to provide an 
equitable remedy to the inequity resulting from the federal 
preemption scheme, the court noted: 
Inherent to our disposition here is the realization that Social 
 
 183. There are other courts that prohibit such offsetting because they view 
pension plans and Social Security plans as materially different. See cases cited 
supra note 8. 
 184. Cornbleth, 580 A.2d at 372. 
 185. Id. 
 186. Id. at 371. But see Rabek v. Kellum, 620 S.E.2d 387, 388 (Ga. 2005) 
(holding as a matter of first impression that it was not improper for the trial court 
to deny husband offset of his CSRS pension benefits by hypothetical amount of 
Social Security benefits that he otherwise would have received, but husband 
failed to present sufficient evidence of what that value would be). 
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Security is, in essence, a forced savings plan. Essentially the federal 
government mandates that a portion of a worker’s income, which as 
previously observed would otherwise be martial property, be saved 
away until the worker becomes eligible to collect it. By exempting 
Social Security from equitable distribution, the federal government 
has created not only a means where a married individual can shield 
marital property from division, but, essentially, has mandated such 
an action. Our decision here simply recognizes this fact and 
attempts to equate those workers in the CSRS with the rest of the 
work force.187 
Of course, this begs the question of whether Congress 
intends for employees who contribute to Social Security and 
employees who participate in private pension retirement 
funds in lieu of Social Security to be equated in terms of the 
benefits to which they are entitled upon divorce. Until 
Congress clarifies this question, for courts adopting this 
view, when parties participate in retirement plans in lieu of 
Social Security,188 the court may attribute to the non-
participating spouse a hypothetical Social Security value 
that is deducted from the marital estate, thereby reducing 
the Social Security participant’s share of the non-
participant’s retirement benefits and equating each party’s 
interest in the marital estate.189 
 
 187. Cornbleth, 580 A.2d at 372 n.3; see also Kelly v. Kelly, 9 P.3d 1046, 1048 
(Ariz. 2000) (having adopted the resolution set forth in Cornbleth, the court held 
that its “resolution merely attempts to place the parties in the position they 
would have been [in] had both participated in social security.”). 
 188. Kelly, 9 P.3d at 1048–49 n.2 (citing Elhajj v. Elhajj, 605 A.2d 1268, 1271 
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1992) (noting that the court’s adoption of the Cornbleth remedy of 
offsetting as separate property pension benefits earned “in lieu of” Social Security 
benefits is improper where both husband and wife participated in CSRS and 
neither was entitled to Social Security benefits). 
 189. See, e.g., Holland v. Holland, 588 A.2d 58, 60 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991) 
(providing that where husband’s estimated pension benefit was $4233.00 and 
wife’s estimated Social Security benefit was $858.00, court awarded wife only 
forty percent of husband’s retirement benefit, or $1693.00, thereby leaving 
husband $2540.00 of retirement interest and affording wife a combined interest 
in husband’s retirement and her Social Security of $2551.00); see also Kelly, 9 
P.3d at 1048 (holding that “a present value . . . should be placed on the social 
security benefits [the husband] would have received had he participated in that 
system during the marriage. . . . The social security calculation then can be 
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Likewise, in Arizona, in Kelly v. Kelly, in which the wife 
participated in Social Security but the husband, instead, 
participated in the CSRS, which did not include Social 
Security, the court held that although federal law prohibits 
it from dividing Social Security benefits because Social 
Security must be characterized as the separate property of 
the entitled spouse, it is not so constrained with respect to 
CSRS pension benefits that are subject to no such restriction 
and are characterized as marital property under state law.190 
Thus, the court held that “to the extent individuals with 
Social Security benefits enjoy an exemption of that ‘asset’ 
from equitable distribution . . . those individuals 
participating in the CSRS must, likewise, be so 
positioned.”191 The court specifically noted that in making an 
equitable response by offsetting, the court does not attempt 
to value the participating spouse’s expected Social Security 
benefits.192 Rather, 
a present value, measured as of the date of dissolution, should be 
placed on the social security benefits [the husband] would have 
received had he participated in that system during the marriage. . . . 
The social security calculation can then be deducted from the 
present value of [the husband’s] CSRS pension on the date of 
dissolution. The remainder, if any, is what may be divided as 
community property.”193 
The court reasoned that, “pension benefits that are ‘in 
lieu of’ social security can be set aside as . . . separate 
property, just as the value of . . . social security benefits 
are . . . separate property.”194 However, the court noted that 
one problem in this approach is that, 
 
deducted from the present value of [the husband’s] CSRS pension on the date of 
dissolution. The remainder, if any, is what may be divided as community 
property.”). 
 190. Kelly, 9 P.3d at 1047. 
 191. Id. at 1048 (quoting Cornbleth, 580 A.2d at 371). 
 192. Id. 
 193. Id. (citing Cornbleth, 580 A.2d at 372) (emphasis in original). 
 194. Id. 
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this method will create an imbalance whenever there is a disparity 
between the salaries of each spouse. But such an inequity is not of 
our making, nor can it be worse than the situation that presently 
exists under the law. If both [the husband] and [wife] had 
participated in social security, they would be in the same financial 
position as that created by our holding today. The social security 
portion of each retirement plan would be set aside as the respective 
spouse’s separate property, whether equal or not, while the 
remaining benefits earned during marriage would be divided as 
community property by the trial court. Thus, our resolution merely 
attempts to place the parties in the position they would have been 
[in] had both participated in social security.195 
In adopting the approach that the court may offset the 
hypothetical value of Social Security with other marital 
property that the court is otherwise authorized to divide 
under state law, the court in Kelly made two important 
determinations that distinguish the reasoning of Hisquierdo 
and the states that rely on it to apply a broad scope of 
preemption:196 (1) it determined that Social Security benefits 
are not sufficiently analogous to Railroad Retirement 
benefits for the restrictions of Hisquierdo to apply;197 and, (2) 
it determined that reclassifying other marital property as 
separate property is different than reclassifying Social 
Security as divisible marital property, which is what federal 
law prohibits.198 Thus, the court’s holding in Kelly provided 
not an offset of Social Security but, rather, a means to 
consider the resulting inequity as an equitable factor.199 The 
 
 195. Id.; see also Kohler v. Kohler, 118 P.3d 621, 625 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005) 
(applying Kelly exemption where only one party participated in retirement plan). 
 196. Wolff v. Wolff, 929 P.2d 916, 921 (Nev. 1996); Olson v. Olson, 445 N.W.2d 
1, 11 (N.D. 1989); Swan v. Swan, 720 P.2d 747, 752 (Or. 1986); see also Cox v. 
Cox, 882 P.2d 909 (Alaska 1994); Peterson v. Peterson, 197 Cal. Rptr. 3d 588 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 2016); In re Marriage of Crook, 813 N.E.2d 198 (Ill. 2004); Manning v. 
Manning, 93 A.3d 566 (Vt. 2014). 
 197. See Kelly, 9 P.3d at 1049 n.3 (distinguishing relevant anti-assignment 
provisions of Railroad Retirement Act and Social Security Act). 
 198. Id. at 1048. 
 199. See In re Marriage of Zahm, 978 P.2d 498 (Wash. 1999) (distinguishing 
Hisquierdo because there was no offset or definitive Social Security value that 
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court held that “we are today neither dividing social security 
benefits nor providing an offset. Therefore, Hisquierdo is not 
violated by our holding.”200 
Of course, again, this begs the question of whether 
Congress intended to make such a distinction when it drafted 
Section 407, and whether the Court in Hisquierdo intended 
the prohibition of offsetting to include the offsetting of Social 
Security, itself, but not the offsetting of other property based 
on Social Security. Some courts do not draw this distinction 
but, instead, hold that reclassifying other marital property 
as separate property of the non-participating spouse to 
compensate for the participating spouse’s Social Security is 
the same as depriving the participating spouse of his or her 
Social Security.201 
ii. Offsetting Using the Actual Value of Social Security 
The approach adopted by the court in Cornbleth, and 
later in Kelly, was flatly rejected by the Superior Court of 
New Jersey in Hayden v. Hayden.202 In Hayden, the husband 
was forty-three years old and received a pension from his 
employment with the New Jersey State Police and, 
consequently, did not contribute to Social Security.203 The 
husband relied on Cornbleth to argue that the court should 
offset from the marital share of his pension the amount of 
hypothetical Social Security benefits he would have received 
had he not participated in the state police pension.204 
 
was determined such that, essentially, the court looked upon Social Security as a 
“consideration” that occurred after property distribution). 
 200. Kelly, 9 P.3d at 1049. 
 201. See Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 539 U.S. 572, 583 (1979); see also Johnson 
v. Johnson, 726 So. 2d 393, 394–95 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999); In re Marriage of 
Crook, 813 N.E.2d at 202; Depot v. Depot, 2006 ME 25, ¶ 11, 893 A.2d 995, 999–
1000. 
 202. Hayden v. Hayden, 665 A.2d 772 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1995). 
 203. Id. at 773. 
 204. Id. The wife’s expert valued the husband’s pension at $188,290, which did 
not account for the husband’s lack of Social Security benefits. Id. The husband’s 
expert valued the husband’s pension at $132,323.18, but based on the holding in 
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However, the court rejected the authority of Cornbleth and 
denied the husband’s claim on the basis that he could still 
accrue Social Security benefits based on other employment 
during his state police career or employment following his 
retirement.205 Thus, Hayden arguably rejected the offset 
approach for retirement benefits in lieu of Social Security in 
New Jersey. 
However, in 2004, the same court that decided Hayden 
decided Panetta v. Panetta.206 In Panetta, during the 
marriage, the husband was initially employed in the private 
sector, but subsequently, from 1977 to 2000, he was 
employed by the federal government.207 As a federal 
employee, he participated in the federal Civil Service 
Employees’ pension system. Therefore, he neither 
contributed to nor received Social Security benefits.208 The 
wife was employed by AT&T and contributed to Social 
Security through her employment.209 The parties divorced in 
1994, at which time the parties agreed, and the court 
subsequently ordered, that when the husband elected to 
retire and to begin receiving Social Security benefits, the 
husband would be entitled to adjust the wife’s portion of his 
pension by decreasing the wife’s portion by the value of the 
husband’s imputed Social Security benefits.210 The husband 
 
Cornbleth, reduced the value of the husband’s pension by $26,160.38, which 
represented the hypothetical value of Social Security the husband would have 
received had he been enrolled in Social Security. Id. at 773–74. 
 205. Id. at 775. The husband also was employed during the marriage as an 
adjunct professor at Seton Hall University. Id. at 773. 
 206. Panetta v. Panetta, 851 A.2d 720 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2004). 
 207. Id. at 722. 
 208. Id. at n.1. In fact, the husband received Social Security benefits from his 
employment prior to his civil service employment through which he derived the 
subject pension, and, thus, the court ultimately held that his Social Security 
benefit should be offset by his wife’s Social Security benefit, and then the wife’s 
marital portion of the husband’s pension should be offset against any remaining 
Social Security benefit that the wife received. Id. at 728–29. 
 209. Id. at 722. 
 210. Id. at 722–23. The court held that “it is impossible to calculate that portion 
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retired in May 2000, at which time both parties raised issues 
about the valuation of the husband’s pension and the Social 
Security offset.211 
In September 2002, the trial judge ruled that the court’s 
holding in Hayden, which was decided in 1995—after the 
agreement in Panetta was signed but before the husband 
retired—changed the law with respect to the offsetting of 
Social Security benefits.212 As a result, the court held that 
“under New Jersey law it was correct for a judge to refuse to 
reduce the valuation of a pension by the amount of the social 
security benefit that [one party] would have received if he [or 
she] had been in equivalent private employment.”213 
The husband appealed, arguing that the trial court erred 
in “finding that Hayden changed the law on the social 
security offset prior to [his] retirement [and in] disallowing 
the social security offset . . . .”214 On appeal, the Superior 
Court of New Jersey held that, in fact, Hayden did not change 
the law of pension offsets by denying the husband’s claim to 
offset.215 Rather, the Hayden court simply rejected the claim 
for an offset based on imputed or hypothetical Social Security 
benefits, and the court in Panetta simply confirmed the 
Hayden court’s rejection of that approach.216 Thus, the 
Panetta court rejected the trial court’s inappropriate reliance 
on Hayden to deny an offset based on actual Social Security 
 
of [the husband’s] pension attributed to . . . social security benefits . . . until [the 
husband’s] true and exact retirement date, pension benefits and social security 
benefits become known . . . .” Id. at 723 (referencing the amended judgment filed 
on March 21, 2000). 
 211. Id. at 723–24. 
 212. Id. at 725. 
 213. Id. at 724 (quoting trial court’s letter opinion referencing Hayden court’s 
rejection of Cornbleth holding). The court also determined that the husband was 
entitled to Social Security benefits related to his employment in the private sector 
prior to his employment with the federal government, which additionally affected 
the court’s valuation of the parties’ pension interests. Id. 
 214. Id. at 725. 
 215. Id. at 728–29. 
 216. Id. at 729. 
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benefits.217 Instead, the Panetta court held that “the purpose 
of the offset is to balance the retirement benefits accrued by 
each of the parties during the marriage”218 and that the best 
way to achieve this balance is to offset the participating 
spouse’s actual social security benefit against his or her 
share of the non-participating spouse’s pension.”219 Thus, the 
court recognized the possibility of offsetting to balance the 
retirement benefits accrued by each of the parties during the 
marriage, but the court treated the Social Security benefits 
like any other deferred distribution and held that the offset 
could not be calculated until the beneficiary spouse collected 
the Social Security benefits.220 The court held that, 
[t]he fairest and most equitable means is to deduct [the husband’s] 
actual social security benefit . . . from [the wife’s] actual social 
security benefit when she begins to collect it, and then offset the 
remainder . . . against [the wife’s] share of [the husband’s] pension. 
In other words, the partial participant’s actual social security 
benefit is deducted from the full participant’s benefit and the 
remainder . . . is offset against the full participant’s share of the 
partial participant’s pension.221 
Notwithstanding the court’s reasoning for its specific 
 
 217. Although the court in Panetta held that an offset of retirement benefits, 
in lieu of Social Security benefits, against actual Social Security benefits is 
appropriate, the court denied the husband’s claim for an offset based on the 
“hypothetical” aspect of his claim as well as for equitable reasons based on the 
husband’s failure to comply with the parties’ existing agreement. Id. at 724–25, 
729. 
 218. Id. at 728. 
 219. Id. at 729; see also Hochstetler v. Hochstetler, 2012-Ohio-2669; 
Eickelberger v. Eickelberger, 638 N.E.2d 130, 135 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994). 
 220. Panetta, 851 A.2d at 728–29; see also Schaffner v. Schaffner, 713 A.2d 
1245, 1249–50 (R.I. 1998) (holding that offsetting husband’s pension by 
hypothetical value of relinquished Social Security benefit would be inequitable, 
but that court should “take into account [wife’s] Social Security benefits when 
they commence.”). The Schaffner court noted that “[i]n return for that 
relinquishment [the husband] received decreased deductions from his paychecks 
while he continued to work and increased pension benefits upon retirement.” Id. 
at 1247. 
 221. Panetta, 851 A.2d at 729. 
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holding, it is clear that New Jersey, like Pennsylvania and 
Louisiana, embraces an interpretation of the scope of federal 
preemption that authorizes the court to equitably divide the 
parties’ marital property by offsetting a calculated marital 
value of Social Security benefits against community property 
that is otherwise divisible by the court under the applicable 
state property distribution scheme. In this way, arguably, 
the court does no damage to the federal law requiring that 
Social Security benefits be classified as “non-community” 
and, thereby, non-divisible property, by allowing the court to 
reclassify, under state law, marital property other than 
Social Security,222 so as to cure the inequity between the 
parties that otherwise results from the application of federal 
law. 
Support for New Jersey’s approach of offsetting a 
spouse’s private retirement benefits received in lieu of Social 
Security against the actual value of a participant spouse’s 
Social Security benefits is found in a long history of cases 
decided in Ohio.223 For example, in Eickelberger v. 
Eickelberger,224 in which the wife was to receive Social 
Security benefits upon retirement, but the husband, instead, 
participated in two pension plans, both of which were subject 
to equitable division as marital property, the court held that 
even though the court has no authority to divide interests in 
Social Security benefits, the trial court erred by not 
evaluating and considering the wife’s Social Security benefits 
when allocating marital retirement benefits in equitably 
dividing property.225 The court remanded the case “for 
 
 222. In the case of Louisiana, this would include any other marital property, 
see supra text accompanying notes 142–59, and in the case of Pennsylvania and 
New Jersey, this would include retirement benefits “in lieu of” Social Security 
benefits, see supra text accompanying notes 166–87, 202–22. 
 223. Neville v. Neville, 99 Ohio St. 3d 275, 2003-Ohio-3624, 791 N.E.2d 434; 
Hochstetler, 2012-Ohio-2669; Colley v. Colley, 2009-Ohio-6776; Parsons v. 
Parsons, 2008-Ohio-1904; Harshbarger v. Harshbarger, 2004-Ohio-3919, 814 
N.E.2d 105; Eickelberger, 638 N.E.2d at 130. 
 224. 638 N.E.2d at 130. 
 225. Id. at 134 (citing Smith v. Smith, 632 N.E.2d 555 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993), 
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further consideration concerning the impact of [the wife’s] 
potential Social Security benefits on the division of the 
parties’ pension and retirement benefits.”226 The court stated 
that, in making its consideration, the court 
should begin an analysis by calculating [the wife’s] potential future 
monthly Social Security benefits and [the husband’s] potential 
future PERS monthly benefits. The court may then offset [the 
wife’s] potential monthly Social Security benefits against [the 
husband’s] potential PERS monthly benefits. . . . The trial court can 
then equitably apportion the balance of the parties’ marital 
assets.227 
This is the same formula applied by the Superior Court 
of New Jersey in Panetta. 
Likewise, in Neville v. Neville,228 the court recognized a 
disparity of approximately $44,000 in the spouses’ expected 
Social Security benefits.229 To compensate for the disparity, 
the trial court awarded the wife equity in the parties’ marital 
home, which was valued at approximately $43,000.230 
However, the appellate court reversed, holding that Social 
Security benefits can only be offset against other deferred 
benefit retirement plans.231 
On appeal, the Ohio Supreme Court reversed, holding 
that, based on the catch-all232 provision of the state’s 
 
rev’d, 791 N.E.2d 434 (Ohio 2003); Cornbleth v. Cornbleth, 580 A.2d 369 (Pa. 
Super Ct. 1990) (noting that non-participants in Social Security are penalized 
because their pensions are deemed marital while private employees’ Social 
Security contributions are not). 
 226. Id. at 135. 
 227. Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 228. Neville, 99 Ohio St. 3d 275, 2003-Ohio-3624, 791 N.E.2d 434, at ¶ 12. 
 229. Id. at 275, 2003-Ohio-3624, 791 N.E.2d 434, at ¶ 2. 
 230. Id. at 275, 2003-Ohio-3624, 791 N.E.2d 434, at ¶ 2. 
 231. Id. at 275, 2003-Ohio-3624, 791 N.E.2d 434, at ¶ 4. 
 232. Under Ohio’s statutory scheme, the court is directed to consider all factors 
relevant to the equitable division of property. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 
3105.171(C)(1) (2015). This analysis includes considering “the duration of the 
marriage” and “the assets and liabilities of the [parties].” Id. § 3105.171(F)(1) – 
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distribution scheme, Social Security could be considered in 
relation to any or all assets in the division of marital 
property.233 As to the argument that this violates Hisquierdo 
by essentially dividing Social Security assets as marital 
property, the court held that it did not divide Social Security 
assets but, rather, considered its value in dividing other 
marital property, which was “precisely what the statute 
dictate[d].”234 Thus, although the issue on appeal addressed 
the narrower issue of whether offsetting the value of Social 
Security benefits must be applied only against similar 
deferred payment plans or whether offsetting may apply 
against other marital property, the court, nevertheless, offset 
other property using the actual value method, at least as 
closely as it could, given the property that it used as 
compensation. 
However, in Harshbarger v. Harshbarger,235 the trial 
court deviated from the “actual value” approach and applied 
the hypothetical offset method in determining retirement 
benefits.236 On appeal, the court addressed the specific 
question of the appropriate valuation method for offsetting 
Social Security benefits.237 The court recognized 
Pennsylvania’s Cornbleth decision as the leading decision 
supporting the hypothetical offset method.238 The court 
stated that 
[t]he Cornbleth method seems to be both the most thorough and the 
most equitable under the circumstances presented . . . . Specifically, 
this method appears to give both parties comparable credit in terms 
of the years of participation in their respective programs, whereas, 
 
(F)(2). In Neville, the “catch-all” provision directed the court to consider “[a]ny 
other factor that the court expressly finds . . . relevant and equitable.” Id. § 
3105.171(F)(10). 
 233. Neville, 99 Ohio St. 3d 275, 2003-Ohio-3624, 791 N.E.2d 434, at ¶ 11. 
 234. Neville, 99 Ohio St. 3d 275, 2003-Ohio-3624, 791 N.E.2d 434, at ¶ 12. 
 235. 2004-Ohio-3919, 814 N.E.2d 105. 
 236. Id. at 2004-Ohio-3919, 814 N.E.2d 105, at ¶¶ 8–9. 
 237. Id. at 2004-Ohio-3919, 814 N.E.2d 105, at ¶¶ 10–13. 
 238. Id. at 2004-Ohio-3919, 814 N.E.2d 105, at ¶¶ 19, 22. 
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in practice, the other methods may well penalize the PERS 
participant by subjecting a larger proportionate share of that 
spouse’s retirement to division as a marital asset.239 
However, the court further considered that the 
hypothetical offset approach becomes increasingly 
inequitable when one of the parties receives pension benefits 
and as the other party’s Social Security benefit approaches 
zero: 
Where the non–Social Security spouse’s retirement benefits accrued 
during the marriage exceed the Social Security spouse’s Social 
Security benefits accrued during the marriage, using the Social 
Security spouse’s actual social security benefits as an offset will 
always result in the equivalent of an equal division of the 
retirement benefits accrued during the marriage and is therefore 
the more equitable method of division, barring unusual 
circumstances justifying an unequal division.240 
The court opted for the “actual value” method as the most 
equitable for offsetting other property against Social 
Security benefits, but noted that an unequal division of 
assets may be appropriate when special circumstances 
justify such an award.241 
The court in Parsons v. Parsons considered such special 
circumstances.242 In Parsons, in evaluating its ability to 
determine the actual benefits that the parties anticipated, 
the court considered: the length of the marriage, the parties’ 
ages, their retirement status, their prospects for 
employment, their respective health status, their ongoing 
contributions to Social Security, and the indefinite nature of 
the spousal support award, and ultimately determined that 
the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying an 
 
 239. Id. at 2004-Ohio-3919, 814 N.E.2d 105, at ¶ 22. 
 240. Id. at 2004-Ohio-3919, 814 N.E.2d 105, at ¶ 27. 
 241. Id. at 2004-Ohio-3919, 814 N.E.2d 105, at ¶ 27. 
 242. 2008-Ohio-1904. 
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offset award.243 The court held that it “would be speculative 
and would unnecessarily assign a single simplistic value to a 
complex benefit that, depending on future events, will 
ultimately work an inequity on the parties.”244 Thus, the 
court was reluctant to apply an offset method for which it 
was not able to apply an “actual” value to the parties’ Social 
Security benefits. 
Conversely, in Colley v. Colley,245 the court distinguished 
Parsons, finding that the circumstances of the case did 
warrant the trial court’s consideration of Social Security 
benefits in the division of property. In fact, the trial court 
specifically stated that it did consider the husband’s Social 
Security “as a matter of equity in arriving at the final 
property distribution.”246 However, the trial court included 
the total value of the wife’s pension account on the balance 
sheet, but did not include the value of the husband’s Social 
Security benefits.247 The court held that although the court 
did consider the husband’s Social Security benefits, it 
“offer[ed] no explanation of how the court took those benefits 
into account in its division and distribution of property and 
contain[ed] no specific findings regarding setoff of the 
parties’ retirement benefits.”248 Accordingly, it held that the 
trial court’s “failure to make specific findings regarding the 
manner in which it calculates a setoff of retirement benefits, 
including Social Security benefits, constitutes an abuse of 
discretion.”249 
Finally, in Hochstetler v. Hochstetler,250 the court 
employed the same “dual-offset” of Social Security benefits 
 
 243. Id. at ¶ ¶ 16, 18, 19. 
 244. Id. at ¶ 16. 
 245. 2009-Ohio-6776. 
 246. Id. at ¶ 42. 
 247. Id. at ¶ 41. 
 248. Id. at ¶ 44. 
 249. Id. 
 250. 2012-Ohio-2669. 
2018] SOCIAL SECURITY AND DIVORCE 59 
that the New Jersey court in Panetta applied.251 First, the 
court offset the parties’ respective Social Security benefits by 
reducing the value of the husband’s benefits ($247,054.61) by 
the value of the wife’s benefits ($37,453.91), thereby deriving 
a remaining Social Security value for husband of 
$209,600.70.252 The court then offset that amount by the 
value of the wife’s SERS retirement account ($237,732.31), 
thereby leaving a SERS balance of $28,131.61 as the marital 
portion of the parties’ retirement benefits that was subject to 
division.253 
The husband appealed, claiming that Section 407 
prohibited the court from treating Social Security benefits as 
divisible.254 However, the court held that, with respect to the 
first offset of the parties’ respective Social Security benefits, 
the “federal statute does not forbid the court from 
considering or figuratively ‘offsetting’ the valuation of each 
spouse’s social security benefits in order to formulate an 
equitable property division. [Thus, n]o improper ‘division’ of 
social security benefits resulted from the court’s decision in 
this regard.”255 With respect to the offset of the remaining 
Social Security value with the wife’s SERS retirement, the 
court held that this offsetting was also valid256 and 
comported with Ohio’s provision for the equitable division of 
property, which provided: 
In making a division of marital property and in determining 
whether to make and the amount of any distributive award under 
this section, the court shall consider all of the following factors: . . . 
Any retirement benefits of the spouses, excluding the social security 
benefits of a spouse except as may be relevant for purposes of 
 
 251. See Panetta v. Panetta, 851 A.2d 720, 729 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2004). 
 252. Hochstetler, 2012-Ohio-2669, at ¶ 27. 
 253. Id. 
 254. Id. at ¶¶ 23–28. 
 255. Id. at ¶ 28. 
 256. Id. 
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dividing a public pension[.]257 
Accordingly, the court in Hochstetler held consistently 
with the long-standing precedent in Ohio that adopts the 
“actual value” of Social Security method when offsetting 
public pension benefits in divorce. Although Ohio embraces 
the same view that other jurisdictions like Pennsylvania, 
Arizona, and New Jersey adopt—that state courts may offset 
retirement benefits received in lieu of Social Security by a 
calculable value of Social Security—these states vary quite 
significantly on the nature of the Social Security that is 
calculated, insofar as whether it is an actual value derived 
from the benefits of the participating spouse or a 
hypothetical value derived from the foregone benefits of the 
non-participating spouse. 
Notwithstanding this distinction between the states, 
these jurisdictions adopt the policy that offsetting retirement 
benefits received in lieu of Social Security does not violate 
federal law. However, the following section addresses the 
jurisdictions that hold that federal law prohibits any form of 
offsetting in which the value of Social Security is calculated 
to affect the distribution of marital property. 
2. Offsetting Prohibited 
Notwithstanding the several states that provide for 
various methods of offsetting divisible marital property with 
a calculable value of Social Security to compensate for the 
arguable inequity of federal preemption, there are a number 
of states that embrace the underlying conclusion that the 
scope of federal preemption prohibits a state court from 
offsetting the value of Social Security benefits against other 
property in divorce.258 
Arkansas is an example of a state in which a court held 
that the scope of federal preemption of Social Security 
 
 257. Id. at ¶ 24. 
 258. See infra text accompanying notes 259–84. 
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benefits extends not only to prohibit the direct distribution 
of benefits,259 but also to prohibit state courts from offsetting 
retirement benefits in lieu of Social Security.260 Specifically, 
in Gentry v. Gentry, upon divorce, the parties entered a 
property settlement agreement, which the court 
incorporated into the parties’ divorce decree, wherein the 
parties agreed for the wife to acquire one-half of whatever 
benefit the husband might receive from Social Security.261 
When the husband began receiving benefits, he refused to 
pay the wife her half interest, and the wife filed a petition for 
contempt.262 The trial court held for the wife, finding that the 
property settlement agreement was enforceable and that the 
wife was entitled to a one-half share of the husband’s Social 
Security benefits.263 As a matter of first impression in 
Arkansas, the widely-respected Justice Ray Thornton relied 
on Hisquierdo’s broad application of the anti-assignment 
clause of Section 407 and held that the assignment of future 
Social Security benefits in the parties’ agreement was 
unenforceable under the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. 
Constitution.264 
 
 259. Gentry v. Gentry, 938 S.W.2d 231 (Ark. 1997). 
 260. Gray v. Gray, 101 S.W.3d 816 (Ark. 2003). 
 261. Gentry, 938 S.W.2d at 231–32. 
 262. Id. at 232. 
 263. Id. 
 264. See id. at 232–33; see also Kelley v. Kelley, 2012 Ark. App. 653, at 7, 2012 
WL 5834633, at *4 (relying on holding in Gentry to find that trial court could not 
enforce agreement to divide Tier I Railroad Retirement benefits, which court held 
were railroad equivalent of Social Security). Note, however, that the court in 
Gentry expressly limited its holding to the assignment of “future” receipt of 
benefits and concluded that “[o]nce Social Security benefits are received, they 
become the recipient’s personal property and he can do whatever he wishes with 
them, even use them to pay preexisting obligations.” Gentry, 938 S.W.2d at 232 
(citing United States v. Eggen, 984 F.2d 848, 850 (7th Cir. 1993)). But see Dinges 
v. Dinges, 743 N.W.2d 662, 666, 670–71 (Neb. Ct. App. 2008) (finding that where 
wife used $27,000 of Social Security back pay as down payment on $54,000 
modular home that she purchased for herself, payment was not traceable as 
divisible marital property upon divorce and once received, lump-sum Social 
Security payment remained protected by anti-assignment clause of § 407); 
Boulter v. Boulter, 930 P.2d 112, 115 (Nev. 1997) (quoting Hatfield v. Cristopher, 
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Subsequently, in Gray v. Gray, the husband wanted his 
“in lieu of” portion of his CSRS pension plan to be exempted 
from distribution as an offset against the wife’s Social 
Security.265 Again relying on Hisquierdo, the court clearly 
distinguished the husband’s private retirement benefits from 
actual Social Security benefits and held that the husband’s 
retirement plan benefits earned in lieu of Social Security 
were not exempted from the equitable division of marital 
property.266 In making this distinction, the court relied on 
the view of the Court of Appeals of Florida, in Johnson v. 
Johnson, which held that 
[a]n offsetting award . . . would upset the statutory balance and 
impair [the participant’s] economic security just as surely as would 
a regular deduction from his [or her] benefit check. The harm might 
well be greater. . . . [T]he offsetting award . . . would improperly 
anticipate payment by allowing [the non-participant spouse] to 
receive [his or] her interest before the date Congress has set for any 
interest to accrue. Any such anticipation threatens harm to the 
employee, and corresponding frustration to federal policy, over and 
above the mere loss of wealth caused by the offset.267 
 
841 S.W.2d 761, 767 (Mont. App. Ct. 1992)) (“It is clear from the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s opinion in Philpott v. Essex County Welfare Board, . . . that if a bank 
account contains social security funds, the funds are exempt from legal process.”); 
Kluck v. Kluck, 1997 ND 41, ¶ 31, 561 N.W.2d 263, 271 (“[I]dentifiable social 
security moneys in the hands of a divorcing spouse cannot be counted as marital 
assets to calculate divisions). This limited holding presents yet another level of 
disagreement among states with respect to whether Social Security payments 
already received may be directly assignable in divorce. For cases dealing with the 
enforceability of agreements, see supra note 116. 
 265. Gray, 101 S.W.3d 816 at 817. 
 266. Id. at 827–28. 
 267. Johnson v. Johnson, 726 So. 2d 393, 396 n.4 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999). See 
In re Marriage of Berthiaume, No. C5-90-2392, 1991 WL 90839, at *2 (Minn. Ct. 
App. June 4, 1991) (finding that the approach taken by court in Cornbleth was 
wrong by not fully appreciating the supremacy of federal law); Olson v. Olson, 
445 N.W.2d 1 (N.D. 1989); Loudermilk v. Loudermilk, 397 S.E.2d 905 (W.Va. 
1990); Mack v. Mack, 323 N.W.2d 153 (Wis. Ct. App. 1982); see also Schaffner v. 
Schaffner, 713 A.2d 1245, 1248 (R.I. 1998) (distinguishing Cornbleth and 
disallowing offset by subtracting hypothetical value of Social Security benefits of 
retirement “in lieu of” Social Security, where other party had received no Social 
Security benefits). Cf. Johnson v. Johnson, 2007 S.D. 56, 734 N.W.2d 801 (holding 
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Therefore, the Gray court held that pension benefits 
received in lieu of Social Security were not sufficiently 
analogous to Social Security so as to be exempted from 
marital property, whereas the pension benefits were 
contractual in nature, but the parties held no property 
interest in Social Security benefits.268 The court also held 
that it was the husband’s choice to opt for the pension plan 
instead of Social Security benefits and that he acquired more 
present benefits from this choice.269 
Thus, Arkansas stands as a state that interprets the 
scope of federal preemption to not only prohibit the 
distribution of Social Security benefits, but also to prohibit 
the court from offsetting a hypothetical portion of retirement 
benefits that are acquired in lieu of Social Security. However, 
Arkansas has yet to determine if, or how, the court may 
consider the effect of this preemption on its determination of 
the equitable division of marital property. 
As in Arkansas, courts in Nebraska have held that 
offsetting to compensate for the disparity in Social Security 
benefits between parties is prohibited by the Supremacy 
Clause and the Court’s holding in Hisquierdo.270 Specifically, 
 
that consideration was not equivalent with direct distribution in terms of effect 
on recipient’s benefits). 
 268. Gray, 101 S.W.3d at 827. 
 269. Id. at 827–28; see also In re Marriage of Boyer, 538 N.W.2d 293, 296 (Iowa 
1995) (noting wife’s willingness to leave her position of employment from which 
she might have derived Social Security); Schaffner, 713 A.2d at 1247 (finding that 
because husband voluntarily opted out of Social Security system by participating 
in private retirement fund, he was not entitled to claim its exemption from 
equitable distribution upon divorce). The dissent in Gray urges the court to adopt 
the view of Pennsylvania and Ohio, which allows for offsetting. Gray, 101 S.W.3d 
at 828 (Corbin, J., dissenting). The dissent held that even though it was the 
husband’s choice, his choice benefitted both parties and, thus, it would be a 
windfall for the wife not to offset against her Social Security. Id. 
 270. See Lorenzen v. Lorenzen, 883 N.W.2d 292, 298–99 (Neb. 2016) (ruling 
that there was to be no offsetting hypothetical value because this effectively 
assigns Social Security, which is prohibited); Webster v. Webster, 716 N.W.2d 47, 
56 (Neb. 2006) (ruling that there was to be no offsetting of actual social security 
value). 
Some courts prohibit offsetting in theory, but then compensate for any inequity 
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in Webster v. Webster, as a matter of first impression in 2006, 
the Supreme Court of Nebraska held that a state court is 
prohibited from offsetting the wife’s marital share of the 
husband’s pension by an amount reflecting the actual value 
of the difference between his marital share of his wife’s Social 
Security benefits and his wife’s share of her Social Security 
benefits.271 The court specifically noted that it was not 
impermissible, however, for the court to make a more 
generalized consideration of Social Security benefits as a 
factor “within the more elastic parameters of the court’s 
power to formulate a just and equitable division of the 
parties’ marital property.”272 The court held that such an 
approach is particularly proper when one spouse has worked 
to contribute to the increase of Social Security benefits.273 
However, like the Arkansas courts, the Webster court never 
reached this specific issue. 
In 2008, the Court of Appeals of Nebraska did reach this 
issue in Dinges v. Dinges, in which the court confirmed the 
 
by offsetting other property that is otherwise divisible, reasoning that any 
offsetting of Social Security in such a division of property is merely as an 
equitable factor authorized under the state property distribution law and not 
violative of federal law under § 407. For example, courts in Iowa and Washington 
adopt this approach. See In re Boyer, 538 N.W.2d at 296; In re Marriage of Zahm, 
978 P.2d 498, 503 (Wash. 1999); In re Marriage of Rockwell, 170 P.3d 572, 577 
(Wash. Ct. App. 2007); see also Shown v. Shown, 479 S.W.3d 611, 614 (Ky. Ct. 
App. 2015) (ruling that where wife was entitled to Social Security, court required 
consideration of husband’s non-eligibility for Social Security and then employed 
offset of husband’s teacher’s retirement account with hypothetical value of 
husband’s interest “in lieu of” Social Security as method of valuation without 
expressly prohibiting offsetting). However, because these courts express the basis 
of support for this approach as one of equitable consideration and specifically not 
one of offsetting calculable Social Security value, the discussion of these 
jurisdictions is reserved for the following section, which discusses the 
jurisdictions that permit the consideration of Social Security benefits as only one 
of many possible equitable factors bearing on the division of marital property. 
 271. Webster, 716 N.W.2d at 54. 
 272. Id. at 55 (quoting In re Zahm, 978 P.2d at 502) (finding Hisquierdo 
inapplicable where trial court does not compute a formal calculation of Social 
Security benefits nor offset a formal numerical value as a basis for the division of 
property). 
 273. Id. at 56. 
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prohibition against offsetting, but then determined the issue 
raised, but not addressed, in Webster, by holding that 
although the court is prohibited from offsetting Social 
Security benefits, it may properly consider such an award in 
equitably dividing the marital property.274 However, the 
court offered no insight into how it might consider and 
structure such an award.275 
In 2016, in Lorenzen v. Lorenzen, the Supreme Court of 
Nebraska confirmed the holdings in Webster and Dinges, but 
went no further in advancing the issue of how Social Security 
benefits may be considered in the distribution of property 
because neither party contended that this is how the benefits 
should be viewed.276 Rather, the parties and the court limited 
the issue to the classification of benefits as marital or 
separate property.277 However, the court based its decision 
on a case in Illinois—In re Marriage of Mueller278—that the 
Illinois Supreme Court had decided subsequent to the 
divorce decree issued in Lorenzen.279 
In Mueller, the court answered the issue that now 
presented itself to the court in Lorenzen, which was whether 
and how to offset from marital property benefits received in 
lieu of Social Security.280 The Mueller court held that 
 
 274. Dinges v. Dinges, 743 N.W.2d 662, 671 (Neb. Ct. App. 2008). 
 275. See id. 
 276. 883 N.W.2d 292, 296 (Neb. 2016). 
 277. Id. 
 278. 2015 IL 117876. 
 279. Lorenzen, 883 N.W.2d at 297–98. For a more in-depth discussion of In re 
Mueller, see infra notes 398–410 and accompanying text. 
 280. There is an important distinction between the two cases, however. In In 
re Mueller, the husband was seeking offset of the value of his wife’s actual Social 
Security benefits that were to be received in the future, but were excluded. See 
In re Mueller, 2015 IL 117876, ¶¶ 1–2. In Lorenzen, the husband was seeking the 
hypothetical value of his own benefits that he gave up. Lorenzen, 883 N.W.2d at 
294–95. The court in Lorenzen later held that although these are different, and 
Lorenzen’s request for hypothetical value may be less subject to speculation than 
those in In re Mueller, they still effectively offset benefits that are separate under 
state law, as well as federal law, and effectively serve as a direct offset from the 
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although reducing the husband’s pension benefits by an 
amount of hypothetical Social Security benefits that the 
husband might have received if he had been eligible was “‘not 
strictly speaking an offset,’” it still created “‘parallel benefits 
for the husband that would affect the division of marital 
property’” and, therefore, such a division was equally 
improper under Section 407.281 Consistent with the line of 
reasoning in Mueller with respect to the issue of how the 
court might “consider” the effect of such a holding in 
distributing marital property, the Lorenzen court held that: 
‘as a matter of policy, any rule permitting trial courts to consider 
the mere existence of Social Security benefits without considering 
their value, and thereby violating federal law, is nearly impossible 
to apply’ . . . because of ‘the uncertainties inherent in Social 
Security benefits’ and the speculation involved in estimating such 
benefits.282 
The court agreed that it would be “‘both illogical and 
inequitable’ to adjust the marital estate for ‘hypothetical 
Social Security benefits that, even if the husband had 
participated in that program, he may not ever receive.’”283 
Thus, although the court in Lorenzen recognized the holdings 
in Webster and Dinges as authorizing the court to consider 
the effect of this view of the scope of federal preemption—
extending the scope of preemption to include the offset of 
property received in lieu of Social Security by either actual 
or hypothetical values—in dividing marital property, the 
court determined, in accordance with the reasoning of the 
court in Mueller, that such consideration would be nearly 
impossible to apply.284 
 
marital estate. Id. at 298–99. 
 281. Id. at 297 (quoting In re Mueller, 2015 IL 117876, ¶ 5). 
 282. Id. at 298 (quoting In re Mueller, 2015 IL 117876, ¶ 26). 
 283. Id. (quoting In re Mueller, 2015 IL 117876, ¶ 26). 
 284. See id. at 298–99. Subsequent to the July 2016 Lorenzen decision, in 
November 2016, the Court of Appeals of Nebraska decided Smith v. Smith, No. 
A-15-1234, 2016 WL 6956771 (Neb. Ct. App. Nov. 29, 2016) in which the husband 
had $137,000 retirement that was marital and was distributed. Id. at *3–5. The 
2018] SOCIAL SECURITY AND DIVORCE 67 
Thus, Arkansas and Nebraska represent the posture of 
those states that have not yet addressed or officially 
embraced the position that a court may consider Social 
Security as an equitable factor in dividing marital property. 
Some states, like Arkansas, interpret the reasoning of 
Hisquierdo to resolve the issue. Other states, like Nebraska, 
are inclined to limit the scope of federal preemption to allow 
courts discretion under state property distribution laws to 
consider Social Security as a factor in determining the 
equitable division of property. In either posture, however, 
offsetting by calculating a hypothetical or actual Social 
Security value with which to offset other marital property, 
including retirement benefits in lieu of Social Security, is 
prohibited. 
3. “Considering” Social Security Benefits as an Equitable 
Factor in Dividing Property 
Even though many courts hold that offsetting is 
prohibited by the preemptive reach of Hisquierdo, and even 
though many of those courts, such as those in Nebraska, 
which nevertheless consider the offsetting issue but still 
prohibit offsetting—even for retirement benefits in lieu of 
Social Security—many state courts interpret the Social 
Security Act to allow a court to consider the effect of this 
broader application of federal preemption on the equitable 
division of marital property. The manner in which these 
states assume this posture and manifest this consideration 
often varies,285 but the objective is the same—to limit the 
 
wife’s Social Security was not distributed. See id. The trial court equalization 
judgment was for the husband to pay $50,902.40 and the only source available 
for payment was his retirement. The court said that the classifications of property 
were correct under Lorenzen, but that a QDRO must be used in consideration of 
the husband’s limited resources to make payment. Id. at 4–5. For cases discussing 
issue of Social Security as the sole source of income, see cases cited supra note 
93. 
 285. For example, courts in Iowa, Kentucky, and Washington have offset Social 
Security value, but framed it as an equitable consideration of future economic 
circumstances. In re Marriage of Boyer, 538 N.W.2d 293, 296 (Iowa 1995); Shown 
v. Shown, 479 S.W.3d 611, 614 (Ky. Ct. App. 2015) (finding that where wife was 
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scope of federal preemption of Social Security and, thereby, 
compensate spouses through the application of the equitable 
provisions of state property distribution laws. 
For example, there are several jurisdictions that 
effectively offset Social Security, without violating the 
broader application of Hisquierdo, by manifesting the offset 
as an equitable consideration affecting the future financial 
circumstances of the parties rather than as a calculated 
influence on the court’s division of marital property. The 
most demonstrative example of this is Washington, in the 
cases of In re Marriage of Zahm286 and In re Marriage of 
Rockwell.287 
In In re Zahm, in dividing property upon divorce, the 
trial court characterized the husband’s Social Security 
benefits as marital property, although it “neither assigned 
 
entitled to Social Security, court required consideration of husband’s non-
eligibility for Social Security and then employed offset of husband’s teacher’s 
retirement account with hypothetical value of husband’s interest “in lieu of” 
Social Security as method of valuation without expressly prohibit offsetting); In 
re Marriage of Zahm, 978 P.2d 498, 503 (Wash. 1999); In re Marriage of Rockwell, 
170 P.3d 572, 577–78 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007). Courts in North Dakota and Oregon, 
however, have, at one time, expressly prohibited offsetting based on the 
supremacy of federal law and the broad application of the reasoning in 
Hisquierdo. See Olson v. Olson, 445 N.W.2d 1, 11 (N.D. 1989) (“social security 
cannot be distributed or used as an offset in division of marital property.”); In re 
Marriage of Swan, 720 P.2d 747, 750–51 (Or. 1986) (holding that federal law 
preempted any inclusion of Social Security benefits in the court’s determination 
of property division, including offsetting). Subsequent to these respective 
decisions, these states have endorsed equitable considerations by the court. See 
Kluck v. Kluck, 1997 ND 41, ¶¶ 30–31, 561 N.W.2d 263, 270–71 (recognizing trial 
court’s authority to consider effect of property distribution—including exclusion 
of Social Security benefits as divisible part thereof—on parties’ future financial 
circumstances); Vitko v. Vitko, 524 N.W.2d 102, 104 (N.D. 1994) (ruling Social 
Security benefits excluded from court’s equitable division of marital property, but 
court may consider disability income “so as to determine the financial 
circumstances of each party to the divorce.”); In re Marriage of Herald, 322 P.3d 
546, 549 (Or. 2014) (finding court’s holding in Swan to be too sweeping and 
restrictive and, instead, holding that, within appropriate limits, it is proper for 
the court to consider anticipated Social Security benefits in effecting an equitable 
division of marital property). 
 286. 978 P.2d at 498. 
 287. 170 P.3d at 572. 
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nor calculated in a future value of these monies as part of the 
court’s property characterization and distribution.”288 The 
Court of Appeals of Washington held that this was an 
improper characterization of Social Security benefits, but 
held that the error was harmless since the court “did not 
order an actual distribution of those benefits.”289 Instead, 
“the trial court merely noted . . . that ‘61% of [the husband’s] 
social security was earned during marriage.’”290 The husband 
asserted that notwithstanding whether the benefits were 
ultimately apportioned or not, such consideration was 
factored into the distribution of the parties’ assets and, 
therefore, was improper.291 However, the court held that 
“mere consideration by a trial court of a party’s social 
security benefits in a marital dissolution proceeding is [not] 
reversible error.”292 Rather, “a trial court may still properly 
consider a spouse’s social security income within the more 
elastic parameters of the court’s power to formulate a just 
and equitable division of the parties’ marital property.”293 
Arguably, the court did precisely that in In re Rockwell 
when it compensated the wife with the present value of the 
Social Security that she would have received but was not 
entitled to draw due to the structure of her federal 
pension.294 Thus, the Washington Court of Appeals viewed 
“hypothetical offsetting” as a method for “consideration” of 
the parties’ financial circumstances in dividing the parties’ 
property. Ultimately, this is nothing more than an offset with 
other marital property, but because there is no actual 
calculation of the participant spouse’s Social Security—an 
approach that the Lorenzen court rejected as “illogical and 
 
 288. In re Zahm, 978 P.2d at 500. 
 289. Id. at 501. 
 290. Id. at 502. 
 291. Id. 
 292. Id. 
 293. Id. 
 294. In re Marriage of Rockwell, 170 P.3d 572, 577–78 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007). 
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inequitable” and “nearly impossible to apply”—the court 
viewed it as “a fair and proper means of considering social 
security or achieving overall fairness” without violating 
federal preemption.295 
Similarly, in Shown v. Shown, the Court of Appeals of 
Kentucky held that where the wife was entitled to Social 
Security but the husband was not, to divide the husband’s 
retirement account without considering its nature as a 
substitute for Social Security “effectively divides his ‘social 
security’ benefits anyway, leaving [his wife]’s Social Security 
benefits untouched, and unconsidered.”296 The court directed 
that to properly consider the husband’s ineligibility for Social 
Security on remand, the court must: 
compute the present value of a Social Security benefit that [the 
husband] would have received had he contributed to Social Security. 
That value should be deducted from the present value of [the 
husband]’s teachers’ retirement pension, prior to division of the 
parties’ pension plans. . . . Otherwise, for the courts to divide 
teacher retirement accounts in this manner puts every teacher 
spouse at grave risk as compared to those persons working in the 
private sector with federally protected Social Security accounts.297 
The court added that such complex financial calculations 
are necessary to determine the equities and should require 
expert testimony.298 Thus, like the Washington courts in 
Zahm and Rockwell, the Kentucky court in Shown effectively 
employed an indirect offset of the wife’s Social Security 
under the guise of mere consideration of the husband’s Social 
Security ineligibility.299 
 
 295. Id. at 578. 
 296. Shown v. Shown, 479 S.W.3d 611, 613 (Ky. Ct. App. 2015); see also Gross 
v. Gross, 8 S.W.3d 56, 57–58 (Ky. Ct. App. 1999) (“court’s consideration of [wife’s] 
non-prospective Social Security benefits in formulating [equitable] division of 
marital property is not preempted by [the Social Security Act]”). 
 297. Shown, 479 S.W.3d at 614. 
 298. Id. 
 299. See id. 
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In In re Marriage of Boyer, the Supreme Court of Iowa 
adopted essentially the same approach.300 As part of the 
equitable division of property, the trial court ordered the wife 
to pay the husband a cash settlement of $20,000 “to equalize 
the property distribution, and also recognizing and taking 
into consideration the greater benefit [the husband] will be 
getting from social security.”301 On appeal, the majority of 
the Iowa Court of Appeals, relying on the reasoning of 
Hisquierdo, concluded that the court may not “consider” 
Social Security benefits in property distributions.302 
Consequently, the Iowa Court of Appeals increased the cash 
settlement the wife was to pay the husband by $5,000, 
presumably to compensate for the trial court’s improper 
consideration of the husband’s Social Security benefits.303 
On appeal, relying on prior case law,304 the Iowa 
Supreme Court recognized distinctions between the Railroad 
Retirement Act applicable in Hisquierdo and the Social 
Security Act applicable in the case before it, but nevertheless 
agreed with the court below that Hisquierdo prohibits state 
courts from “directly or (by way of setoff) indirectly divid[ing] 
social security benefits in their formulation of economic 
terms and dissolution decrees.”305 However, the Supreme 
Court of Iowa disagreed with the lower court that the trial 
court’s “consideration” of the anticipated Social Security 
benefits of the parties amounted to an indirect offset.306 
Rather, the court held: 
We see a crucial distinction between: (1) adjusting property division 
 
 300. 538 N.W.2d 293, 293–94 (Iowa 1995). 
 301. Id. at 294. 
 302. Id. 
 303. Id. 
 304. In re Marriage of Schissel, 292 N.W.2d 421, 424–27 (Iowa 1980) (holding 
that court may consider military pension benefits in formulating economic terms 
of dissolution decree). 
 305. In re Boyer, 538 N.W.2d at 295. 
 306. Id. at 296. 
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so as to indirectly allow invasion of benefits; and (2) making a 
general adjustment in dividing marital property on the basis that 
one party, far more than the other, can reasonably expect to enjoy a 
secure retirement. [The court] should not invalidate a property 
division if a disproportionate expectation regarding social security 
benefits is acknowledged in the court’s assessment of the equities.307 
Like the court in Rockwell, the Boyer court held that 
while “a court cannot ‘divide’ the anticipated benefits or 
establish any exact setoffs on such a basis,” a court can weigh 
as a factor in fixing the economic terms of a dissolution 
decree “the fact that one party expects benefits that will not 
be enjoyed by the other.”308 
By doing this, the trial court did not value [the husband’s] social 
security and offset it against other property, nor did it divide his 
social security benefit. . . . Rather, the trial court focused solely on 
[the wife’s] foregone, indivisible social security benefits and valued 
them for purposes of comparing her economic future against [her 
husband’s]. . . . [T]his was appropriate—the trial court’s adjustment 
method simply removed both parties’ social security benefits from 
the equation in order to put them on comparable footing prior to 
dividing the remaining assets.309 
Thus, the court effectuated as an appropriate 
consideration what many courts otherwise prohibit as an 
indirect offset.310 The court noted that the adjustment that 
the trial court made was not proportional to the 
 
 307. Id.; see also Biondo v. Biondo, 809 N.W.2d 397, 402–03 (Mich. Ct. App. 
2011); Johnson v. Johnson, 2007 SD 56, ¶¶ 26–27, 734 N.W.2d 801, 808–09 
(finding as a matter of first impression that Social Security benefits may be 
considered as a factor, among others, when dividing marital property in a divorce 
action). 
 308. In re Boyer, 538 N.W.2d at 293–94. 
 309. In re Marriage of Rockwell, 170 P.3d 572, 577 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007). 
 310. See, e.g., Smith v. Smith, 2015 MT 256, ¶¶ 16–17, 381 Mont. 1, 358 P.3d 
171 (allowing consideration of Social Security benefits in division of property, but 
only as an equitable factor in considering economic circumstances of parties while 
cautioning against “achiev[ing] indirectly what [it] may not do directly” by 
succumbing to the temptation to simply shift property of equivalent value, 
thereby treating Social Security as marital property, which is an unacceptable 
practice). 
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disproportion of the parties’ Social Security interests, but 
further noted that the trial court’s adjustment was based not 
only on the disproportion in Social Security benefits but, 
rather, it was also based on the court’s “desire ‘to equalize 
the property distribution.’”311 Additionally, the court noted 
that “[t]he disproportion was in part a result of [the wife’s] 
willingness to leave her position [and forego Social Security 
benefits].”312 
The court’s interpretation of the holding in Hisquierdo as 
prohibiting “consideration” of Social Security benefits by way 
of indirect offset suggests that if the trial court’s adjustment 
were proportional to the disproportion of Social Security 
benefits, then the trial court’s “adjustment” would be 
unconstitutional as falling within the scope of federal 
preemption. However, the Boyer court held that “the 
adjustment here was not proportional because no attempt 
was made to shape the extent of the adjustment by 
computing the disproportion . . . [and, therefore,] the 
challenged consideration did not poison the trial court’s 
property division.”313 Thus, the court held: 
[A] state court is not required to pretend to be oblivious of the fact 
that one party expects benefits that will not be enjoyed by the other. 
This contrasting economic security can be weighed as a factor in 
fixing the economic terms of a dissolution decree. . . . [Therefore,] 
[w]e do not think the federal preemption legislation requires state 
courts under these circumstances to purge so obvious an economic 
reality in its assessment.314 
Accordingly, even though most courts hold that 
offsetting is prohibited by the preemptive reach of 
 
 311. In re Boyer, 538 N.W.2d at 296. 
 312. Id.; see also Gray v. Gray, 101 S.W.3d 816, 827 (Ark. 2003). 
 313. In re Boyer, 538 N.W.2d at 296; see also Litz v. Litz, 288 S.W.3d 753, 758 
(Mo. Ct. App. 2009) (holding that court may not offset but may consider Social 
Security in a way that “would not have a material impact on its division of marital 
property.”). 
 314. In re Boyer, 538 N.W.2d at 293–94, 296. 
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Hisquierdo, many of these same courts nevertheless allow a 
state court to consider the effect of this broad application of 
federal preemption on the overall division of marital 
property by viewing Social Security as one of many equitable 
factors bearing on the parties’ future financial 
circumstances.315 However, even at this level of the analysis, 
courts disagree about what this reconciliation means and 
how a court may implement it within a divorce proceeding. 
One of the states that most comprehensively addressed 
each level of the analysis of the court’s consideration of Social 
Security benefits is Maryland, where its courts have held 
that Social Security may not be directly distributed316 or 
offset,317 but that it may be considered as an equitable 
consideration in the division of property.318 Specifically, 
recall that in Pleasant v. Pleasant, the Court of Special 
Appeals of Maryland held that Social Security may not be 
directly distributed because 
the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution precludes 
states from intervening in the allocation of social security benefits. 
Consequently, social security benefits may not be considered 
 
 315. Lorenzen v. Lorenzen, 883 N.W.2d 292, 298–99 (Neb. 2016) (prohibiting 
offset of retirement benefits in lieu of Social Security, but recognizing holdings in 
Webster and Dinges, which authorized court to consider prohibition when making 
determination of property division); Simmons v. Simmons, 709 S.E.2d 666, 668 
(S.C. 2011) (ruling that parties’ agreement to apportion Social Security was 
unenforceable, but court considered the effect of preemption on equitable 
resolution of entire divorce judgment, including alimony, which court held to be 
“inextricably connected” to division of marital property). 
 316. Huntley v. Huntley, 145 A.3d 607, 613–14 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2016); 
Pleasant v. Pleasant, 632 A.2d 202, 206 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1993). 
 317. See Dapp v. Dapp, 65 A.3d 214, 220–21 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2013) (holding 
that Supremacy Clause of United States Constitution precluded enforcement of 
marital separation and property settlement agreement entitling ex-wife to one-
half of ex-husband’s “Tier I” retirement benefits, the component of ex-husband’s 
retirement benefits that served as substitute for Social Security benefits under 
Railroad Retirement Act of 1974, since assignment of Tier I benefits is prohibited 
by the Railroad Retirement Act). 
 318. See Brewer v. Brewer, 846 A.2d 1, 21 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2004) (ruling 
that courts, when seeking to compensate inequity, may generally consider non-
marital property to understand parties’ incomes and posture). 
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marital property or be subject to distribution in any manner in a 
divorce proceeding. . . . [However] a court could consider the fact 
that a party is receiving, or will receive, social security benefits, as 
“any other factor” in determining whether to make a monetary 
award.319 
Thus, the court attempted to reconcile both sides of the 
conflict—the broad federal law preempting the distribution 
of Social Security benefits in any manner and the state law 
permitting state courts to consider factors that are relevant 
to the equitable distribution of property. 
In 2016, the court in Jackson v. Sollie confronted the 
same balance.320 In Jackson, the husband and wife were 
married for thirty-five years.321 The sixty-one-year-old 
husband participated in the federal government’s CSRS 
program since 1977.322 Under the CSRS program, Social 
Security taxes are not withheld from the employee’s salary; 
thus, the employee is not entitled to Social Security 
benefits.323 However, for twelve years prior to his 
employment with the federal government, the husband 
worked in the private sector and contributed to Social 
Security during that time.324 Thus, upon retirement, the 
husband was entitled to limited Social Security benefits.325 
However, the fifty-eight-year-old wife participated in the 
Maryland State Retirement Service (MSRS) plan and was 
entitled to her state pension as well as full Social Security 
 
 319. Pleasant, 632 A.2d at 206, 207 n.3 (emphasis added). 
 320. 141 A.3d 1122, 1125 (Md. 2016) (finding that anticipated income may be 
considered as a factor). 
 321. Id. 
 322. Id. at 1124 n.2, 1125. 
 323. Id. at 1124 n.1. The CSRS program was replaced by the Federal 
Employees Retirement System (“FERS”). Unlike participants in the CSRS 
program, FERS participants contribute to Social Security; the husband opted not 
to participate in the FERS program. Id. at 1124 n.4, 1125 n.5. 
 324. Id. at 1125. 
 325. Id. 
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benefits upon retirement.326 The husband argued that, in 
dividing the parties’ property, the court should reduce his 
CSRS pension benefits by the embedded portion that was in 
lieu of Social Security.327 However, the trial court awarded 
each party fifty percent of the marital share of the other 
party’s divisible retirement benefits, which included only the 
wife’s state pension and the entirety of the husband’s federal 
CSRS pension, from which the husband appealed.328 
On appeal, the court addressed the jurisdictional split on 
the interpretation and application of the holding in 
Hisquierdo, which “preempted state courts from directly or 
indirectly interfering with [in this case, Social Security] 
benefits.”329 The Maryland court defined the issue as being 
whether “indirect” interference in Hisquierdo included both 
offsetting of other property—namely, retirement benefits in 
lieu of Social Security—as well as a more general 
consideration of Social Security in the overall property 
distribution scheme.330 With respect to offsetting, the court 
held that because of the difference in property interests 
between pension annuities and Social Security benefits, 
federal law preempts state courts from “offset[ting] the 
alleged embedded Social Security value in the CSRS 
pension” based on the Court’s finding in Hisquierdo that 
“‘[a]n offsetting award . . . would upset the statutory balance 
and impair petitioner’s economic security just as surely as 
would a regular deduction from his [or her] benefit check.’”331 
The court also held that “any valuation of hypothetical 
Social Security benefits allegedly located within the CSRS 
 
 326. See id. at 1124 n.2, 1125. 
 327. Id. at 1125. 
 328. See id. 
 329. See id. at 1128, 1131–34 (citing Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572, 
588 (1979). 
 330. See id. at 1131–34. 
 331. Id. at 1134–35 (quoting Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. at 588). 
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pension would be speculative.”332 However, with respect to a 
more generalized consideration of Social Security, the court 
held that “federal law does not prevent courts from generally 
considering a party’s participation in the Social Security 
program . . . because it does not involve the direct division of 
Social Security benefits or the indirect division of those 
benefits by way of an offset.”333 Rather, it may be considered 
as a statutory factor in “the determination of the parties’ 
relative economic circumstances at the time of the divorce 
proceeding.”334 In reaching this conclusion, the court drew a 
critical clarification regarding the relevant limitations of 
Section 407(a)’s prohibition against subjecting Social 
Security to “other legal process[es]” whereas the U.S. 
Supreme Court has limited the phrase “other legal process” 
to some judicial mechanism by which control over property 
passes from one person to another, which the Jackson court 
found does not include a divorce court’s consideration of 
“anticipated or actual Social Security benefit payments as a 
factor relevant to the equitable distribution of property.”335 
The court reasoned that for a court to fail to make such 
considerations is to “ignore reality” and results in “a 
distorted picture of [each] spouse’s financial needs, and, in 
turn, an inequitable division of the marital property.”336 
Accordingly, the Jackson court held that “a trial court is 
required to consider the parties’ actual or anticipated Social 
Security benefits as a relevant factor” under the applicable 
state property distribution provisions.337 Provided the trial 
court neither directly distributes nor indirectly offsets a 
 
 332. Id. at 1135. 
 333. Id. 
 334. Id. at 1136 (citing In re Marriage of Zahm, 978 P.2d 498, 503 (Wash. 1999) 
(en banc)). 
 335. Id. (quoting Washington State Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs. v. 
Guardianship Estate of Keffeler, 537 U.S. 371, 385 (2003)). 
 336. Id. at 1136–37 (quoting Depot v. Depot, 2006 ME 25, ¶ 17, 893 A.2d 995, 
1101–02). 
 337. Id. at 1138 (emphasis added). 
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formally calculated lump sum value equated with Social 
Security in equitably dividing property, Social Security must 
be considered with all of the other past, present, and future 
financial circumstances of the parties.338 Thus, the court 
concluded that under Maryland’s statutory property 
distribution scheme, a monetary award is a valid means of 
compensating for the inequity of the preempted distribution 
of marital property.339 
Specifically, the court noted that under Maryland’s 
statutory scheme, there are eleven factors that the court 
must consider, several of which would include the parties’ 
actual or anticipated Social Security benefits.340 In terms of 
 
 338. See id. (first quoting Depot, 2006 ME 25 at ¶ 10, 893 A.2d at 999; and then 
quoting In re Zahm, 978 P.2d at 501). 
 339. See id. at 1139. 
 340. See id. at 1139–40. Section 8–205(b) of the Maryland Code of Family Law 
lists the considerations that a court must take into account in determining a 
monetary award: 
(1) the contributions, monetary and nonmonetary, of each party to the 
well-being of the family; 
(2) the value of all property interests of each party; 
(3) the economic circumstances of each party at the time the award is to 
be made; 
(4) the circumstances that contributed to the estrangement of the 
parties; 
(5) the duration of the marriage; 
(6) the age of each party; 
(7) the physical and mental condition of each party; 
(8) how and when specific marital property or interest in property 
described in subsection (a)(2) of this section, was acquired, including the 
effort expended by each party in accumulating the marital property or 
the interest in property described in subsection (a)(2) of this section, or 
both; 
(9) the contribution by either party of property described in § 8–201(e)(3) 
of this subtitle to the acquisition of real property held by the parties as 
tenants by the entirety; 
(10) any award of alimony and any award or other provision that the 
court has made with respect to family use personal property or the 
family home; and 
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consideration and valuation, the court stated that non-
marital Social Security benefits need not be evaluated in the 
same manner as marital property. 
It is enough if the court is generally aware of the relative wealth of 
the parties, in order that it can determine whether it would be 
equitable to award a greater share of marital property to the spouse 
owning less of the total property and having less wealth because of 
that spouse’s greater need and the wealthy spouse’s lesser need for 
additional assets.341 
Upon consideration of these factors, the court then has 
the discretion to grant a monetary award to adjust the 
equities of the parties with respect to the division of marital 
property.342 Because the equitable factors allow the court to 
consider circumstances that are not limited to a party’s 
property rights, the reasoning of Hisquierdo is inapposite, 
and considering Social Security—albeit a non-contractual 
interest—as an equitable factor with respect to the division 
of marital property, is appropriate.343 The reasoning of the 
court in Jackson, therefore, accommodates the approach 
taken by courts like In re Zahm and In re Rockwell, which 
prohibited the offsetting of Social Security benefits but 
effectively offset other marital property as a means of 
 
(11) any other factor that the court considers necessary or appropriate 
to consider in order to arrive at a fair and equitable monetary award or 
transfer of an interest in property described in subsection (a)(2) of this 
section, or both. 
MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 8–205(b) (West 2017). 
 341. Jackson, 141 A.3d at 1140 (quoting Melrod v. Melrod, 574 A.2d 1, 9 (Md. 
Ct. Spec. App. 1990)). 
 342. See id. at 1140–41. 
 343. See id. at 1131–36; see also Neville v. Neville, 99 Ohio St. 3d 275, 2003-
Ohio-3624, 791 N.E.2d 434, at ¶ 11 (“We believe that allowing consideration of 
Social Security benefits in relation to all marital assets is the more reasoned 
approach. . . . Although a party’s Social Security benefits cannot be divided as a 
marital asset, those benefits may be considered by the trial court under the 
catchall category as a relevant and equitable factor in making an equitable 
distribution. Accordingly, . . . a trial court, in seeking to make an equitable 
distribution of marital property, may consider the parties’ future Social Security 
benefits in relation to all marital assets.”). 
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considering Social Security without violating the broad 
application of Hisquierdo. 
Likewise, in Biondo v. Biondo, much like the parties in 
Simmons,344 the parties entered a settlement in which they 
agreed to equalize their Social Security benefits.345 The 
Court of Appeals of Michigan held that federal law 
preempted the state court from enforcing the agreement, 
which it accepted as having been entered by the parties by 
mutual mistake, and the court remanded the case for the 
trial court to address the issue of “whether the amount of the 
parties’ anticipated social security benefits may play any 
part in a modified judgment reallocating marital 
property.”346 Like the courts in In re Boyer and Jackson, the 
Biondo court determined that in dividing marital property, 
the state court would consider statutory factors relevant to 
its determination and, therefore, held that “[t]he amount of 
a spouse’s anticipated or received social security benefits 
qualifies as relevant to several of the . . . factors, including 
the contributions each made to the marital estate, their 
‘necessities and circumstances,’ and ‘general principles of 
equity.’”347 Relying on the Boyer court’s distinction between 
adjusting property division so as to invade actual benefits 
and making a general adjustment in assessing the equities 
of the parties,348 the court held that a circuit court may 
consider the parties’ anticipated Social Security benefits as 
one of the many factors to be considered when devising an 
equitable distribution of property, but the appellate court 
cautioned that “the court may not treat social security 
benefits as tantamount to a marital asset. Instead, the 
circuit court may take into account, in a general sense, the 
extent to which social security benefits received by the 
 
 344. Simmons v. Simmons, 709 S.E.2d 666, 666 (S.C. 2011). 
 345. Biondo v. Biondo, 809 N.W.2d 397, 398–99 (Mich. Ct. App. 2011). 
 346. Id. at 402. 
 347. See id. (quoting Sparks v. Sparks, 485 N.W.2d 893, 901 (Mich. 1992)). 
 348. See supra note 305 and accompanying text. 
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parties affect the . . . factors.”349 With respect to how a court 
might account for this, however, the court did not issue any 
specific directive for formulating an equitable property 
division.350 
Undertaking that issue, however, several courts have 
attributed an unequal percentage of marital property to each 
spouse as a means of doing equity after generally considering 
the parties’ respective Social Security benefits as an 
equitable factor bearing on the ultimate division of 
property.351 For example, in Delaware, in Forrester v. 
Forrester, the court determined that retirement benefits 
received “in lieu of” Social Security benefits are divisible as 
marital property and may not be offset.352 However, the court 
held that the divorce court may consider the fact that they 
are divisible in determining an equitable distribution of 
property.353 The court added that it may consider “the 
existence and the amount of Social Security benefits in the 
course of an equitable property division, even where that 
consideration might lead the Family Court to alter its 
division of the marital estate.”354 In doing this, the trial court 
opted that, rather than determining the anticipated future 
value of hypothetical Social Security contributions and 
subtracting that value from the marital portion of the 
divisible estate, it could “rectify any imbalance by awarding 
a lesser or greater portion of the pension [of the non-
 
 349. See Biondo, 809 N.W.2d at 403. 
 350. See id. at 402–03. 
 351. See In re Marriage of Morehouse, 121 P.3d 264, 267 (Colo. App. 2005); 
Stanley v. Stanley, 956 A.2d 1 (Del. 2008); Forrester v. Forrester, 953 A.2d 175 
(Del. 2008); see also Mahoney v. Mahoney, 681 N.E.2d 852 (Mass. 1997); Johnson 
v. Johnson, 2007 SD 56, ¶ 27, 734 N.W.2d 801, 808–09. 
 352. See Forrester, 953 A.2d at 185. 
 353. Id. 
 354. Id. The statute that the court held to authorize this approach “permit[ted] 
the Family Court to consider the ‘economic circumstances of each party at the 
time the division of property is to become effective.’” Id. at 185 n.42 (quoting DEL. 
CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 1513(a)(8) (2008)). 
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participating spouse] after comparing the respective 
economic positions of the parties, their employment history, 
annual income, and assets as required by the statute.”355 
In Forrester, the court concluded that fifty percent of the 
husband’s retirement that was in lieu of Social Security was 
sufficient to represent this equitable consideration.356 Thus, 
the court held that the trial court appropriately “considered” 
the parties economic equities.357 Of course, what this simply 
amounts to is an indirect offset with other marital property, 
which, in effect, is no different than what the State of 
Louisiana provides for by statute.358 Also, there was no direct 
evidence reported in the Forrester opinion that supported 
how a fifty percent division of other retirement benefits 
constituted an equitable division that rectified any 
imbalance that may have resulted given that the husband 
was not entitled to a portion of the wife’s accrued Social 
Security benefits. Thus, it seems that the court either did not 
truly “consider” the resulting inequities—(how could it, 
without calculating any hypothetical or actual Social 
Security value?359)—or it “actually” valued the wife’s future 
income of Social Security, along with the husband’s “in lieu 
of” benefits, to determine that fifty percent of the assets was 
the equitable division of property that accounted for the 
inherent inequity of federal preemption. Either way, the 
result is effectively the same—an offset of divisible marital 
property that compensates for the inequitable consequence 
of the federal preemption of Social Security benefits.360 
 
 355. Id. at 186 n.45. 
 356. Id. at 186. 
 357. Id. 
 358. See supra note 142 and accompanying text. 
 359. See In re Marriage of Mueller, 2015 IL 117876, ¶ 25; Lorenzen v. 
Lorenzen, 883 N.W.2d 292, 298 (Neb. 2016). 
 360. But see In re Marriage of Anderson, 252 P.3d 490, 494–95 (Colo. App. 
2010) (stating that a court may not presume invalid offset just because of unequal 
distribution of property after considering Social Security, especially when other 
factors are relevant); Hornung v. Hornung, 146 A.3d 912, 926 (Conn. 2016) 
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Just one month after Forrester, the court decided Stanley 
v. Stanley.361 In that case, the trial court ordered the 
husband to pay part of his Social Security Disability lump-
sum benefits to the wife as part of a modification of a 
stipulated property division that was based upon the wife 
then receiving less than she would have received under the 
original agreement.362 The court held that this violated 
federal law by directly dividing the husband’s Social Security 
benefit.363 Therefore, as the court did in Simmons,364 the 
Stanley court held that it was appropriate to reopen and 
reconsider the equitable distribution of property and, as in 
Forrester, determined that Social Security may be considered 
as one of the factors when dividing property.365 However, the 
 
(concluding that a lump sum alimony award does not necessarily constitute 
functional property distribution). 
 361. 956 A.2d 1 (Del. 2008). 
 362. The agreement was based on the wife receiving fifty percent, or $1,341.00, 
of the husband’s pension, but when the husband applied for SSDI, her benefit 
was reduced to $367.00. Id. at 2. 
 363. Id. at 5. 
 364. See 709 S.E.2d 666, 668 (S.C. 2011). 
 365. See Forrester v. Forrester, 953 A.2d 175, 185–86; see also In re Anderson, 
252 P.3d at 490 (holding that although Social Security Act prohibits distribution 
of marital property to offset computed value of Social Security, court may grant 
unequal distribution of property based on fact that one party is more likely to 
enjoy secured retirement than the other and in making that determination, court 
may not presume unequal distribution of property representing an impermissible 
offset of Social Security benefits, especially when justified by a combination of 
factors, only one of which was disparity in parties’ future Social Security 
benefits); In re Marriage of Morehouse, 121 P.3d 264, 267 (Colo. App. 2005); In re 
Marriage of James, 950 P.2d 624 (Colo. App. 1997); Skibinski v. Skibinski, 2009 
ME 13, ¶¶ 5–11, 964 A.2d 641, 642–43 (stating that although the court is 
prohibited from treating Social Security benefits as marital property, it 
considered those benefits as a relevant factor in reaching equitable division of 
parties’ property); Depot v. Depot, 2006 ME 25, ¶¶ 9–10, 893 A.2d 995, 998–99 
(stating that although Social Security may not be transferred or attributed a 
lump-sum value and offset, court may consider benefits as a relevant factor when 
fashioning an equitable division of parties’ marital estate, particularly when 
anticipated benefits are relevant to a multiplicity of factors affecting parties’ 
respective economic circumstances under state property distribution laws). But 
see Bradbury v. Bradbury, 2006 ME 26, ¶ 7, 893 A.2d 607, 609–10 (holding that 
trial court did not abuse discretion by not considering given facts of case). 
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court reversed the trial court’s order that the husband’s 
Social Security benefits be assigned to the wife and, instead, 
held that the “[h]usband’s payment to [the w]ife must come 
from a different source, to be determined on remand.”366 
In Stanley, the court noted the then-existing split in 
authority regarding the treatment of Social Security benefits 
in the equitable division of the parties’ assets.367 However, 
the court in Stanley opted for the “equitable consideration” 
approach, holding that, 
while a trial court may not distribute marital property to offset the 
computed value of social security benefits, it may premise an 
unequal distribution of property—using, for example, a 60–40 
formula instead of 50–50—on the fact that one party is more likely 
to enjoy a secure retirement. . . . [S]ocial security benefits may be 
considered as a factor, among others, when dividing marital 
property. This adheres to the federal restrictions, for it is not a 
direct division of [the husband’s] social security.368 
 
 366. Stanley, 956 A.2d at 2. 
 367. At the time of Stanley, twelve states “considered” Social Security benefits 
in arriving at an equitable division of the parties’ other assets. See Stanley, 956 
A.2d at 4 n. 6 (citing In re Morehouse, 121 P.3d at 267; then citing In re Marriage 
of Boyer, 538 N.W.2d 293, 293–94, 296 (Iowa 1995); then citing In re Marriage of 
Brane, 908 P.2d 625, 626, 628 (Kan. Ct. App. 1995); then citing Pongonis v. 
Pongonis, 606 A.2d 1055, 1058 (Me. 1992); then citing Depot, 2006 ME 25 at ¶¶ 
14–17, 893 A.2d at 998; then citing Pleasant v. Pleasant, 632 A.2d 202, 206, 207, 
n.3 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1993); then citing Mahoney v. Mahoney, 681 N.E.2d 852, 
856 (Mass. 1997); then citing Rudden v. Rudden, 765 S.W.2d 719, 720 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 1989); then citing Dinges v. Dinges, 743 N.W.2d 662, 671 (Neb. Ct. App. 
2008); then citing Neville v. Neville, 99 Ohio St. 3d 275, 2003-Ohio-3624, 791 
N.E.2d 434, at ¶ 11; then citing Johnson v. Johnson, 2007 SD 56, ¶ 27, 734 
N.W.2d 801, 808; then citing Olsen v. Olsen, 2007 UT App 296, ¶22, 169 P.3d 
765, 772; and then citing In re Marriage of Zahm, 978 P.2d 498, 502 (Wash. 1999) 
(en banc)). Eight states prohibited “consideration.” See id. at 4 (citing Johnson v. 
Johnson, 726 So. 2d 393, 396 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999)); In re Marriage of Crook, 
813 N.E.2d 198, 204 (Ill. 2004); In re Marriage of Berthiaume, No. C5-90-2392, 
1991 WL 90839, at *1–2 (Minn. Ct. App. June 4, 1991); Wolff v. Wolff, 929 P.2d 
916, 921 (Nev. 1996); English v. English, 879 P.2d 802, 808 (N.M. Ct. App. 1994); 
Olson v. Olson, 445 N.W.2d 1, 11 (N.D. 1989); In re Marriage of Swan, 720 P.2d 
747, 752 (Or. 1986); Reymann v. Reymann, 919 S.W.2d 615, 617 (Tenn. Ct. App. 
1995); In re Marriage of Mack, 323 N.W.2d 153, 157 (Wis. Ct. App. 1982). 
 368. Stanley, 956 A.2d at 4–5. 
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Therefore, the court held that the trial court’s order that 
the husband pay the wife money out of his SSDI lump-sum 
benefit violated federal law and must be revised “to provide 
for payment from any other source the court deem[ed] 
appropriate.”369 Thus, the court simply held that Social 
Security benefits may be considered in determining a fair 
and equitable division of property, as long as the 
compensation for any inequity does not directly affect the 
receipt of Social Security benefits but, rather, is derived from 
some other property.370 Again, although this solution is 
framed in the context of a determination about the future 
equities of the parties, which includes a general 
consideration of Social Security benefits as a source of future 
disparate income, we must be realistic about what the court’s 
solution entails—it is an authorization to offset the value of 
disparate Social Security benefits with other marital 
property, which, in effect, is nothing more than what the 
State of Louisiana authorizes by statute. 
4. Total Preemption 
There are at least four jurisdictions—including 
Alaska,371 Illinois,372 Nevada,373 and Vermont374—that adopt 
 
 369. Id. at 5. 
 370. See id.; see also Phipps v. Phipps, 864 P.2d 613, 616–17 (Idaho 1993) 
(enforcing agreement for husband to pay wife portion of retirement funds where 
agreement did not require transfer of Social Security funds and payment could 
be derived from other retirement fund sources). 
 371. See Cox v. Cox, 882 P.2d 909, 920 (Alaska 1994) (holding that given 
speculative nature of future benefits using Social Security as a factor in 
determining equities is simply not a “wise” approach). 
 372. See infra text accompanying notes 381–410. 
 373. See Wolff v. Wolff, 929 P.2d 916, 921 (Nev. 1996). 
 374. See Manning v. Schultz, 2014 VT 22, ¶¶ 11–12, 93 A.3d 566, 570 (holding 
that federal law preempts distribution and offset of Social Security benefits, and 
recognizing state division on issue of court’s consideration of benefits as factor in 
determining equitable division of property, but holding that because its own state 
law authorized division of only property owned by parties, there is no basis in law 
for dividing, offsetting, or considering Social Security benefits in distribution of 
marital property). 
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the view that the scope of federal preemption extends to 
prohibit state courts from considering Social Security 
benefits in any way as part of the division of marital 
property.375 Of these jurisdictions, like the courts in 
Maryland, Illinois has considered the entire gamut of 
approaches to the issue of Social Security benefits, including 
direct distribution,376 offsetting377—even upon the 
 
 375. California is a total preemption state, but based only on California law. 
See In re Marriage of Peterson, 197 Cal. Rptr. 3d 588 (Cal. Ct. App. 2016). For a 
further discussion of In re Peterson, see infra text accompanying notes 412–21. 
Some states are not clear on the issue of consideration. See, e.g., English v. 
English, 879 P.2d 802, 808 (N.M. Ct. App. 1994). In North Dakota, the Supreme 
Court in Olson v. Olson held that courts “shall not consider” Social Security, but 
actually only applied to offset. See 445 N.W.2d 1, 6–7 (N.D. 1989). Subsequent 
decisions have provided for consideration. See Kluck v. Kluck, 561 N.W.2d 263, 
270 (N.D. 1997); Vitko v. Vitko, 524 N.W.2d 102, 103 (N.D. 1994). For a further 
discussion of Vitko, see supra note 285 and accompanying text. In Tennessee, the 
court in Reymann v. Reymann followed the Oregon Supreme Court’s decision in 
In re Marriage of Swan, 720 P.2d 747 (Or. 1986) to deny consideration, but the 
court really equated “consideration” with offsetting, so Tennessee is classified as 
“unknown.” See Reymann v. Reymann, 919 S.W.2d 615, 617 (Tenn. Ct. App. 
1995); see also Loudermilk v. Loudermilk, 397 S.E.2d 905, 909–10 (W.V. 1990) 
(prohibiting offsetting based on Olson v. Olson, 445 N.W.2d 1, 6–7 (N.D. 1989), 
but taking no definitive position on manner of consideration). 
 376. See In re Marriage of Evans, 406 N.E.2d 916, 918 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980) 
(recognizing the basic concept that Social Security benefits are excluded from 
distribution upon divorce), rev’d on other grounds, 406 N.E.2d 916 (Ill. 1980). The 
court held that Congress has already expressly defined the parameters of its 
intent with respect to the scope of preemption by establishing specific 
requirements for the qualification of spouses. As long as the parties were married 
for at least ten years, and the under-employed spouse remains unmarried and is 
at least sixty-two years old, then the under-employed spouse has a statutorily 
defined interest in the ex-spouse’s Social Security benefits, which includes 
exceptions for alimony and child support. See In re Evans, 406 N.E.2d at 918 
(discussing 42 U.S.C. § 659(a)); see also In re Swan, 720 P.2d at 751–52. Congress 
already contemplated the contingency of divorce and defined each spouse’s 
interest. Outside of this allowance, Social Security benefits simply cannot be 
divided upon divorce. In re Evans, 406 N.E.2d at 918. 
 377. See In re Marriage of Hawkins, 513 N.E.2d 143, 147 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987) 
(ruling that trial court’s award to wife of extra $10,000 in property distribution 
to make up for disparity resulting from Social Security benefits husband was to 
receive upon retirement violated federal scheme and principles of federal 
supremacy). 
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agreement of the parties378—and equitable consideration.379 
However, contrary to the conclusion of the Maryland courts, 
Illinois courts have rested on the policy of “total 
preemption.”380 
In 2004, in In re Marriage of Crook, the Supreme Court 
of Illinois grappled with the issue of the court’s authority to 
consider the inequitable effect of preemption in its 
application of state property distribution laws, specifically in 
the context in which one spouse participates in a retirement 
plan in lieu of Social Security.381 In In re Crook, upon divorce, 
the trial court equally divided the parties’ respective 
benefits.382 Thus, the husband received half of his wife’s 
State University Retirement System (SURS) pension, but 
the wife, who was only fifty-five years old, received no part of 
the husband’s Social Security because she was not old 
enough to qualify under the statutorily defined marital 
entitlement.383 Therefore, the husband would receive $850 in 
Social Security and $460 a month from his wife’s pension, 
while the wife would receive $460 a month, total.384 The wife 
appealed, arguing that the court should have considered the 
husband’s future Social Security benefits in making its 
award of marital property.385 Thus, she argued for the court 
to let her keep her pension and to let her husband keep his 
 
 378. See In re Marriage of Hulstrom, 794 N.E.2d 980, 985-86 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003) 
(holding that only exception to the anti-alienation provision of the Social Security 
Act was 42 U.S.C. § 659(a), which allowed former spouse to reach Social Security 
benefits for alimony or child support, but not for property division, and the 
parties’ agreement did not circumvent limitations of federal preemption). 
 379. See In re Marriage of Crook, 813 N.E.2d 198, 205 (Ill. 2004). 
 380. See cases cited infra notes 381–410. 
 381. In re Crook, 813 N.E.2d at 199–200. 
 382. Id. 
 383. In re Marriage of Crook, 778 N.E.2d 309, 312 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002), aff’d in 
part, rev’d in part, 813 N.E.2d 198 (Ill. 2004). 
 384. In re Crook, 813 N.E.2d at 199. 
 385. Id. at 200. 
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Social Security benefits, and the court agreed.386 The 
husband then appealed to the Illinois Supreme Court, which 
held that because pension benefits were divisible marital 
property, the court was forced to consider the interplay 
between Illinois divorce law and the Social Security Act.387 
Applying the reasoning of Hisquierdo,388 the court held 
that “[a]lthough the courts in a number of other states have 
permitted a trial judge to consider a spouse’s anticipated 
Social Security benefits as one factor, among others, in 
making an equitable distribution of the distributable marital 
assets, we reject that analysis.”389 The court reasoned that 
[i]nstructing a trial court to “consider” Social Security benefits, as 
the appellate court did in this case, either causes an actual 
difference in the asset distribution or it does not. If it does not, then 
the “consideration” is essentially without meaning. If it does, then 
the monetary value of the Social Security benefits the spouse would 
have received is taken away from that spouse and given to the other 
spouse to compensate for the anticipated difference. This works as 
an offset meant to equalize the property distribution. That this type 
of “consideration” amounts to an offset is recognized in the well-
reasoned decisions from other state jurisdictions holding that under 
Hisquierdo, it is improper for a circuit court to consider Social 
Security benefits in equalizing a property distribution upon 
dissolution.390 
 
 386. Id. at 200–01. 
 387. See id. at 200. 
 388. 439 U.S. 572, 590 (1979). 
 389. See In re Crook, 813 N.E.2d at 204–05 (first citing In re Marriage of Zahm, 
978 P.2d 498 (Wash. 1999) (en banc); then citing Mahoney v. Mahoney, 681 
N.E.2d 852 (Mass. 1997); then citing In re Marriage of Boyer, 538 N.W.2d 293 
(Iowa 1995); then citing In re Marriage of Brane, 908 P.2d 625 (Kan. Ct. App. 
1995); then citing Eickelberger v. Eickelberger, 638 N.E.2d 130 (Ohio Ct. App. 
1994); then citing Pleasant v. Pleasant, 632 A.2d 202, 206, 207 n.3 (Md. Ct. Spec. 
App. 1993); then citing Pongonis v. Pongonis, 606 A.2d 1055, 1058 (Me. 1992); 
then citing Holland v. Holland, 588 A.2d 58 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991); and then citing 
Rudden v. Rudden, 765 S.W.2d 719, 720 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989)). 
 390. Id. at 205 (citing Wolff v. Wolff, 929 P.2d 916 (Nev. 1996); then citing 
Olson v. Olson, 445 N.W.2d 1 (N.D. 1989); and then citing In re Marriage of Swan, 
720 P.2d 747 (Or. 1986)). 
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Thus, the court held that allowing each party to keep 
their respective benefits was equivalent to an offset in that 
it anticipated future Social Security payments, thereby 
allowing the wife to receive her interest before the date 
Congress set for interests to accrue.391 And, offsetting the 
“value” of the husband’s Social Security in this way had the 
same effect on the husband’s resources as if his Social 
Security benefit were directly reduced.392 Therefore, 
although the court acknowledged that it was 
fully aware of the potential inequities implicated by the federal 
preemption protection of one spouse’s Social Security benefits . . . 
[i]t remains a fact that it is not the province of this court—or of any 
state court—to interfere with the federal scheme, no matter how 
unfair it may appear to be. . . . [U]nfairness was a consequence of 
the statutory scheme as enacted by Congress, and . . . the federal 
scheme c[an] not be disrupted by state courts. . . .393 
Accordingly, the court held that “it is up to Congress, and not 
the state courts, to correct any inequity in the federal 
system.”394 
Additionally, the court in In re Crook recognized that 
other courts compensate for the unfairness when other 
retirement benefits were taken “in lieu of” Social Security 
benefits,395 but the parties did not assert the applicability of 
those cases in that scenario, and so the court declined to 
answer that question.396 However, subsequent to the holding 
in Crook, several Illinois appellate courts confirmed that 
Social Security benefits could not be directly divided or used 
as an offset during state dissolution proceedings, but that 
 
 391. See id. at 203–04. 
 392. See id. at 203. 
 393. Id. at 205 (referencing Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. at 588–90). 
 394. Id. at 206. 
 395. See id. (first citing Cornbleth v. Cornbleth, 580 A.2d 369 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
1990); then citing Walker v. Walker, 677 N.E.2d 1252 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996); and 
then citing In re Marriage of Kelly, 9 P.3d 1046 (Ariz. 2000)). 
 396. Id. 
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Social Security benefits may be considered in determining 
maintenance awards.397 
In turn, in 2015, the court in In re Marriage of Mueller 
answered the question that the Crook court left unaddressed 
regarding the consideration of retirement benefits received 
in lieu of Social Security.398 Relying on the Crook decision, 
the trial court in Mueller denied the husband’s claim and 
affirmed the trial court’s decision not to offset the wife’s 
benefits with hypothetical benefits not actually received by 
the husband.399 The court acknowledged the unfairness of 
the process and the fact that courts in other states have both 
supported and rejected similar offsetting valuation 
methods,400 but it held that it was “intent on keeping . . . 
Social Security benefit[s] out of the pension, and basically the 
overall analysis of the marital estate.”401 The court reasoned 
that if parties have no property interest in Social Security 
benefits and, therefore, Social Security benefits are not 
marital property that are “acquired by” either party such 
that they are divisible upon divorce, then “surely 
hypothetical social security benefits . . . are not marital 
property and cannot be used to pare down the value of 
marital property.”402 Thus, the court determined that the 
“hypothetical” or “in lieu of” methods, by any other name, 
were still offsets that caused an actual difference in the asset 
distribution and, therefore, violate federal law, as 
 
 397. See In re Marriage of Dea, 2013 IL App (1st) 122213, ¶ 22, 1 N.E.3d 947, 
953; In re Marriage of Wojcik, 838 N.E.2d 282, 301 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005); In re 
Marriage of Rogers, 817 N.E.2d 562, 565–66 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004). 
 398. In re Marriage of Mueller, 2015 IL 117876, ¶¶ 1–2, 34 N.E.3d 538. The 
husband sought a hypothetical offset of his pension benefits to compensate for 
the wife’s receipt of Social Security benefits. See id. at ¶ 1, 34 N.E.3d at 539. 
 399. Id. ¶ 27, 34 N.E.3d at 541. 
 400. See id. at ¶ 8, 34 N.E.3d at 540–41. 
 401. Id. at ¶ 8, 34 N.E.3d at 540. 
 402. Id. at ¶ 25, 34 N.E.3d at 543 (citing Reymann v. Reymann, 919 S.W.2d 
615, 617 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1994)). 
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interpreted by the Crook court.403 Like the court in Crook, 
the Mueller court held that “it is not the province of this 
court . . . to interfere with the federal scheme, no matter how 
unfair it may appear to be.”404 
Like the Jackson court in Maryland, which favored the 
consideration approach, however, the dissenting appellate 
court justice in Mueller held that the state’s property 
distribution law mandates that the court “divide marital 
property in just proportions,” and that “ignoring a 
substantial asset, like a Social Security benefit, that was 
earned during the marriage runs afoul of that mandate.”405 
The Illinois Supreme Court dissent also offered several of the 
policy arguments adopted by several other courts that 
support the view that either allows for offsetting other 
marital property as being materially different from offsetting 
Social Security benefits or that allows for Social Security 
benefits to be considered as an equitable factor.406 
However, the majority court held that even considering 
the existence of anticipated Social Security benefits as an 
equitable factor under the state’s distribution laws creates a 
parallel benefit that would affect the division of marital 
property and, therefore, is preempted.407 Furthermore, in 
accordance with the Lorenzen court’s position, the majority 
court held that it is “nearly impossible” to apply a rule that 
allows courts to consider the existence, but not the value, of 
Social Security benefits.408 The court noted that simply 
defining the term “consider” is difficult, and that many 
 
 403. See id. at ¶ 23. 
 404. Id. at ¶ 27, 34 N.E.3d at 545 (quoting In re Marriage of Crook, 813 N.E.2d 
198, 205 (Ill. 2004). 
 405. See id. at ¶ 13, 34 N.E.3d at 541 (citing In re Marriage of Mueller, 2014 
IL App (4th) 130918-U, ¶ 31 (Appleton, J., dissenting)). 
 406. See id. at ¶¶ 48–49, 51, 34 N.E.3d at 547–48 (Burke, J., dissenting). 
 407. See id. at ¶¶ 22–23, 34 N.E.3d at 542–43. 
 408. Id. at ¶ 25, 34 N.E.3d at 544. The In re Mueller opinion was cited for this 
proposition in Lorenzen v. Lorenzen, 883 N.W.2d 292, 298 (Neb. 2016). 
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courts’ attempt to “mitigate the consideration problem with 
still more considerations” which runs a “real risk of crossing 
a line drawn by Congress.”409 Therefore, the court held that 
total preemption of Social Security is the more coherent 
approach.410 
California is a state that also is postured as a “total 
preemption” state, but only on the basis that California state 
law mandates a total prohibition of state court consideration 
of Social Security. Thus, although California courts are 
prohibited from considering Social Security benefits in any 
way when dividing marital property, California has not 
addressed the issue of whether federal law requires such a 
prohibition. However, in 2016, the court in In re Marriage of 
Peterson suggested that federal preemption does not 
 
 409. In re Mueller, 2015 IL 117876, ¶ 25. The In re Mueller court questioned 
the utility of cases that allowed for consideration of Social Security without 
providing guidance on how to do so. See id. (citing Litz v. Litz, 288 S.W.3d 753, 
758 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009) (holding that Social Security benefits should be 
considered when dividing marital property, “but not to such a degree that such 
consideration would have a material impact on the division of marital property”); 
Biondo v. Biondo, 809 N.W.2d 397, 403 (Mich. Ct. App. 2011) (holding that a trial 
court “may not treat social security benefits as tantamount to a marital asset,” 
but may “take into account, in a general sense” the extent to which those benefits 
bear on the factors related to property division); In re Marriage of Herald, 322 
P.3d 546, 557–58 (Or. 2014); Johnson v. Johnson, 2007 SD 56, ¶ 26,734 N.W.2d 
801, 808 (“while a trial court may not distribute marital property to offset the 
computed value of Social Security benefits, it may premise an unequal 
distribution of property—using, for example, a 60–40 formula instead of 50–50—
on the fact that one party is more likely to enjoy a secure retirement”) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 410. In 2015, the appellate court in In re Marriage of Frank relied on the 
reasoning of In re Crook in holding that federal benefits, including Tier 1 railroad 
pension and Social Security payments may not be directly divided, used as an 
offset, or considered in marital property distribution proceedings. See In re 
Marriage of Frank, 2015 IL App (3d) 140292, ¶ 16, 40 N.E.3d 740, 744–45 (citing 
In re Marriage of Crook, 813 N.E.2d 198, 204 (Ill. 2004)). The Illinois Supreme 
Court held similarly, also relying on the reasoning of In re Crook, but held in 
accordance with In re Marriage of Dea, 2013 IL App (1st) 122213, ¶ 22, 1 N.E.3d 
947, 953, that Social Security may be considered in determining a maintenance 
award. See In re Marriage of Roberts, 2015 IL App (3d) 140263, ¶ 21, 53 N.E.3d 
17. 
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necessarily extend that far.411 
In Peterson, the husband contributed to Social Security, 
but the wife participated in the Los Angeles County 
Employees Retirement Association (LACERA) plan and was 
prohibited from contributing to Social Security under the 
plan.412 The trial court held that it could not consider the 
husband’s contributions from marital earnings to Social 
Security when allocating the wife’s LACERA benefits 
because it would amount to an offset prohibited by federal 
law (with respect to Social Security) and state law (with 
respect to pension benefits).413 Like the court in Mueller, the 
Peterson court held: “‘[W]hether the result is inequitable or 
not, this court cannot adjust the division of [the wife’s] 
LACERA benefits or deviate from the requirement of equal 
division.”414 
The Peterson court specifically recognized that federal 
law prohibits both the direct assignment and the offset of 
Social Security benefits.415 The court also specifically 
recognized the jurisdictional split on the issue of “whether 
mere ‘consideration’ of Social Security benefits in dividing a 
marital estate is preempted under the reasoning of 
Hisquierdo.”416 However, the court never addressed this 
 
 411. See In re Marriage of Peterson, 197 Cal. Rptr. 3d 588, 599 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2016). 
 412. Id. at 590. 
 413. Id. at 591. 
 414. Id. 
 415. Id. at 593 (first citing In re Marriage of Cohen, 164 Cal. Rptr. 672 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 1980); then citing In re Marriage of Kelley, 134 Cal. Rptr. 259 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1976); and then citing In re Marriage of Hillerman, 167 Cal. Rptr. 240, 244–
45 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980). 
 416. Id. at 596 (first citing Smith v. Smith, 2015 MT 256, ¶ 19, 381 Mont. 1, 
358 P.3d 171; then citing In re Marriage of Herald, 355 Or. 104, 119–20 (Or. 
2014); then citing Johnson v. Johnson, 2007 SD 56, ¶ 25, 734 N.W.2d 801, 808; 
then citing Depot v. Depot, 2006 ME 25, 893 A.2d 995, 1002; then citing In re 
Marriage of Zahm, 978 P.2d 498, 503 (Wash. 1999); then citing Mahoney v. 
Mahoney, 681 N.E.2d 852, 856 (Mass. 1997); then citing In re Marriage of Boyer, 
538 N.W.2d 293, 293–94 (Iowa 1995); then citing Harshbarger v. Harshbarger, 
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issue because California state law, which prohibits courts 
from making unequal awards of community assets, which 
included the wife’s pension benefits, mandated the equal 
division of those benefits and, therefore, the “total 
preemption” outcome, notwithstanding the “consideration” of 
the husband’s Social Security benefits.417 However, it is on 
this point that the court offered an insightful distinction. 
The court noted that “[m]any other jurisdictions have 
fashioned various solutions to compensate a spouse who does 
not participate in Social Security, thereby preventing an 
unequal award resulting from the federal mandate that 
Social Security be deemed separate property”418 and the 
court recognized that several of those jurisdictions, like 
California, are community property jurisdictions. However, 
the court distinguished California law from the various other 
community property jurisdictions that allow the trial court 
to consider Social Security in the division of the marital 
estate, in that California law is unique in its strict limitation 
of trial court discretion to divide the community estate 
unequally, as is authorized in other community property 
states like Washington, Arizona, and Louisiana.419 The court 
recognized that if there are multiple community assets to be 
divided, the trial court may apportion the respective 
interests in the assets in a manner that is equitable under 
the circumstances of the case by, for example, offsetting 
community assets with other community assets, but the 
 
2004-Ohio-3919, ¶ 15, 814 N.E.2d 105; then citing Wolff v. Wolff, 929 P.2d 916, 
921 (Nev. 1997); then citing In re Marriage of Crook, 813 N.E.2d 198, 205 (Ill. 
2004); then citing Cox v. Cox, 882 P.2d 909, 920 (Ala. 1994); then citing Webster 
v. Webster, 716 N.W.2d 47, 56 (Neb. 2006); and then citing Manning v. Schultz, 
2014 VT 22, ¶ 11, 196 Vt. 38, 93 A.3d 566. The first eight cases the court cited to 
represent jurisdictions that allow some consideration of Social Security benefits 
in fashioning an equitable division of marital property, whereas the remaining 
five cases the court cited to represent a minority number of jurisdictions that bar 
all consideration of Social Security benefits. 
 417. See id. at 596. 
 418. Id. at 598 (citing Kelly v. Kelly, 9 P.3d 1046 (Ariz. 2000)). 
 419. See id. (describing respective state laws that allow discretion to divide the 
marital estate unequally). 
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ultimate division still must be equal.420 In this case, however, 
in considering the equitable division of the wife’s pension 
benefits, Social Security benefits are deemed separate 
property and, thus, there is only one community asset at 
issue, thereby limiting the court’s discretion to fashion an 
alternative equitable award. 
Finally, the court stated that “it is within the parties’ 
power to create a more equitable solution—even if the court 
may not do so” and made reference to specific California law 
that allows for an unequal division of property “‘upon the 
written agreement of the parties, or on oral stipulation of the 
parties in open court.’”421 However, as has been discussed in 
this Article, most courts hold that any assignment or offset 
of Social Security benefits in a property settlement 
agreement between the parties directly violates federal law, 
specifically within jurisdictions that extend federal 
preemption to prohibit state courts from enforcing such 
agreements.422 Any such agreement of the parties would 
have to be accommodated by state law in a manner that did 
not violate federal law, such as in the jurisdictions discussed 
here. Arguably, under those circumstances, as recognized by 
the court in In re Peterson, the court could enforce an 
agreement to equitably divide property in this manner, such 
as the court held in Reffalt v. Reffalt, where the court held 
that the parties may agree on the distribution of Social 
Security as alimony, as a form of equitable consideration, 
instead of property distribution.423 
Thus, California stands as a jurisdiction that adopts a 
“total preemption” policy, but not based on an expanded view 
of the scope of federal preemption. Rather, California 
effectuates a similar result on the basis of its own state 
 
 420. Id. at 598 n.5. 
 421. Id. at 599 (quoting CAL. FAM. CODE § 2550 (West 2017)). 
 422. See cases cited supra note 115. 
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property distribution laws. The Peterson court acknowledged 
those states that authorize trial court discretion to consider 
Social Security benefits in the division of marital property 
and to fashion an award that is more equitable to the 
parties,424 and even expressly provided that “the result of 
California’s strict policies on the division of property, 
intended to protect spouses . . . did not produce an equitable 
result . . . .”425 Accordingly, the court noted that the 
“[l]egislature is free to craft a statute similar to 
Louisiana’s . . . which directs courts to assign a portion of 
community assets to one spouse when the other spouse’s 
retirement plan is classified as separate property under 
federal law.”426 It is ironic that a court in California, where 
any consideration of Social Security benefits is prohibited, 
espoused the viability of legislation that provides for 
offsetting, such as in Louisiana, when Louisiana’s own 
Appellate Court suggests the unconstitutionality of such 
legislation. But therein lies the confounding dilemma 
confronted by state courts and the need for congressional 
clarification. 
For all of the courts that reach this level of analysis, the 
crux of the “total preemption” position lies in the elimination 
of the practical distinction between “offsetting” and 
“considering” Social Security benefits in terms of its effect on 
the parties, as is recognized by the Supreme Court of Nevada 
in Wolff v. Wolff.427 In Wolff, the court held that an offset of 
the community interest in the husband’s retirement account 
based on the wife’s separate interest in future Social Security 
benefits “would upset the statutory balance and impair [the 
wife]’s economic security just as surely as would a regular 
deduction from [her] benefit check. . . . Any such anticipation 
threatens harm to the employee, and corresponding 
 
 424. In re Peterson, 197 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 596. 
 425. Id. at 599. 
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 427. 929 P.2d 916, 921 (Nev. 1996). 
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frustration to federal policy, over and above the mere loss of 
wealth caused by the offset.”428 Like many of the 
“consideration” courts, the trial court specifically stated that 
in awarding an unequal distribution of property in the 
husband’s favor, the award was not based on an offset of the 
wife’s Social Security interest but, rather, it was based on the 
court’s consideration of the wife’s future Social Security 
payments in constructing an equitable division of the 
property.429 However, the court in Wolff held that, despite 
the court’s attempt to deny the unequal award as an offset, 
the court erred when it reduced the wife’s marital share of 
the husband’s PERS pension when it considered her 
payments to Social Security.430 The court provided: “Calling 
a duck a horse does not change the fact it is still a duck. 
‘Considering’ [the wife]’s social security benefits does not 
change the fact that this is still an offset, and therefore, 
error.”431 Thus, the court effectively addressed the approach 
taken by states like Washington, Iowa, Kentucky, and 
others, which implement an offset as a form of equitable 
consideration, and insightfully and essentially questioned, 
“What is the difference?” 
Indicative of the dilemma, however, the dissenting court 
in Wolff responded that the difference is that to equate the 
consideration of the benefits that the spouses reasonably 
anticipate receiving in the future as an assignment or offset 
of Social Security benefits is “patently unfair,” even when the 
nonparticipating spouse qualifies for a modest statutory 
marital interest, and unduly extends the scope of federal 
preemption into the state court’s obligation to equitably 
divide property.432 Additionally, if the Social Security Act 
authorizes courts to consider the parties’ future benefits in 
 
 428. Id. (quoting Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572, 588–89 (1979)). 
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determining an appropriate alimony award to accommodate 
the future financial equities of the parties, then 
“consideration” states, likewise, might posit, “What is the 
difference?”—particularly when there is no statute or U.S. 
Supreme Court authority that mandates such a prohibition? 
The irony, of course, is that, for the majority court in Wolff, 
and for the courts in several other states that adopt the “total 
preemption” approach, it is precisely because there is no 
difference that federal preemption must be held to extend 
broadly to preclude the assignment, offset, and consideration 
of Social Security benefits, altogether. 
III. THE NEED FOR CLARIFICATION OF THE SCOPE OF FEDERAL 
PREEMPTION OF SOCIAL SECURITY BENEFITS 
The reasoning of the “total preemption” approach 
effectively takes courts on a circular return to the 
interpretation of the language of the Social Security Act and 
the limits of the holding in Mansell. Since Mansell, there 
remains no authoritative determination that resolves the 
dilemma of the scope of federal preemption of Social Security. 
The result has been nearly four decades of interpretative 
variation among states and inequity between and among 
divorcing parties. 
A. Clarification by the U.S. Supreme Court 
In May 2017, the U.S. Supreme Court’s holding in 
Howell v. Howell, which involved the remuneration of 
military retirement and disability benefits, was the closest 
the Court or Congress has come to clarifying the dilemma 
since its decision in Mansell in 1989. 
1. Howell v. Howell (2017) 
In Howell, the husband and wife divorced in 1991.433 
Pursuant to the parties’ agreement, the divorce decree 
 
 433. Howell v. Howell, 137 S. Ct. 1400, 1404 (2017). 
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awarded to the wife “[fifty percent] (50%) of [the husband’s] 
military retirement,” once it began to be distributed through 
a direct pay order.434 The husband retired from the Air Force 
in 1992, and the parties began receiving their one-half share 
of the husband’s military retirement pay pursuant to their 
agreement.435 In 2005, the husband received a twenty 
percent disability rating as a result of degenerative joint 
disease in his shoulder, which entitled him to monthly, tax-
exempt VA disability benefits.436 As required by the USFSPA 
and Mansell, to receive his disability benefits, he elected to 
waive an equivalent amount of military retired pay.437 
Consequently, the husband’s monthly retirement pay was 
reduced by roughly $250,438 thereby reducing the wife’s 
monthly payment of the husband’s pay by approximately 
$125.00.439 
In 2013, the wife sought to enforce the divorce decree’s 
division of military retirement pay and sought judgment 
against the husband for her lost share of the retirement pay 
resulting from the husband’s subsequent disability 
waiver.440 The trial court held that the wife had a vested 
property right in fifty percent of the husband’s retirement 
pay pursuant to the existing divorce decree and that neither 
federal law preempting the division of military retirement 
pay waived for disability pay, nor state law prohibiting a 
state court from offsetting waived military retirement pay 
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retirement pay. Id. 
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Marriage of Howell, 361 P.3d 936, 937 (Ariz. 2015), rev’d by Howell, 137 S. Ct. at 
1406. 
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with other marital assets, could deprive her of that right.441 
The court determined that “the family court order did not 
‘divide’ [the husband’s] waived military retirement pay, the 
order did not require [the husband] ‘to rescind’ his waiver, 
nor did the order ‘direct him to pay any amount to [the wife] 
from his disability pay.’”442 Therefore, the court awarded the 
wife her $3,813 in military retirement pay arrearages and 
ruled that the husband was “responsible for ensuring [the 
wife] receive[d] [thereafter] her full 50% of the military 
retirement without regard for the disability.”443 
The court of appeals affirmed,444 but not because it 
construed a limited scope of federal preemption with respect 
to the distribution of military retirement pay; rather, the 
court held that the state statute prohibiting offsetting as a 
remedy to federal preemption, by its terms, did not apply to 
post-decree enforcement proceedings.445 Therefore, the court 
held that the trial court in Howell did not violate the 
USFSPA or Mansell because it did not treat the husband’s 
disability pay as marital property; “[r]ather the family court 
simply ordered [the husband] to ‘reimburse’ [the wife] for 
‘reducing . . . her share’ of military retirement pay.”446 The 
Supreme Court of Arizona granted review because of the 
recurring nature and importance of the federal preemption 
issue.447 
Upon review, the U.S. Supreme Court held simply that 
“Mansell determines the outcome here.”448 It held that 
“federal law completely pre-empts the States from treating 
waived military retirement pay as divisible community 
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property” and that giving the wife a “vested” interest in the 
husband’s retirement pay and ordering that the wife receive 
her share of his retirement pay “without regard for the 
disability” violated federal law.449 Although the Arizona 
Supreme Court attempted to distinguish Mansell on the 
basis of the timeliness of the waiver vis-à-vis the divorce 
proceeding, the U.S. Supreme Court held that that 
distinction simply highlighted the contingent nature of the 
parties’ ownership rights in retirement benefits, not a 
limitation on the scope of federal authority to determine 
those rights or a distinguishing authorization for state courts 
to extinguish those rights.450 
The Court further held that the reimbursement award to 
the wife was nevertheless an award of the portion of 
retirement pay that the husband waived for disability 
benefits, which is what Congress prohibited.451 Simply 
referring to the wife’s interest as “vested” does not change 
the contingent nature of the benefit.452 Likewise, the Court 
held that referring to the award as an order to “reimburse” 
or “indemnify” the wife does not change the fact that it was 
an order to divide property.453 The Court stated that the 
reason for indemnifying the wife was “to restore the amount 
previously awarded as community property” thus, “[t]he 
difference is semantic and nothing more” particularly since 
“the amount of indemnification mirrors the waived 
retirement pay, dollar for dollar.”454 The Court held that 
“[r]egardless of their form, such reimbursement and 
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indemnification orders displace the federal rule and stand as 
an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the 
purposes and objectives of Congress. All such orders are thus 
pre-empted.”455 
Thus, in Howell, the U.S. Supreme Court determined 
that with respect to military disability benefits (and, 
arguably, Social Security benefits, assuming the two are 
sufficiently analogous to be determinative, which, in itself, is 
an issue that may distinguish the Court’s reasoning as 
inapposite),456 Congress intends that federal law totally 
preempts state law with respect to the distribution of federal 
benefits and that indemnifying a spouse for his or her lost 
share of retirement pay as a result of disability waiver 
violates federal law, regardless of how a court describes such 
an award.457 To this extent, within the context of the various 
approaches adopted by courts in the Social Security context, 
the Court in Howell seemed to opt for the “total preemption” 
approach as well. 
If the Court’s opinion in Howell ended there, it 
essentially would resolve the dilemma in the Social Security 
context. However, the Court added three sentences to its 
analysis that indicate that its holding in Howell is too narrow 
to resolve the issue addressed in this Article or to determine 
the means by which a state court may “consider” Social 
Security benefits in dividing marital property. The Court 
added: 
We recognize, as we recognized in Mansell, the hardship that 
congressional pre-emption can sometimes work on divorcing 
spouses. . . . But we note that a family court, when it first determines 
the value of a family’s assets, remains free to take account of the 
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contingency that some military retirement pay might be waived, or, 
as the petitioner himself recognizes, take account of reductions in 
value when it calculates or recalculates the need for spousal 
support. . . . We need not and do not decide these matters . . . .458 
Thus, the Court recognized the inequity resulting from 
federal preemption and noted that state courts have the 
authority to exercise their discretion to “take account of” or 
“consider” the resulting inequities “when it first determines 
the value of a family’s assets” or “when it calculates or 
recalculates the need for spousal support.”459 Therefore, the 
Court suggests that a state court has limited discretion to 
consider the inequities resulting from federal preemption, 
exclusive of its valuation of property and inclusive of its 
determination of alimony, which is already provided for in 
Section 659 of the Social Security Act. Outside of these 
procedural parameters, a state court order that divides the 
parties’ share of marital property by adjusting the 
percentage of marital property that each spouse would 
otherwise receive but for the court’s consideration of the 
separate nature of Social Security benefits, violates federal 
law. Arguably, these conclusions are consistent with the 
language of the Social Security Act and with the cases 
supporting a “total preemption” approach, nevertheless, this 
begs the question of whether, or how, a court’s consideration 
of the effect of preemption may affect the court’s final 
equitable division of property. In any case, the Court 
expressly provided that it did not decide these matters in its 
opinion in Howell. 
Accordingly, the Court’s opinion in Howell is limited in 
terms of resolving the specific Social Security issue 
addressed in this Article because nothing within the opinion 
itself necessarily refutes the distinctions upon which so 
many state courts have drawn to circumvent the U.S. 
Supreme Court decisions in Hisquierdo and Mansell. In fact, 
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in its opinion in Howell, the Court does not even mention 
Hisquierdo. Therefore, although the Court’s dicta extends 
the scope of federal preemption to its arguable “total” limit, 
the Court’s actual holding stops at Mansell—the case from 
which nearly forty years of Social Security federal 
preemption law has evolved into a starting point for varied 
state interpretation and factual distinction that only 
contradicts the purposes of the Social Security Act. This 
stands as a clear message to Congress that clarification is 
needed to resolve the issues addressed here and which are 
left unanswered in Howell. 
2. State Court Application of Howell 
The U.S. Supreme Court suggests in its opinion in 
Howell that what Congress likely intends is total 
preemption. Within the limited context of military disability 
benefits, state courts have already begun to apply the Court’s 
holding in Howell, and the effect of the Howell decision on 
existing state property distribution laws has been 
significant. For example, in Hurt v. Jones-Hurt, upon 
divorce, the parties were subject to an order for the 
distribution of property in which the wife was entitled to one-
third of the husband’s military pension.460 As occurred in 
Howell, subsequent to the court’s division of property, the 
husband increased his disability rating and consequently 
opted to waive a greater percentage of his retirement 
benefits for disability benefits, thereby reducing the amount 
the wife received from his disposable retired pay.461 The wife 
sought a declaratory judgment entitling her to the amount 
she had been receiving pursuant to the parties’ divorce 
judgment.462 The trial court held that the wife was entitled 
to the amount she previously had been receiving from the 
husband’s total military benefits, notwithstanding the 
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reduction in his pension payout upon his additional 
disability waiver.463 
On appeal, the court determined that “[this] result was 
consistent with three reported decisions of [the Court of 
Special Appeals of Maryland] and the greater weight of cases 
across the country.”464 However, subsequent to the appellate 
argument in Hurt, the U.S. Supreme Court issued its opinion 
in Howell, and the court in Hurt recognized the effect of the 
Court’s decision, holding: “We need not revisit our earlier 
decisions . . . because the Supreme Court of the United 
States’s opinion in Howell v. Howell, . . . effectively overrules 
our precedents and compels us to reverse the judgment of the 
circuit court.”465 Commenting on the effect of Howell, the 
court observed: 
Before Howell, our decisions . . . supported the circuit court’s 
decision here. And as a matter of real-world logic, those decisions 
made sense. . . . Howell effectively overrules these cases. . . . To be 
sure, the Supreme Court recognized that its holding might work as 
a hardship on divorcing spouses . . . [b]ut of course, that doesn’t help 
Wife in this case . . . . Without Howell, our precedents would have 
supported a decision to affirm the judgment of the circuit court. 
Howell changed the superseding federal law on the question before 
us in this case, and compels us to reverse the circuit court.466 
Likewise, in Mattson v. Mattson, pursuant to the parties’ 
stipulated divorce decree, the wife was to receive forty 
percent of the husband’s gross monthly military retirement 
pay and disability compensation.467 When the husband failed 
to satisfy his obligations under the decree, the wife sought to 
enforce the decree and collect the substantial arrearages to 
which she was entitled under the terms of the court’s 
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stipulated decree.468 The court recognized the inequity that 
results from a disability waiver of military retirement 
benefits469 and the state precedent that applied equitable 
principles that “could render a stipulated decree 
indemnifying an ex-spouse enforceable, even if it ran afoul of 
Mansell,”470 but the court held that “[i]n light of Howell, we 
conclude that our [previous] holding . . . has been 
functionally overruled . . . [and that,] as clarified in Howell, 
such equitable compensation decrees do not escape federal 
preemption . . . .”471 
Thus, in the first two cases to apply the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s holding in Howell, the result has been to overrule 
existing state property distribution laws through which the 
state divorce court sought to provide equity to military 
spouses deprived of their marital share of federal military 
retirement benefits by the preemptive effect of federal law.472 
Both courts interpreted and applied the holding in Howell so 
as to find that such equitable compensation schemes 
“displace the federal rule and stand as an obstacle to the 
accomplishment and execution of the purposes and objectives 
of Congress.”473 
At the same time, both courts recognized, as this Article 
recognizes, that even in the context of military disability 
benefits, the Court’s holding in Howell does not entirely 
resolve the issue raised in this Article regarding the extent to 
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which Congress intends federal law to preempt state law. 
Both courts that have applied Howell recognize not only the 
limited context within which Howell applies—federal 
military benefits—but they also recognize the scope of 
Howell’s preemptive effect on state law as limited to the 
classification of military disability benefits as distributable 
marital property. The court in Hurt recognized that “the 
preemptive scope of Howell governs only the treatment of . . . 
[federal military benefits] in the analysis of marital property 
awards . . . and that is as far as [the court] think[s] it 
reaches”474 The court in Hurt provided: 
Howell now has redefined (or maybe re-redefined) the federal 
retirement and disability benefits that may be considered “marital 
property.” But a Maryland trial court’s equitable division of marital 
property only truly begins “once property is determined to be 
‘marital’ in the first place. . . . [I]t is still up to our trial courts to 
determine . . . the totality of the circumstances, and, alongside that 
process, to make other decisions about the parties’ post-marital 
financial future. To posit one . . . example, the impact of Howell may 
in a particular case constitute a change in circumstances entitling 
a court to revisit an alimony award . . . . We don’t have any of these 
questions before us in this case, and Howell leaves them to be 
decided by trial courts—our State’s trial courts—in the first 
instance.475 
Likewise, the court in Mattson provided: 
District courts, when they determine the value of marital assets, 
remain free to account for the possibility that some military retired 
pay might later be waived in favor of disability compensation. And 
district courts may account for reductions in the value of these 
assets when calculating or recalculating the need for spousal 
support. . . . We encourage district courts to keep these avenues in 
mind as they navigate the changing landscape involving military 
disability compensation.476 
Thus, although the courts that have applied Howell have 
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been limited to the military disability context and have 
cautioned that the preemptive effect of Howell may be to 
overrule otherwise applicable state property distribution 
laws that authorize the court to account for military 
disability benefits in dividing marital property, the courts 
nevertheless recognize that Howell does not necessarily 
prohibit a state court from considering the preemptive effect 
of federal law in determining an equitable division of 
property or the propriety of an alimony or maintenance 
award. Accordingly, the courts that have applied Howell 
support the conclusion posited in this Article that, in the 
context of Social Security, congressional clarification of the 
intended scope of federal preemption is required, not only to 
resolve the arguable analogousness of Social Security 
benefits and military disability benefits, but to resolve the 
preemptive scope of federal law outside the context of the 
classification of Social Security benefits as divisible marital 
property. Even in the context of federal military disability 
benefits, the Court’s dicta in Howell clearly suggests that its 
holding does not answer these questions, and the courts’ 
decisions in Hurt and Mattson, which are the first to 
interpret and apply the Court’s holding in Howell, have 
confirmed that these questions must be resolved by Congress 
if state courts are to reconcile the purposes of federal 
preemption and the obligation of state courts to equitably 
divide property upon divorce. 
B. The Need for Congressional Clarification 
It is time for Congress to clearly define its intended scope 
of federal preemption under the Social Security Act so as to 
accomplish its goals of uniformity of application, financial 
security for its participants, and equity for divorced spouses. 
This Article asserts that since the U.S. Supreme Court 
decided Hisquierdo and Mansell, and states began to 
interpret and distinguish their meaning and application, the 
Social Security Act has served none of its purposes well. 
Individual states may be providing equity to individual 
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spouses in individual cases, but it is at the expense of 
congressional intent for national uniformity and what 
Congress views as financial security for Social Security 
participants and their spouses. 
The existing variation among state approaches is 
represented in the national map depicted in Figure 1. 
 
FIGURE 1. The existing variation among state approaches to 
preemption.  
 
 
As seen in the variation throughout the map, if Congress 
intends uniformity of application, it is clear that the existing 
language of the Act does not accomplish it. To the contrary, 
as the many cases discussed in this Article have 
demonstrated, this variation of approaches not only 
fragments uniformity, it arguably deprives Social Security 
participants of the financial security that Congress sought to 
guarantee, and it facilitates inequity, at least among spouses 
of different states. In fact, the courts adopting these various 
approaches have nevertheless acknowledged the resulting 
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inequities.477 
Based on the development of these approaches, however, 
there does seem to be a momentum of courts moving toward 
the general expansion of the scope of federal preemption of 
state property distribution laws as applied to Social Security. 
This is demonstrated by the courts’ decisions in Vermont,478 
Illinois,479 Montana,480 California,481 and most recently, 
Arizona, as well as the U.S. Supreme Court, all of which, just 
since 2014, have adopted (or indicated a reasoned preference 
for) the total preemption approach.482 This momentum is 
consistent with the observations of many leading scholars 
studying other areas of federal preemption.483 The 
momentum across contexts is gradual, but consistent. In 
adopting the broader scope of federal preemption in the 
Social Security context, these courts necessarily have had to 
address a host of broader relevant issues, such as: the 
analogousness of different federal benefit contexts;484 the 
concomitant relevance of Supreme Court precedent, such as 
Hisquierdo;485 the propriety and effect of reclassifying 
 
 477. See In re Marriage of Peterson, 197 Cal. Rptr. 3d 588, 599 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2016) (“[T]he result of California’s strict policies on the division of property, 
intended to protect spouses . . . did not produce an equitable result. . . .”); Tucker 
v. Tucker, 47,373 (La. App. 2 Cir. 08/01/12); 103 So. 3d 493, 497–98 n.1. 
 478. See Manning v. Schultz, 2014 VT 22, ¶ 11, 196 Vt. 38, 93 A.3d 566. 
 479. See In re Marriage of Mueller, 2015 IL 117876, ¶ 22, 34 N.E.3d 538, 542. 
 480. See Smith v. Smith, No. A-15-1234, 2016 WL 6956771, at *3–5 (Neb. Ct. 
App. Nov. 29, 2016). 
 481. See In re Peterson, 197 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 599. 
 482. See Howell v. Howell, 137 S. Ct. 1400, 1406 (2017). 
 483. See Langbein, supra note 2, at 1666; Waggoner, supra note 2, at 1636–37; 
Raymond C. O’Brien, Selective Issues in Effective Medicaid Estate Recovery 
Statutes, 65 CATH. U. L. REV. 30 (2016). 
 484. Although there is disagreement on this point among some state courts, 
the United States Supreme Court has repeatedly concluded that the contexts are 
sufficiently analogous. See Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572, 576–77 
(1979). 
 485. See supra text accompanying notes 131–41. 
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marital property under state law;486 the effect of offsetting 
property other than Social Security;487 the distinction 
between hypothetical and actual valuation methods;488 the 
financial impact of retirement plans in lieu of Social 
Security;489 the enforceability of the agreement of the parties 
and its capacity to circumvent federal preemption; and, the 
appropriate timing and nature of courts’ consideration of the 
receipt of Social Security benefits as a result of federal 
preemption and its effect on the distribution of property and, 
arguably, on the federal scheme—i.e., is the court’s 
consideration of Social Security a calculated component of its 
determination of the equitable division of property or merely 
one of many other generalized equitable considerations that 
factor into its determination? Or, is the court’s consideration 
of Social Security reserved for its determination of the 
parties’ respective needs for alimony, secondary to any 
division of property?490 All of these issues bear on the scope 
of federal preemption and must be addressed. However, as 
described in this Article, many courts have not addressed 
these issues. And, as clearly demonstrated in Figure 1, most 
states that have addressed these issues are not resolving 
them uniformly; rather, they are resolving them with wide 
variation and, often, flat disagreement. 
Alternatively, uniform agreement and application of 
broad federal preemption by state courts would present as 
depicted in Figure 2. 
 
 
 486. See supra text accompanying notes 196–200. 
 487. See supra Section II.B.1.a. 
 488. See supra Section II.B.1.b. 
 489. See supra Section II.B.1.b. 
 490. See supra Section II.B.3. 
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FIGURE 2. The hypothetical result of agreement among state 
approaches to preemption.  
 
 
Figure 2, of course, represents complete uniformity of 
application, which would be accomplished through total 
preemption. However, as courts and commentators agree, 
complete uniformity through total preemption arguably 
comes with a cost—inequity between spouses in the 
distribution of marital property, with alimony as the only 
context within which a state court might consider the 
existence of Social Security. In Howell, the U.S. Supreme 
Court vaguely predicted that Figure 2 is the application of 
federal preemption that Congress likely intends, yet the 
Court, in its dicta, also presented the dilemma that this 
Article presents regarding the extent to which a court may 
consider the effect of federal preemption in equitably 
dividing property. The Court in Howell expressly did not 
resolve this dilemma. Therefore, Congress must decide. 
The issue of what Congress should decide, and the 
various other issues that state courts must decide, such as: 
which of the maps depicted in Figures 1 and 2 is correct; 
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which of the seven different state approaches are most 
advantageous; what ought to be the correct jurisprudential 
relationship between federal sovereignty and state law; and, 
whether there is simply too much federal preemption going 
on, are all questions far beyond the scope of this Article. 
These are matters best studied and resolved by the likes of 
Professors John Langbein, Lawrence W. Waggoner, and 
Raymond C. O’Brien. Instead, the purpose of this Article is 
simply to demonstrate that the existing federal preemption 
jurisprudence in the context of Social Security has become so 
fragmented that Congress’s federal plan for uniformity in the 
distribution of Social Security benefits and long-term 
security for qualified retirees is being dissolved by the 
idiosyncrasies of state property distribution laws in divorce. 
Notwithstanding the predictive relevance of the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s holdings for analogous federal benefits, 
including the recent decision in Howell, there is arguably 
sufficient basis for distinguishing analogous contexts and 
cases, as well as a host of other relevant issues upon which 
state courts disagree and for which federal common law 
simply has not yet developed. Therefore, the purpose of this 
Article is simply to urge Congress to clarify its intent for the 
scope of federal preemption under the Social Security Act. In 
light of the body of law that has developed, as discussed 
herein, if Congress does clarify its intent, it likely will be for 
total preemption. 
C. Anticipating Congressional Intent 
Despite significant U.S. Supreme Court precedent 
addressing the issue, the opportunity for varied state court 
interpretation of the plain but limited language of the Social 
Security Act—specifically, the anti-assignment provision of 
Section 407 and its exception stated in Section 659—and the 
damage to the purposes of the federal plan that seems to 
have resulted, highlight the need for congressional 
clarification. Admittedly, the Court’s holding in Howell is 
limited in scope and dictates no authoritative direction for 
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any state to do anything in the Social Security context other 
than what it is already doing. And, if Congress is content to 
sacrifice the uniform distribution and protection of federal 
benefits to intended beneficiaries so that state courts may 
reconsider the effect of limited preemption under federal law 
on the equities of the parties based on the application of 
individual property distribution laws of individual states, 
then Congress need not do anything, since this is what is 
occurring now in most states. After all, there are sound 
reasons supporting a limited scope of preemption in this 
area. 
For example, domestic relations is an area of law 
traditionally reserved for the state,491 and any inequity to the 
parties resulting from minimum preemption against the 
classification of benefits as divisible marital property under 
federal law may be remedied by the equitable considerations 
afforded within state law. As this Article has shown, 
depending on the facts of any given case, there is a variety of 
viable options through which a state court may provide for 
the equity it deems appropriate in its determination of the 
division of property. And, if Congress has authorized state 
courts to exercise such discretion in its consideration of 
alimony, which often is tied so closely to property 
distribution, then what is the difference?—especially if there 
are broader jurisprudential reasons that support pulling-
back the reigns on the expansive momentum of federal 
preemption?492 The fact that Congress has not been inclined 
to intercede to clarify its intent after 1989 may demonstrate 
that, in fact, Congress is willing to tolerate a lack of 
uniformity in this area and that, perhaps, this is not an area 
ripe for expanded federal preemption.493 However, as this 
 
 491. See supra text accompanying note 19. 
 492. See Langbein, supra note 2, at 1666; Waggoner supra note 2, at 1637; 
O’Brien, supra note 485, at 30. 
 493. See Brown v. Ames, 201 F.3d 654, 661 (5th Cir. 2000) (noting that case for 
federal preemption is particularly weak when Congress is aware of operation of 
state law and nevertheless stands by both concepts and tolerates whatever 
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Article has demonstrated, this is not likely what Congress 
intends. In fact, Congress has already indicated that, in 
balancing the purposes of the federal plan, what it deems to 
be equitable, notwithstanding any resulting inequity for 
divorcing parties in the distribution of marital property 
under state law, is the uniform application of the guaranteed 
receipt of benefits for intended beneficiaries.494 Therefore, 
since most of the state court decisions since Mansell have 
been toward circumventing congressional intent through 
reinterpreting the plain language of the Social Security Act 
and distinguishing U.S. Supreme Court precedent so as to 
provide, essentially, a second level of equity to divorcing 
parties in the division of property, Congress should expressly 
clarify what it intends under the Social Security Act. 
As is evident by the holdings in Hurt and Mattson, if, in 
fact, the U.S. Supreme Court’s implied prediction in Howell 
is correct, and Congress, in fact, clarifies its intent that 
federal law totally preempts even the consideration of Social 
Security in the application of state property distribution laws 
upon divorce, there are significant consequences for the 
states that adopt a view of minimal federal preemption 
under the Social Security Act. For example, in states like 
Louisiana, Pennsylvania, and others, which allow for 
offsetting with other property by contending that the 
language of the Social Security Act is perfectly clear as to 
what it preempts and, therefore, as long as the court avoids 
what is preempted—classifying Social Security benefits as 
community property—then it is free, if not obligated, to 
divide other property in whatever manner it deems to be 
equitable, such a view will be deemed unconstitutional as a 
violation of the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. 
Constitution.495 For Louisiana, specifically, which is the only 
state that statutorily provides for the direct offset of Social 
 
tension might exist between them). 
 494. See Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572, 584 (1979). 
 495. See, e.g., Tucker v. Tucker, 47,373 (La. App. 2 Cir. 08/01/12); 103 So. 3d 
493, 497, 498 n.1. 
116 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66 
Security in the division of marital property, it would have to 
amend its property distribution scheme to prohibit state 
courts from offsetting the value of either party’s Social 
Security benefits with other marital property or considering 
Social Security as an equitable factor affecting the division 
of property. 
For states such as Arizona, New Jersey, Ohio, and 
Pennsylvania, which do not specifically legislate state court 
authority on this issue, but in which courts nevertheless 
attempt to remedy any arguable inequity resulting from the 
preemption of Social Security by offsetting other divisible 
marital property, state courts will no longer be able to offset 
other property if such offset is based on either the actual or 
hypothetical value of Social Security benefits received or 
anticipated by either spouse. To the extent that the property 
distribution provisions in these states expressly provide for 
the court to calculate such values as a basis for any such 
disposition of marital property, such provisions would have 
to be amended to exclude Social Security as such a basis. 
Otherwise, state provisions that provide for offsetting in-
kind property values are not necessarily unconstitutional, 
provided they are not applied to Social Security. 
For states such as Arkansas, Florida, New Mexico, and 
Tennessee, for example, which prohibit offsetting based on a 
broad common law application of the Court’s reasoning in 
Hisquierdo but which have not specifically addressed the 
issue of whether the court may more generally consider 
Social Security as a factor in the equitable distribution of 
property, and for those “unknown” states, such as, for 
example, Alabama, New Hampshire, and Virginia, which 
have not yet addressed these issues, the only concern would 
be the extent to which the applicable state property 
distribution provisions allow for such consideration to affect 
the division of marital property. To the extent that such 
provisions are so applied, they would be unconstitutional; to 
the extent that they limit such consideration to a 
determination of the respective parties’ future financial 
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circumstances for purposes of determining alimony, they 
would be constitutional. 
For the many states that allow for the court to consider 
Social Security income as one of possibly several equitable 
factors that affect the court’s determination of the respective 
future financial circumstances of the parties and, thereby, 
the court’s division of marital property, as typified by states 
like Delaware, Iowa, Maryland, and Washington, for 
example, courts would no longer be able to include Social 
Security as such a consideration. Rather, the only 
permissible consideration of Social Security would be that 
which is relevant to alimony. 
Finally, for states like Alaska, California, Illinois, 
Minnesota, Nevada, and Vermont, which already conform to 
the required limitations predicted by the Court in Howell, 
application of existing property distribution schemes would 
continue to be viable and constitutional. The concern within 
these states, as with any state that eventually may satisfy 
the parameters of Howell, however, is the extent to which a 
court may draw a calculable distinction between the 
disparate effect of the parties’ respective incomes and future 
financial circumstances on the court’s determination of the 
equitable division of property and the disparate effect of the 
same considerations on the parties’ respective need for 
alimony, both of which, typically, are affected by Social 
Security interests. 
The Court’s decision in Howell suggests that a state 
court considering Social Security benefits in divorce 
proceedings would be required to draw this distinction. The 
difficulty is not in justifying such a consideration or in 
calculating a monetary award based on such considerations. 
To the contrary, Section 659 of the Social Security Act 
provides for such considerations, and courts regularly 
calculate and apply such exceptions to federal preemption.496 
 
 496. See Kaplan v. Kaplan, No. HHDFA780223144S, 2014 WL 6996673, at *2 
(Conn. Super. Ct. Nov. 6, 2014) (ordering garnishment of plaintiff’s Social 
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Rather, the only concern, as recognized by many courts,497 is 
the fact that the equitable division of property and the award 
of alimony are so often interconnected, and so often relied 
upon as a means by which parties may agree on the equitable 
division of property, that it may be difficult, impractical, 
inequitable, or ultimately impossible for a court to consider 
Social Security in one context but to disregard it in the other. 
Nevertheless, if Congress intends an expanded application of 
federal preemption under the Social Security Act, then these 
are the parameters within which all state courts must work 
to provide equity to divorcing parties. 
Despite any practical concerns to the contrary, there are 
sound reasons to anticipate that Congress likely intends a 
broad scope of federal preemption. Primarily, broad federal 
preemption better accomplishes the purposes of uniformity 
of application, guaranteed financial security for its 
participants, and equity for divorced spouses. First, with 
regard to equity, applying broad federal preemption is not to 
prohibit state courts from considering Social Security 
benefits at all or to prohibit state courts from compensating 
parties for the inequities that result from federal 
preemption. Rather, it simply prohibits state courts from 
considering Social Security benefits or compensating for the 
unequal receipt of benefits in its division of property. A court 
is authorized to evaluate and provide for equity in its 
 
Security payment pursuant to § 659 exception for satisfaction of alimony support 
order); Cassello v. Cassello, No. FA104042807S, 2013 WL 3119433, at * 3 (Conn. 
Super. Ct. May 24, 2013) (citing In re Marriage of Schonts, 345 N.W.2d 145, 147 
(Iowa Ct. App. 1983)), which held that § 659 reinforces state law and reflects the 
importance that Congress attributes to support payments); Reffalt v. Reffalt, 
2010-CA-0103-COA (¶ 13), 94 So. 3d 1222, 1226–32 (Miss. Ct. App. 2011) 
(allowing Social Security allocation for alimony); Urbaniak v. Urbaniak, 2011 
S.D. 83, ¶¶ 23–24, 807 N.W.2d 621, 627–28 (holding that trial court did not err 
in merely considering Social Security benefits in determining whether an 
alimony award was appropriate, since such benefits are subject to garnishment 
under federal law). 
 497. See In re Marriage of Mueller, 2011 S.D. 83, ¶¶ 23–24, 34 N.E.3d 538, 545; 
Luttrell v. Luttrell, 10 N.E.3d 1002, 1003 (Ind. 2014) (David, J., dissenting); 
Lorenzen v. Lorenzen, 883 N.W.2d 292, 298 (Neb. 2016); Simmons v. Simmons, 
709 S.E.2d 666, 668 (S.C. 2011). 
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determination of alimony, based on the respective parties’ 
future financial circumstances. Indeed, Congress has 
already provided for this in the plain language of Section 659 
of the Social Security Act. 
Second, because a state court may still evaluate and 
satisfy the parties’ financial needs outside its determination 
of the equitable division of property, no state court 
determinations will directly affect the distribution and 
receipt of actual federal benefits by the intended 
beneficiary.498 Thus, state courts may consider and provide 
for the parties’ respective needs without affecting the 
security of the intended beneficiary spouse in receiving the 
protected benefits to which they are entitled under federal 
law. 
Finally, under a broad scope of federal preemption, the 
distribution of federal benefits is not affected by the 
idiosyncrasies of the various state property distribution 
laws. For example, consider the various titles and 
conceptualizations that state courts use to describe and 
justify the consideration of Social Security benefits in 
providing equity under their respective state property 
distribution schemes: direct offset;499 indirect offset;500 
 
 498. The irony, of course, is that an order to pay alimony based on the court’s 
consideration of the disparate receipt of Social Security affecting the parties’ 
future financial circumstances may “impair [the participant’s] economic security 
just as surely as would a regular deduction from his [or her] benefit check.” 
Johnson v. Johnson, 726 So. 2d 393, 396 n.4 (Fla Dist. Ct. App. 1999). Thus, the 
same logic that prohibits the consideration of Social Security benefits as affecting 
the division of marital property applies equally to the court’s determination of 
alimony and, therefore, potentially damages the federal scheme just as 
unconstitutionally. If the only source for paying an alimony award is Social 
Security, then calling it a monetary award based on need is no different than 
calling an offsetting property award based an “equitable consideration.” 
However, the trade–off may be the uniformity of application with which states 
may exercise their discretion to effectively offset the disparate receipt of Social 
Security benefits. 
 499. See supra text accompanying notes 142–43 (regarding Louisiana’s 
statutory provision allowing for offset with other marital property). 
 500. See supra Section II.B.1.b (regarding states allowing for offset with 
property received in lieu of Social Security). 
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hypothetical offset “in lieu of” Social Security;501 offset “in 
lieu of” Social Security using actual present value;502 
equitable consideration;503 “general adjustment;”504 and, 
alimony.505 Call it what you want. But, as the U.S. Supreme 
Court so clearly evaluated in Howell, we must cut through 
the many hollow semantic distinctions on which so many of 
the courts rely to “displace the federal rule and stand as an 
obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the 
purposes and objectives of Congress.”506 Rather, under a 
broad scope of preemption, courts of every state are limited 
to considering the disparate receipt of Social Security 
benefits only if it bears on the future financial needs of the 
parties within any given case, notwithstanding the 
application of individual state property distribution laws. 
Specifically for divorcing parties, there will remain 
additional issues and concerns under a broad scope of federal 
preemption. For example, although parties may not be able 
to enforce an agreement that includes a direct distribution or 
offset of Social Security benefits as part of the division of 
marital property, parties may agree to, and enforce, a 
monetary award based, in whole or in part, on each party’s 
anticipated Social Security as a source of income affecting 
their respective need for alimony. The parties would have to 
confront the same difficulty of the interdependence of 
 
 501. See supra Section II.B.1.b.i (regarding states allowing for offset using 
hypothetical value of Social Security). 
 502. See supra Section II.B.1.b.ii (regarding states allowing for offset using 
actual Social Security value). 
 503. See supra Section II.B.2 (regarding states prohibiting offset but allowing 
court to consider Social Security as one equitable factor bearing on the future 
financial circumstances of the parties). 
 504. See In re Marriage of Boyer, 538 N.W.2d 293, 296 (Iowa 1995). 
 505. See supra Section II.B.4 (regarding states foreclosing courts from 
considering Social Security in determining the appropriate distribution of 
marital property). 
 506. Howell v. Howell, 137 S. Ct. 1400, 1406 (2017). 
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alimony and property distribution,507 and the court would 
have to be satisfied that the parties were not falling victim 
to the temptation to simply exchange the rights and equities 
of property division for their respective need for alimony, 
which courts have cautioned against as improper,508 but 
there is nothing in the Court’s opinion in Howell, or in the 
courts’ opinions in Hurt and Mattson, which have interpreted 
and applied Howell, that would prevent the court from 
enforcing such agreements. In light of the differences among 
states on the law applied to this and other miscellaneous 
issues on which many courts disagree, such issues may be 
resolved in a manner that accommodates Congress’s clarified 
intended scope of preemption as the federal common law in 
this area develops. 
CONCLUSION 
The body of law that has developed around the scope of 
federal preemption under the Social Security Act has 
fragmented into a kaleidoscope of state court interpretation 
and the individual application of state property distribution 
laws that, in most cases, violates the Supremacy Clause of 
the U.S. Constitution. This development took root in 1989, 
after the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Mansell v. 
Mansell, and it has led to no less than seven different 
interpretations and applications of the scope of federal 
preemption under the Social Security Act by various states. 
Such variation continues to dilute the intended purposes of 
the Social Security Act and usurp the sovereignty of federal 
law, as defined by Congress. 
 
 507. See Wolfe v. Wolfe, 46 Ohio St. 2d 399, 411 (1976) (“most awards of 
property incident to a final divorce are readjustments of the party’s property 
rights, and . . . whether in the judgment such adjustment is called ‘alimony’ or 
‘division of property’ . . . has not been considered important . . . by parties, bench 
or bar.”), superseded by statute, Am. Sub. H.B. No. 358, 141 Ohio Laws, Part II, 
3388, 3389, as recognized in Morris v. Morris, 148 Ohio St. 3d 138, 2016-Ohio-
5002, 69 N.E.3d 664, at ¶¶ 23–24. 
 508. See Smith v. Smith, 2015 MT 256, ¶ 19, 381 Mont. 1, 358 P.3d 171. 
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In May 2017, in Howell v. Howell, the U.S. Supreme 
Court clarified what it perceives to be Congress’s intended 
scope of federal preemption for analogous federal benefit 
plans, but the Court’s holding was limited in scope and 
context, and its opinion, therefore, was merely predictive 
with respect to the scope of federal preemption under the 
Social Security Act. Consequently, we must rely on Congress 
to clarify its intent in this context. 
No clarification of congressional intent will eliminate all 
of the inequities inherent in the division of marital property 
upon divorce, particularly when the issue of federal 
preemption is a factor, but at least it will provide uniformity 
of application and expectation in the context of Social 
Security. Based on the Court’s analysis in Howell, it is likely 
that in the context of Social Security, Congress intends a 
broad scope of federal preemption. Even if this is not what 
Congress intends, it is time for Congress to say so. Until 
Congress clarifies its intent for the scope of federal 
preemption of Social Security benefits in divorce, however, 
most states will continue to apply their own state property 
distribution laws to compensate for the perceived inequities 
resulting from the application of federal law, and they will 
do so narrowly, without uniformity, arguably inequitably, 
and in most cases, unconstitutionally. 
